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Preface 
 
 
 
 
This book is the winner of the 2007 ASC/CODESRIA/NiZa Africa Thesis 
Award. The jury’s report included the following comments: 
 
The war in Sierra Leone lasted for 10 years and was characterized by egregious atrocities 
such as the mass killing of civilians, torture, sexual violence, the abduction of women and 
children, forced marriages, and the use of child soldiers. (…) Janneke chose to focus on the 
issue of the reintegration of young women who had been forced to join one of the fighting 
factions during the war as the ‘bush wives’ of combatants. What happened to these women 
when the conflict ended? What is the meaning of reintegration for these women in Sierra 
Leone from an anthropological perspective?  
Janneke spent six months in northern Sierra Leone where she interviewed women who 
had been abducted and forced to marry combatants in the RUF rebel group. Based on these 
interviews, she wrote this fascinating and very original study. In addition to interviews, she 
became involved in the personal lives of some of the women she met. The jury was im-
pressed by the high quality of both her theoretical and empirical research. This thesis is 
innovative and forces us to review our traditional scheme of thought.  
Unlike many studies on gender in post-conflict situations, it does not treat women as 
passive victims. And it shows us through a meticulous but never boring study that the 
women have a voice, and have ideas and strategies about how to continue to survive and 
build a new life for themselves after the end of the war in Sierra Leone. Here we are far from 
the clichés in which African women in the aftermath of war are perceived as victims waiting 
for some sort of providential external assistance. 
The thesis demonstrates how the social and cultural identity of these women as either 
daughters or wives influenced their decision to return or not to their former community and 
how they constantly have to negotiate their social identities in the community in order to 
integrate into new networks (by bonding and bridging). We should, however, bear in mind 
that these women’s choices are made in a context of extreme poverty and amid the total 
destruction of the social fabric. 
The study also highlights how post-conflict policies developed by NGOs, international 
organizations and national institutions are not always effective because they fail to under-
stand the dynamics and persist in imposing what they think is right on their ‘clients’. For 
instance, most of these bush wives were excluded from the Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) programme because it simply ignored the key social role they had 
played within the rebel movement and the way they had negotiated this role. 
The thesis demonstrates how, contrary to popular belief, women can reintegrate by them-
selves and do not need to be reintegrated by anyone else. The best way to assist them is to 
understand this and listen to their voices. This requires humility and openness from all those 
involved. Janneke has undoubtedly shown this ability. 
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A preliminary exploration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
“Do you know why we wear these?” the girl in the compound asks while she stirs the rice in 
the big blackened pot on the fire. She lifts up part of her lappa1 and shows the tight cotton 
knee-length pants she is wearing underneath. “It’s because of the war, you know. We started 
wearing these so that if the rebels came to attack we were able to run … we wear these so 
you do not get naked while running …. And now we got used to wearing them …” 
“This war was a demand for social change” was the answer I received many 
times when talking to people in Sierra Leone about what they thought the war in 
their country had been about. The civil war in Sierra Leone, a small West African 
country with a population of approximately five million and rich in natural 
resources, was brought to the world’s attention through images of child soldiers – 
drugged teenagers carrying machine guns – who were said to be responsible for 
widespread and cruel atrocities in the form of amputations and sexual violence. 
Directed by a couple of young men bearing a grudge against those in power they 
threw the country into ten years of devastatingly brutal conflict. And it was said, 
it was all about getting the diamonds. Both the image and the explanation are 
oversimplified. Contemporary African wars are more complicated than this. In 
the case of Sierra Leone, after ten years of fighting, the final peace agreement 
was signed and the war was officially declared over in January 2002.2 The largest 
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 Lappa is the Krio word for a piece of cotton cloth, often worn by women wrapped around their bodies 
as a skirt. 
2 
 The first peace accord between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF (Revolutionary United 
Front) was signed on 30 November 1996. The Lomé Accord, signed on 7 July 1999, was a second 
attempt to put the conflict on hold. It was not until January 2002 that the war was officially declared 
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UN peacekeeping force ever3 was already installed and reconstruction, rehabili-
tation and reintegration could start.  
It is not the aim of this thesis to give an overall explanation of the motives 
and rationale that fuelled this war. As the sub-title suggests, the general focus is 
on issues of gender, youth and reintegration in its aftermath. Young people, 
children and youth, male and female, were a significant part of the fighting forces 
during the war. Often pictured as innocent victims, they have attracted much 
attention from international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multi-
lateral organisations representing the international community and researchers 
from various academic disciplines. Psychologists, for example, are particularly 
interested in the effect of participation in violent conflict on individual 
psychological development and mental health. The human rights movement 
addresses the issue of using children in conflict, seeing it as a violation of their 
fundamental rights, and at the same time is trying hard to establish guidelines on 
how to treat children before the law, as perpetrators or victims (see, for example, 
HRW 2003; AI 2000; Ferme & Hoffmann 2002). In addition to these psycho-
logical and legal perspectives, this study aims to provide a social and cultural 
framework that focuses on reintegration defined as the re-establishment of social 
relations.  
This thesis is based on the results of both a literature study and empirical data 
gathered during six months of fieldwork in northern Sierra Leone. Both the 
research and the writing have been done to fulfil the requirements of a Master’s 
degree in Cultural and Social Anthropology at Utrecht University in the 
Netherlands. The central theme and objectives are rooted in my personal desire to 
conduct an anthropological study in the field of conflict resolution and peace 
building. I wanted to focus on finding some possible answers to the broad 
question of how people manage to live together and rebuild a society when 
conflict has broken down the social structure and groups within the community 
have become enemies. So one could say that my aim was to gain insight into the 
way a conflict can bring about social and cultural transformation.  
It is tempting to consider youth participation as a symptom of the cruelty of 
rebel movements. For this study, however, I have chosen to adopt the view that it 
could also be seen as the outcome of cultural and social exclusion prior to the 
conflict and that this made the youth vulnerable to recruitment (see, for example, 
Richards 1995; Veale & Stavrou 2004). With particular reference to the 
                                               
 
over. This shows that a peace process often does not follow a straight line but develops in cycles, 
during which relapses into violence occur.  
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 On 22 October 1999 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL (UN 
Assistance Mission Sierra Leone). Eventually its maximum authorized strength was 17,500 including 
260 military observers and 170 civilian police (Malan et al. 2003). 
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reintegration of youth, it is important to realize this if one wants to understand 
whether or not youth are reintegrating into situations that contributed to their 
participation in the first place. Reintegration studies are often linked to 
reintegration programmes. No matter how informative and valuable this kind of 
research is, it does not bring into focus those who fall outside these programmes, 
nor does it provide information on how reintegration actually proceeds after the 
programmes have finished. The focus in this thesis is therefore not on the policy 
discourse on reintegration but on reintegration as seen from the perspective of the 
individual who is reintegrating in relation to his/her social and cultural context. 
The youth factor is present in much of the literature on the subject of civil 
conflict in Africa. However, it is clear from the literature that although the 
involvement of children in conflict is a legitimate concern, it is the social 
category of youth that tends to grow into a political force of influence and 
significance in Africa and therefore should be at the heart of reintegration 
programmes and peace building. The ambiguity or hybrid and somewhat vague 
characteristics of the social category of youth make it a special challenge to focus 
on if one wants to use the concept of social identities and explore the space for 
negotiation. What I found striking though is that youth is often presented as 
being gender-neutral and most studies on youth and conflict do not include a 
gender-specific perspective. While having registered this, it was not until I went 
into the field that I realized that the reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone 
also had been gender biased and, because of that, had to a large extent excluded 
women affiliated with the fighting forces in non-combatant roles. For this reason 
I decided to make their reintegration the central focus of this study. Two 
questions directed data collection and analysis in the field: 
(1) How do young women and girls who were previously associated with the 
fighting forces (re-)establish relations with the communities they now live in?  
(2) How do the social identities of youth and female gender affect the course of 
reintegration as seen from individual life experiences at a community level? 
In the world of NGO policy as well as in the literature, the victim-perpetrator 
dichotomy can still be found, with the victim usually being female and the 
perpetrator male. However, women do also take on the role of fighter in certain 
situations or they become part of a rebel movement through different non-
combatant roles. In such cases, the community might consider them to be ‘guilty 
by association’ and the victim-perpetrator distinction is not as clear as it might 
initially seem. Informants’ accounts in this study show that once captured and 
taken into the bush by rebels, women do not always comply with the role of 
passive victim. They develop survival strategies and take on different kinds of 
roles and tasks. By linking reintegration with social and cultural identities, I have 
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attempted to adopt a gender perspective in this particular process. The objective 
is to understand the ways women reintegrate in their community and in the wake 
of this process negotiate, reproduce and transform their gender identities and 
related social roles.  
The relevance of this thesis lies in its exploration of the more or less 
autonomous or spontaneous reintegration of a group that has been to a large 
extent invisible until recently. It is primarily made up of young women who are 
affiliated in such a way with rebel movements that they often fall outside official 
policy or reintegration programmes. The central hypothesis is that people reinte-
grate into society in the aftermath of war, while the challenge is to understand 
how they do this in relation to the social and cultural context.  
At the time of writing, the Special Court4 in Sierra Leone has started legal 
proceedings. The enforcement of marriage between combatants in the Revolu-
tionary United Front (RUF) and captured young women is included in its indict-
ments.5 One of the reasons behind the setting up of the Special Court is that if 
those held responsible for the atrocities committed during the war are brought to 
trial, this will contribute to the process of social reconstruction and reconcili-
ation. This thesis tries to shed some light on the way forced marriages might be 
understood from an actor-oriented perspective in the course of conflict and 
reintegration. In an attempt to refrain from making moral judgments, the data and 
analysis will show that, in the context of civil war, the distinction between victim 
and perpetrator, suppression and survival is often difficult to make and certainly 
not fixed or consistent. 
Reintegration is a process influenced by many factors and occurs over a long 
period of time. A fieldwork period of six months can only try to capture part of 
this. It was never my intention to assess whether the reintegration process of 
these women succeeded or not but to provide insight into the way the process 
was continuing up until the time when I left the field. This means that while 
reading this thesis one should take into account the fact that the processes 
described are still ongoing. I certainly do not profess to be writing a thesis that is 
either inclusive or conclusive, but I do want to consider a highly relevant area of 
study. 
Prevalence and recruitment 
Active involvement of young people in armed conflict is a worldwide phenome-
non. According to estimates by The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 
over 120,000 children are participating in conflicts on the African continent. 
Some of the countries best known for using children in combat are Angola, the 
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 The international tribunal for the Sierra Leone war.  
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 Personal communication with Prof. G.G.J. Knoops, 5 April 2004. 
5 
  
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone.6 The 
last two in particular caught the international community’s attention with stories 
of amputations and other atrocities committed by children and teenagers dressed 
in rags and decorated with amulets who were carrying machine guns and were 
under the influence of magic rituals and drugs. The tendency to make a dis-
tinction between child soldiers and ‘regular’ combatants and the general indigna-
tion it provokes are related to the notion that fighting a war and participation in 
combat should be reserved for adults. Adulthood is therefore often defined by an 
absolute age bracket.  
In the case of Sierra Leone, it is estimated that 5,000 children and teenagers 
were actually involved in the civil war as combatants and another 5,000 were 
used for related activities within the forces (Ibid.; Zack-Williams 2001: 73; 
Wessels 2002: 245). Although this focus on the use of children in conflict is 
recent – the recruitment of child soldiers is for the first time in history explicitly 
included in indictments by the Special Court in Sierra Leone – the phenomenon 
itself is not. In medieval Europe, children were trained as knights and in the 13th 
century they participated in the Crusades (Wessels 2002: 238). Children in 
African societies moved through different life phases that were marked by 
initiation rituals before entering adulthood. To become a warrior, one had to have 
reached the stage of an adult but that does not exclude the fact that adulthood was 
reached at an earlier age than that of 18, the current standard used by the 
international community. It is known that teenagers fought together with their 
fathers the same way they worked the land together (Wessels 2002: 238; Stavrou 
& Stewart 2000: 39-40). Comparative studies show that young people in contem-
porary armed conflict sometimes become involved from as young as eight years 
old (Peters & Richards 1998: 183; Wessels 2002: 246). It is also suggested that 
the increasing availability of small arms contributed to the use of children in 
conflict (Stohl 2002: 20-21). Children, teenagers and adolescents are no longer 
affected by war just as victims and, as the numbers show, their participation − 
either voluntarily or enforced − cannot be ignored.  
As far as the participation of children in conflict is concerned, the general 
assumption is that they are recruited because they are easier to manipulate. It is 
suggested that they can be programmed to do what is asked in fighting and to do 
it with less fear and reluctance. Their moral status is still to be developed 
(Honwana 1999: 6; Thompson 1999: 193) and children are easier to control than 
adults. They have more energy, are more vulnerable to propaganda and tend to 
obey orders. They have fewer skills and knowledge to survive on their own and it 
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 http://www.child-soldier.org, 11 May 2003. This particular figure is the most widely used regarding 
estimates of child combatants worldwide. Unfortunately, the kind of data it is based on is unclear. 
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is therefore less likely that they will try to escape (Thompson 1999: 193). In so-
called bush wars, children have a physical advantage when moving about in 
densely overgrown areas (Richards 2002).  
The actual form of recruitment is highly contextual and can be very different 
between countries, regions, conflicts and even the time or phase of a conflict. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make a broad distinction between those who are 
captured and thus the victims of enforced recruitment and those who more or less 
voluntarily tag along with fighting groups. Apparent forced recruitment often 
happens during village raids, sometimes organized specifically for this purpose 
and during which land and material is destroyed, inhabitants are murdered or 
mutilated, and children and young people are taken. Sometimes the village chief 
is forced to hand over some of the village youth. Examples of these mostly cruel 
forms of recruitment come from the wars in Uganda, Angola and Mozambique. 
In Sierra Leone the youth was mainly recruited by the RUF and the CDF (Civil 
Defence Forces). Methods of recruitment varied depending on movement and 
local situation and both groups used forced recruitment and voluntary con-
scription. Forced recruitment through abduction was often combined with the 
branding of children. Sometimes they were forced to mutilate relatives before 
pulling back into the bush. Drugs such as marijuana and crack made fear 
disappear and made the combatants more aggressive. While in the bush, terror 
was used to make youth comply with the group. 
Some of the recruits also tagged along more or less voluntarily in an attempt 
to survive, trying to find food, shelter and protection (Richards 1995, 2002; 
Peters & Richards 1998; Wessels 2002). This partially voluntary conscription of 
youth is another way they can become involved in armed conflict. But it is a kind 
of voluntarism that asks for a closer look. It should not be understood as a 
rational or conscious choice based on political aims or ideology, with a clear 
view of the consequences. Youth join as a means of survival in a given social 
reality. Richards (2002) calls this sort of person a volunteer by circumstances – 
the circumstances turn involvement in armed conflict or affiliation with a rebel 
movement into one of the options in life for youth. These circumstances involve 
peer group pressure as well as basic economic survival. Participation means 
access to clothing, food and protection (Wessels 2002: 246-247; Maxted 2003: 
61-62). At the same time, young people are searching for alternatives for the 
breakdown in social networks and parental guidance in the course of conflict 
(Zack-Williams 2001: 78-79; Richards 2002). Children and youth are capable – 
at least to a certain extent – of making choices in order to survive within given 
social circumstances. These are choices that they often defend with a great deal 
of verve, as shown in interviews with (ex-)combatants in Sierra Leone (Peters & 
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Richards 1998).7 Youths affiliated to one of the fighting forces in Sierra Leone 
give varying reasons for fighting, such as improvement of and better access to 
education (RUF) or defending their country (CDF). Their underlying motives are 
revenge or survival (Ibid.: 186-187; Peters 2004). Youth are pulled into violent 
conflict as a result of a combination of violent recruitment, survival strategies 
and personal motives. These youth are not simply victims of others, nor are their 
choices purely rational.  
Although fewer in number, girls and young women are also found in the 
fighting forces, usually having been recruited in the same way as the boys. It has 
been suggested that voluntarily conscription is less common among girls because 
the role of combatant does not easily fit existing gender perspectives and 
therefore it is not a clear survival option for girls. Not much is known about the 
specific problems women and girls experience during and after violent conflict, 
especially women within the fighting forces and specifically young women or 
girls. Some researchers (e.g. McKay & Mazurana 2004) rightfully state that 
movies, documentaries and literature on the subject of child soldiers tend to 
present their information as gender-neutral, but are in fact implicitly gender-
biased towards young men and boys, picturing women as helpless victims or 
placing them merely in their reproductive role. It is true that girls are often used 
in conflict for the same tasks as boys are, especially the young ones who are still 
seen as children. They are porters, messengers and look-outs (Machel 1996; 
Wessels 2002: 237).  
However, existing notions on gender-related labour and gender relations are 
frequently reconstructed within the social relations in such a rebel movement or 
group (West 2000). This results in boys and men taking a dominant position and 
girls and women taking on additional domestic and reproductive tasks. Girls are 
therefore more prone to becoming victims of sexual exploitation and forced 
marriages, the latter with higher-ranked men. In Mozambique, RENAMU ‘gave 
away’ girls to fighters as a reward for good behaviour (Thompson 1999: 193). 
Schafer (2001: 232-233) states that in Mozambique a distinction was made in 
attitudes towards women attached to a specific group and women associated with 
the opponent. The former were protected and relationships between combatants 
and civilian women were discouraged. The opponent’s women, on the other 
hand, were at risk of becoming victims of gender-based violence. The Sierra 
Leonean women at the centre of this thesis were all involved in some sort of 
relationship with the men who had captured them. Because of various forms of 
sexual abuse, girls are at higher risk and face serious health problems related to 
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 In his novel Allah n’est pas obligé, Kourouma (2000/2001) describes the life of young Birahima who 
travels from Ivory Coast to Sierra Leone in search of his aunt while keeping himself alive as a child 
fighter. Although it is fiction, the story appears to be an attempt to show how this might influence the 
way their lives are shaped. 
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pregnancy, HIV infection and other sexually transmitted diseases. In the coming 
chapters I argue that the fact that they were captured as children or young girls 
and were subsequently forced into a relationship with men in the rebel movement 
during the war has made them more mature in a cultural sense, which means their 
social and cultural reintegration can be even more problematic.  
Perspectives on reintegration 
Reintegration can be explained as the reinsertion of a part into a whole, or the 
process of recovery in a well-functioning unity. The reintegration of combatants 
means their transfer from the field of military or fighting forces to any other 
social domain or category. For the individual, it refers to the transformation from 
combatant to civilian and moving from fighting forces back into a community of 
civilians. In contemporary civil wars, the distinction between civilians and com-
batants is not always clear, nor is the distinction between perpetrator and victim 
which, I believe, complicates the process and meaning of reintegration.  
Once an armed conflict has formally ended, reconstruction and reintegration 
can start. Ball (1996: 615-617) states that activities in a post-conflict context are 
directed towards three main fields. First there is society’s institutional rehabili-
tation, such as the reinstallation of governmental administration. The second 
direction is restoring national security and order. This includes the demobiliza-
tion of former combatants and often the reform of the military and police forces. 
The third domain of attention is socio-economic recovery, which includes the 
reconstruction of basic infrastructure like health care, education, water and sani-
tation, and telecommunication networks. It also includes the social reinsertion of 
various groups like refugees and ex-combatants. In this framework Ball (1997: 
86-91) uses reintegration in a very strict sense. She employs the term to refer to 
the reinsertion of former combatants into society and their regaining of financial 
independence by productive labour. In practice, this means demobilization and 
providing ex-combatants with food, clothing, shelter, possibly land, tools and 
starting capital. In the long term, one could also include education and training, 
credit facilities and employment projects. Everything is put in motion to take 
combatants out of the military and place them back in civilian structures. 
Obviously this can only work if there is some sort of two-way traffic between ex-
combatants and the communities they are returning to. This can be achieved by 
organizing reintegration programmes in such a way that they benefit communi-
ties as well as individual combatants.  
What has to be done in relation to peace building is linked to the kind of 
peace that is envisaged. Negative peace, by which we mean the absence of vio-
lence, can be achieved by preventing a conflict from relapsing and by stopping 
combatants from picking, up their guns. This means giving priority to disarma-
9 
  
ment and demobilization. Positive peace targets the root causes of a conflict. To 
create sustainable peace, processes of social reconstruction and reconciliation 
play an important role as well as the overall recovery of society and social 
change in relation to the possible underlying causes of the conflict (Miall et al. 
1999: 186-188). This approach more explicitly points towards psychosocial 
recovery in addition to material rehabilitation. 
Three main issues emerge in the literature regarding the reintegration of 
teenagers and child soldiers. First, there is the importance of providing a social-
economic base for reintegration, which is little different for children than for 
adult combatants. They need to be provided with shelter, food, clothing, educa-
tion and, depending on their age, with economically productive work (Honwana 
2002: 76-77).  
Secondly, a great deal of attention has been paid to the actual experiences 
young people went through during the conflict and the possible traumatization 
these may have induced. This is often what triggers the discussion on the use of 
western psychology and the notion of individual psychological trauma in the 
African context. There is a difference between the common use of the word 
trauma, by which in general we mean the experience of a shocking event which 
may have a negative effect on our psychological well-being and what is referred 
to as the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This is the expression used in 
psychiatry to describe a serious condition that can occur when coping mecha-
nisms fail and the experience and memories of a disturbing event keep haunting 
someone, causing stress to such an extent that it affects their total well-being and 
functioning. It is evident that child soldiers have experienced situations that will 
affect their psychological well-being. They have often witnessed extreme acts of 
violence, either as the perpetrator or as a victim. They have lost important people 
in their lives and found themselves in a situation where basic survival has been 
their first priority. Girls and young women have often become the victims of 
gender-based violence but this does not mean they all necessarily develop PTSD. 
Drawing on case studies in Angola and Mozambique, Gibbs (1997), Thompson 
(1999) and Honwana (1999) all warn of the pitfalls of indiscriminately copying 
western notions of trauma. These notions take the individual and his/her 
individual experiences as the central focal point. Gibbs (1999) argues that coping 
with the experiences of war in Mozambique took place within the interaction 
between the individual and the community. Jackson (2004: 71-72) concluded, 
when visiting Sierra Leone during the aftermath of the war: “Rather, suffering 
was seen as something shared, and healing was sought not through therapy but in 
things. Not through words, but deeds. Fees to send children to school. Cement 
and roofing iron to rebuild houses. Grain. Micro-credit. Food. Medicines.” 
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To bring the use of western notions of trauma into question does not suggest 
there is such a thing as immunity from the effects of certain events on the 
psychological well-being of people who have long lived in a context of violence. 
It is about acknowledging that the meanings these experiences are given are 
closely related to the cultural context in which they occur (West 2000: 181). It is 
also an attempt not to step into the pitfall of medicalizing an entire population. A 
detailed discussion of trauma goes beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important, 
however, to state that the subject is often considered in relation to the reinte-
gration of child soldiers, probably because the issue becomes important at the 
same time. Post-trauma treatment often starts when child soldiers are being dis-
connected from the fighting forces. Of course, psychological well-being and 
coping with experiences of war have their place in the post-conflict recovery of a 
country and its people but, in my opinion, reintegration cannot be reduced to only 
a psychological dimension. While psychology defines post-conflict processes in 
individual objectives, reintegration should imply an interaction between indivi-
dual and community. 
The third central issue in the literature on the reintegration of children and 
youth combatants is a focus on the moment of reinsertion in the community. This 
is the short time period during which the child is disconnected from the fighting 
forces and handed over to the community he/she came from. To a large extent, 
experiences of conflict are dealt with by active participation in society’s 
reconstruction, sometimes supported by rituals. This is precisely why Machel 
(1996: 55) argues in favour of placing children and youth at the centre of reinte-
gration processes and adjusting the process to their specific needs. Attention for 
children and youth in reintegration might be expected to be present in the policies 
and programmes designed for this process. However, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW 2003) stated that child soldiers and youth ex-combatants are more or less 
absent in the demobilization and reintegration programmes in Angola. Further-
more, women and girls often miss connection with these programmes (Shepler 
2002; de Watteville 2002; McKay & Mazurana 2004).  
Studies on culturally specific ways of reintegrating youth combatants into 
local communities in Angola and Mozambique show that individuals are located 
in a chain of generations and in the history of the community. The community as 
a whole therefore carries responsibility for the fact that their children ended up in 
this situation. Rituals aimed at the construction of a symbolic break with recent 
events sometimes support this. They also are meant to confirm relations with the 
present and generate purification and reconciliation (Nordstrom 1997: 145-147; 
Gibbs 1997; Honwana 1999: 10-12). It remains unclear how widespread and 
common these rituals actually are in countries in post-war conditions.  
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As mentioned earlier, most research carried out on the reintegration of child 
soldiers has been done within reintegration programmes and projects. This might 
explain why so much attention has been given to their experiences during the 
conflict and the way they deal with these. Attention on reintegration appears to 
be focused predominantly on the moment of return to a community. What 
happens after reunification or some time after the end of war remains under-
represented in the literature on child soldiers in Africa. Some researchers do 
mention processes of negotiation and redefining these children’s identities (Hon-
wana 1999) but how communities perceive these children and young women 
over a longer period of time seems to be beyond the horizon of NGOs and 
academics.  
To continue… 
This thesis continues with Chapter 2, which focuses on the theoretical framework 
that supports the analysis of reintegration as a social process of (re-) establishing 
relations. In Chapter 3 I elaborate on several issues regarding my fieldwork, the 
methods used and some of the ethical choices I made. The following two 
chapters are an exploration of the two social identities that feature in this study 
and the influence they might have on reintegration. Chapter 4 looks at the 
meaning of the social identity ‘youth’ in relation to violent conflict in Sierra 
Leone and post-conflict transformation. In Chapter 5 the focus is on gender and 
the position of women and their roles in the context of violent conflict. Chapters 
6 and 7 concentrate on reintegration as it evolves in day-to-day life of individual 
women in an urban and rural context. In Chapter 8 I conclude this thesis and 
answer the question about the meaning of gender and youth for reintegration in 
Sierra Leone. In addition, I explain what this study has shown about two 
characteristics of reintegration from an anthropological perspective.  
To ensure that the participants’ privacy is protected in this thesis, I have 
either altered people’s names or just left them out completely from the interview 
fragments. Because the village in which I gathered additional data is a small 
community, I have chosen not to mention its name at all. I took all the photo-
graphs included in this thesis during my fieldwork period in Sierra Leone. 
However, none of the people in these pictures have actively participated in my 
research. 
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Social organization, social identity  
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Introduction 
Reintegration was defined in the previous chapter as a dynamic process that 
revolves around the (re-)establishment of relations between the individual and 
social networks, and contains – implicitly or explicitly – a negotiation of social 
and cultural identities. This process implies interaction between the individual 
who is reintegrating and the community of relevance. People do not reintegrate 
into society as such. As individuals, they form relationships with other indi-
viduals, creating or participating in groups and networks based on the individual 
and his/her social identity. Between these groups and networks, relations exist 
through which the society’s social fabric – social structure composed of cross-
cutting social relations between people and groups of people – is woven. In the 
wake of conflict and post-conflict reintegration, elements of social structure are 
either reproduced or transformed by participants in the process and correspond-
ing cultural meanings are confirmed or altered. An anthropological point of view 
of reintegration trying to grasp the individual’s interaction with the social and 
cultural context includes cultural discourse on relevant social networks, social 
categories and social identities, as well as the individual’s agency.  
This chapter offers a theoretical exploration of the central elements in such a 
perspective on reintegration. The aim is to clarify the meaning of social organi-
zation, social identity and agency in a post-conflict context and to use these 
notions in an analytical model of social and cultural reintegration processes. 
Although in this thesis reintegration and its implied interaction is looked at from 
14 
 
the individual’s position in relation to his/her surrounding community and 
society (the individual who reintegrates into a larger entity), I elaborate on these 
elements in reverse order in this chapter. The following section explores some 
features of social organization that are of relevance in a post-conflict context and 
reintegration processes. In the next section the focus is on the connection be-
tween the individual and the social and cultural context through the construction 
of social and cultural identities. The following section aims at balancing structure 
and actor orientation by introducing the concept of agency. In the final section, 
the theoretical themes are related to reintegration and placed in an analytical 
model used to consider the empirical data. 
Social organization 
During a civil war much of a society’s social fabric is damaged and later needs to 
be restored. The word ‘restoration’ reflects the wish that is often expressed, once 
a crisis has come to an end, of getting things back to normal. Although my 
interest in this thesis is indeed in the relationship between social fabric and the 
way it is affected by civil conflict, I prefer to use the word ‘transformation’ to 
indicate these social changes. This choice reflects more than semantic issues. It is 
an attempt to acknowledge the social reality that, after prolonged civil conflict, 
society can never go back to the way it was before. At the same time, it denotes a 
neutral movement and thus rejects a static understanding of the social organiza-
tion of a society. The use of the word transformation reflects a dynamic percep-
tion of social processes free of a moral opinion on whether the changes these 
processes induce are either desired or unwanted. 
While the social fabric is transformed due to civil conflict and because social 
relations between different groups are jeopardized, broken or become hostile, 
what is indeed lost or damaged as a result is commonly referred to as social 
capital (e.g. Colletta & Cullen 2000). Using social capital as a concept itself in 
qualitative studies is problematic because it “has not been nailed down suffi-
ciently to be useable” (Dasgupta & Serageldin 1999: xi). While it emerged from 
cooperation between economics and social sciences as an attempt to explore the 
interaction between the way society works and the way the economy works, 
social capital as a concept has been adopted by many and given different mean-
ings depending on what one wants to explore (Ibid.: 7). The general consensus, 
however, appears to be that social capital refers to a social organization’s poten-
tial to generate collective action (Richards et al. 2004: 7) or “mutually beneficial 
collective action” (Uphoff 2000: 1876). Social capital is often perceived as the 
abstract production of social networks and social relations (Woolcock 1998: 
153). Hence, social capital benefits not only the individual but also the collective 
it arises from. One element that frequently remains unclear when defining social 
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capital is whether it refers to the social relations themselves or to what these 
relations mediate (Ibid.: 156).  
Further elaboration on the debate on social capital and its conceptual meaning 
will not contribute substantially to this study and the term social capital itself is 
therefore not used again as it is too much a container concept. This analysis 
needs a more specific approach. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned critique, 
two models of social capital enlighten certain features of social organization in a 
way that is particularly relevant in the theoretical approach of – post-conflict – 
reintegration as a process of re-establishing social relations.  
Uphoff (2000) states that social capital is – in line with other forms of capital 
– an asset that exists in either structural or cognitive forms. Structural forms are 
social roles, procedures and networks that establish ongoing patterns of social 
interaction and facilitate mutually beneficial collective action. Those structural 
elements are relatively external and objectified and are therefore observable. 
Cognitive forms encompass norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that predispose 
people to cooperate and are thus conducive to collective action. Cognitive 
elements are more internally present and subjective and, although carried out 
individually, are often shared within the (sub-)culture. Examples of this are 
norms of reciprocity, attitudes of solidarity and beliefs in fairness that turn 
collective and social action into expected behaviour (Uphoff 2000: 1876-1877; 
Coletta & Cullen 2000: 10-11). It is clear that these abstract features, by shaping 
social relations and interaction in society, come under pressure from protracted 
civil conflict.  
Woolcock’s (1998) model offers opportunities to further analyze the struc-
tural features of social organization. This model distinguishes between two forms 
of social organization in terms of who is included in the relationship. Woolcock 
(1998: 164) initially differentiates between ‘embeddedness’ and ‘autonomy’ and 
between a micro (inter- and extra-community dynamics) and macro (state-
community interaction) level at which they are employed. The micro level in 
particular falls within the scope of this study because of its compatibility with the 
perspective of the individual-community social and cultural reintegration pro-
cess. ‘Embeddedness’ at the micro level refers to the individual’s integration into 
social networks and induces bonding, inter-community social ties between mem-
bers. Strong bonding networks are, for example, based on kinship, religion and 
ethnicity (Colletta & Cullen 2000: 14). ‘Autonomy’ manifests itself at the micro 
level in bridging extra-community relations between social networks and groups, 
referred to by Woolcock as linkage (1998: 168). For example, within a village 
community, individuals are integrated in kinship networks (bonding) and fami-
lies are connected to each other through marriages within the village. Ethnic bor-
ders might be crossed through participation in religious institutions (bridging). It 
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seems that linkage is often the result of the socially beneficial interaction of 
groups and networks and is mediated by individuals’ integration in different 
networks, groups and categories at the same time.  
Woolcock explores the forms in which social organization manifests itself at 
a certain level of social cohesion. The outcome is the result of co-existing levels 
of linkage and integration. High levels of integration and linkage offer social 
opportunity and here we find the mutually collective benefits mentioned related 
to social capital. But strong bonding organization (integration) together with low 
linkage levels (bridging relations) means that social cohesion does not reach 
beyond the social network itself (Ibid.: 171-175). This might cause group 
members to be indifferent or even openly hostile towards other networks within 
the community. According to Colletta & Cullen (2000: 15-16), “the absence of 
horizontal relations – of cross cutting ties between unlike groups […] – can erupt 
into hostilities if one group is seen as monopolizing resources and power to the 
disadvantage of the others.” Rebel groups, like the RUF in Sierra Leone often 
reflect such an excluded position in society and can be seen as reacting to 
unequal power relations embedded in social organization. In their own way of 
organizing, they not uncommonly represent strong bonding based on loyalty or 
force, and reject or jeopardize linking relations or actively demonstrate a 
destructive or negative attitude to extra-community interaction. With this in 
mind, a post-conflict demobilization then means breaking down the existing 
bonding relations that hold together the rebel group. Subsequently, reintegration 
means the reintegration of former rebels or combatants into non-conflict-related 
bonding groups that have the potential to participate in bridging relations with 
other groups in society. Cognitive forms of social relations, as referred to by 
Uphoff (2000), influence the ability of this process to succeed because they 
determine whether people and groups are willing to maintain such relations.  
Social identity 
Following this focus on features of social organization, this section addresses an 
understanding of the mutually shaping connection between the individual and 
forms of social organization. To be part of a group or a member of a collective 
offers human beings an important foundation for self-definition as well as a 
definition of other people. People do not only perceive themselves as a total of 
individual characteristics since part of their identity – the notion of who we are – 
derives from belonging to a social category (e.g. ethnicity or gender), fulfilment 
of a relational role (e.g. mother, husband) or membership of a certain organiza-
tion or institution (e.g. church, political party) (Deaux et al. 1995). These are all 
examples of social identity and can be understood as the part of us that exists in 
relation to our social surroundings. Social identities are often seen as the bridge 
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between the individual and society, between actor and structure (Jenkins 1996: 
Hogg et al. 1995; Verkuyten 1999).  
In the social-science debate, two perspectives on social identity act as a link 
between the individual and their social context. The first perspective defines 
social identity as the social roles that we fulfil in interaction with others. Who we 
are is the sum of these roles. Who I am is always defined by my relations with 
others and is therefore inherently socially constructed. Indeed I cannot be without 
a social role as, without exception, I relate to others in a social context. The 
essential meaning of a social role only exists in interaction with the ‘counter role’ 
(Hogg et al. 1995: 257). One can only be a daughter in interaction with parents; a 
sister in relation to siblings; and it makes a difference whether I am a researcher 
in relation to other scholars or in interaction with informants. These social roles 
place the individual in a network made up of personal relations with others.  
The second perspective on social identity has its roots in social psychology 
and attempts to give insight into group processes and relations between groups. It 
argues that the social categories to which we belong define who we are socially. 
Examples of this are gender, ethnicity and social categories constructed around 
age. Our social identity is, according to this perspective, the sum of all the 
characteristics of all the social categories to which we belong. Social identity 
related to social category can be an ascribed status but can also come from self-
identification. The social structure to which the individual is linked in this line of 
reasoning is composed of all the different social groups and categories in a 
society (Ibid.: 259-260). 
Both perspectives offer an explanation as to who we are socially and, while 
doing so, social structure is defined at a different level. The first underlines the 
individual and their social identity based on direct relations with others. The 
second is more focused on larger networks of which the individual is a part and 
stresses the social identity related to social categorization and group membership 
(Hogg et al. 1995: 259-260). In this study, both forms of social identity are seen 
to be relevant in examining reintegration processes. Social identity in the broad 
sense – the socially constructed self – cannot, in accordance with an individual’s 
social reality, be reduced to either the sum of role fulfilment or the embodiment 
of social categories and group membership. In exploring reintegration, the (re-) 
establishment of social relations is examined at different contextual levels, 
namely individual, community and society.1 At these levels, different forms of 
social identities become more prominent but none of them is fully excluded at 
each level. Social category identities, like female gender and youth, reflect the 
dimension of society and general cultural discourse. At the community and 
                                               
1 
 What exactly is meant by these levels is explained in the last section of this chapter where the 
analytical model is presented. 
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individual level these categories become more personalized through the way they 
shape individuals’ social relations and experiences within the community. At the 
individual level, which encompasses the individual’s personal life experiences 
and personal interaction with others, the actual fulfilment of social role identities 
becomes more prominent because these are directly linked to relations between 
persons instead of between groups or categories. 
Individuals belong to different categories and have different social roles that 
lead to multiple social identities. These different social identities can mutually 
influence each other within and between the two forms of social identity (e.g. 
gender identity shapes being a parent, religious identity shapes gender identity). 
Society’s social fabric is at least partly embodied by individuals having multiple 
social identities. Individuals as persons never have only one social identity and, 
depending on the context, there may be shifts in the dominance and relevance of 
certain social identities. This provides space for reintegration because it offers 
individuals room to identify with certain social identities while they may actively 
dissociate from other identities. It also offers others the opportunity to perceive 
individuals in different social identities. The intersectional influence between 
youth and gender is one of the themes in this study. 
The specific intrinsic meaning of a social identity within a certain society or 
cultural context can rarely be automatically or completely deduced from the 
social position or the property it represents. Social identities have a cultural 
dimension that reflects the connection with the cultural context. We can clarify 
this with the example of gender (category-identity) and motherhood (role-
identity). Gender refers to the culturally constructed and perceived difference 
based on the biological property of sex (male-female). Motherhood points to the 
relationship between a woman and her children. The cultural role-identity of 
motherhood stretches far beyond the biological or social relations between the 
mother and her offspring, notwithstanding the fact that the cultural meaning of 
motherhood is often presented as the obvious and natural way things are 
supposed to be. The biological and social relations of motherhood are universal, 
the underlying notions and meanings are culturally specific and thus vary through 
time, space and context. This changeability offers space for negotiation on the 
cultural content and meaning of social identities that is either implicitly or 
explicitly part of the social reintegration processes. 
Social identities are often connected to access to resources and assets in the 
broadest sense (Jenkins 1996: 39). The positions in the social landscape that 
social identities represent are therefore not neutral. The relationship between 
these positions is one of power distribution and the cultural content frequently 
serves to support such power relations. An example is the way access to land in 
Sierra Leone is arranged through gender-based kinship relations. The genera-
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tional conflict regarding the social exclusion of youth in Sierra Leonean society 
also reflects this dimension of social identities. Hence, the relationship between 
social identities and access to resources and assets makes the social reintegration 
process not only a matter of survival but also a political issue.  
Actor orientation and agency 
The reader might easily get the impression that this thesis is theoretically 
founded on structuralism because of the attention paid to elements of social 
structure (social organization and social identities) in the previous sections. This 
is not the case and I will attempt to correct such an impression of structuralism 
by elaborating on the way social structure and individuals as actors relate through 
agency. This study takes the informants, their individual life experiences and 
their reintegration strategies as the starting point, not social structure itself. 
Saying we have a certain social identity is to suggest that we are someone or 
something within a certain social context and relational situation. “To have a 
social identity” indicates that the identity is the property of the individual. To a 
certain extent this is indeed the case but it cannot be understood as a property 
inherently belonging to the individual as a person. A social identity is something 
we only have within the social relation it derives from. Therefore, as far as social 
identity is concerned, our socially and culturally constructed self has significance 
due to the social and cultural context through which it is constructed. This 
understanding of the character of social identity strongly connotes structuralism 
that argues that elements have no inherent meaning but receive it from the 
relation they have with other elements or with the system that they belong to as a 
whole. Structural analysis in this thesis makes sense for two reasons. The first is 
our concern with the relationship between individuals and society. Structuralist 
analysis helps us view society as more than an arbitrary collection of individual 
people. Through social structure, members of society are connected and, in addi-
tion, extract meaning from being socially and culturally positioned. Secondly, in 
times of violent civil conflict, social networks and structure are radically trans-
formed. A study concerned with social and cultural processes in the aftermath of 
such a conflict cannot address these processes without paying attention to what is 
left or what has changed concerning these structures. 
However, a one-sided emphasis on structural analysis has a number of pit-
falls. It runs the risk of social determinism by giving the impression that human 
beings and their behaviour are totally determined by the social position they take 
and the social relations they participate in. It also risks perceiving people as 
being merely an embodiment of properties belonging to social categories into 
which they fall (Hogg et al. 1995: 261). To avoid giving the impression that such 
a narrow view is the basis for this study, structural analysis is only applied to 
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understand social identity. Individuals are more than a collection of social 
identities. Hence, the socially constructed self should be seen as one of multiple 
dimensions of personhood but in this thesis one that is – in relation to the main 
theme of this study – of specific interest and placed at the heart of the analysis. 
Nevertheless, Cohen (1994) criticizes anthropologists for a lack of recognition of 
their subject’s personhood. They tend to present society in ethnographic writings 
as the determining factor for human behaviour by which they depersonalize their 
informants and present them as empty vessels filled with culture and directed to 
act by social structure. Cohen argues that individuals have (self-)consciousness 
and are able to reflect on themselves and the world around them. If anthropolo-
gists ignore this self-consciousness in their informants, they will not be able to 
truly understand the social world they are exploring (Ibid.: 68-71).  
Another weak point of structural analysis is the tendency to present social 
structure and its elements as disconnected from their history. Social structure and 
cultural bodies of meaning and knowledge as well as social and cultural identities 
that come with it are the temporary outcome of ongoing social and cultural pro-
cesses. They are therefore not static entities but dynamic and changing. With this 
they carry and represent a history and with that a component of continuity 
(Jenkins 1996: 62; Verkuyten 1999). Instead of just coming into existence, they 
evolve through time and space, and shape and content become far from arbitrary. 
This dynamic potential is related to the way individuals participate in the making 
of the social and the cultural. People are born into a social structure and cultural 
context and, although as individuals they had no role in bringing them into 
existence, they contribute to them by reproducing and transforming the social 
and the cultural. Individuals shape and give personal meaning to social and cultu-
ral identities. People bring along their personal emotions, experiences, history 
and interpretations while they carry various cultural identities. It is the personal 
interpretation of what is socially defined that makes the difference (Verkuyten 
1999: 39).  
To address the pitfalls that structural analysis runs, we need a viewpoint that 
perceives the relation between the individual and society through social structure 
and culture not as being static but as one of interaction. This is where an actor-
oriented approach is meaningful. Such an approach builds on the observation that 
“local practices include macro representations and are shaped by distant time-
space arenas, but that these macro phenomena are only intelligible in situated 
contexts. That is, they are grounded in the meanings accorded them through the 
ongoing life-experiences and dilemmas of men and women” (Long 1992a: 6-7). 
It acknowledges that individual responses to similar structural circumstances and 
shared cultural context show differences and it subsequently assumes that the 
differential patterns are to a certain extent to be contributed to the actors them-
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selves (Long 1992b: 21). Long argues that in the heart of the actor-oriented 
approach we find the concept of agency which is defined in the following:  
In general terms the notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to 
process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most 
extreme forms of coercion. 
It is important also to emphasize that ‘agency’ must not simply be equated with decision- 
making capacities. Agency – which we recognize when particular actions make a difference 
to pre-existing state of affairs or course of events – is composed of social relations and can 
only become effective through them. (Ibid.: 22-23) 
So with an understanding of agency, people are no longer presented as the 
depersonalized embodiments of social and cultural identities that structural 
analysis might suggest but are transformed into social and cultural actors in an 
interactive relation with their social and cultural environment. Not only does this 
context infiltrate their daily life experiences but, through agency, individuals 
reproduce and transform social structure and culture at the same time. It is 
precisely in this interaction provided by agency that space is created for 
negotiation of the form and content of social and cultural identities.  
The concept of agency has been raised before to explore the participation of 
children and youth in armed conflict. Honwana (1999, 2000) refers to Certeau2 
when she makes a distinction between strategic and tactic agency. The former is 
more directed towards long-term developments, the latter aims at short-term 
effects. Where a strategy is built on preconceived planning, a tactic anticipates 
the tangible circumstances within which it arises and is carried out. Children and 
teenagers, she argues, are not yet able to come to strategic agency. Often they 
cannot see the long-term consequences of their choices or place their actions in a 
broader context. But they do practice tactical agency to survive in daily life and 
they actively anticipate the context they find themselves in (Honwana 1999: 8-9). 
Whether teenagers have the capacity for strategic agency or not is beyond the 
scope and professional domain of this thesis. The point to make here is that 
agency not only serves to explore the participation of youth during conflict but is 
similarly valuable in examining social and cultural reintegration in the aftermath.  
Young women and youth should be seen as social and cultural actors before, 
during and after the ten-year war in Sierra Leone. This study examines the role of 
social identities in the reintegration of young women into their communities after 
the war. In this process, the individuals are the actors. Social structure is not 
perceived as a static determining factor in the process but as the material for 
reintegration as a relational process, during which it is reproduced, moulded and 
transformed within certain limits by the individuals who are reintegrating. 
                                               
2  Honwana (2000: 61 footnote 4); M. de Certeau (1980, re-ed. 1990) L’Invention du quotidien, t.1: Arts 
de faire. Paris: Gallimard. 
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The play of reintegration 
In summary, the specific interest of this study is reintegration as a process of the 
(re-)establishment of social relations between individuals and groups and be-
tween groups within a community and society. These relations consist of a 
structural and a cognitive dimension. The structural dimension encompasses the 
actual relations and the elements they are composed of (individuals and groups). 
Social relations are in their structural dimension bonding where they integrate 
individuals into networks and bridging where they create linkage between groups 
and networks. The cognitive dimension holds the norms, values, perspectives and 
attitudes that either predispose (if positive in nature) people and groups to engage 
with each other or (if negative in nature) make people and groups reluctant to 
participate in such relations with each other. The structural and cognitive 
dimensions are as form is to content: the structural dimension (what) refers to the 
relation and its elements; the cognitive dimension (how) shapes its character.  
Social identities reflect the embodiment of social structure and cultural con-
text in individual persons. Social identities derive from participation in social 
networks and by association with social categories. At the same time, access to 
these social networks and groups is granted to or acquired by people based on 
these identities. Depending on the scale on which social interaction takes place, 
these identities influence relations in a very tangible and personalized manner (as 
role identities are in individual life experiences) or as a more abstract and con-
ceptual (as social categories are within a culture) factor.  
What exactly do these notions explain when applied to social processes con-
cerning civil conflict and its aftermath? The situation of a fictive young woman 
(a ‘bush wife’) as a very rough, generalized and simplified presentation of the 
actual cases in this study, serves as an example. When she was captured by the 
rebels during the war and taken into the bush away from her family, the bonding 
relation with her kin was broken. In the following years, the rebel group became 
a forced alternative for her, but one with little potential for linkage with other 
people or groups in society because of the hostilities they carried out. After 
demobilization, one of the choices for her to make was either to try and find her 
way back to her family and attempt to re-establish her kinship ties or to stay in 
the community where she was at the time and try to establish new relations with 
new bonding groups.  
Earlier I argued that individuals do not coincide with a social identity but that 
they carry multiple identities that become more or less relevant depending on the 
social and cultural context. The exact meaning of a social identity can vary 
within certain limits of context and history. One of this woman’s strategies for 
reintegration into her former kinship network might have been to emphasize and 
negotiate her position as a daughter. She could also have attempted to communi-
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cate the meaning of her time spent with the rebels, which would mean renego-
tiating her social identity as an ex-combatant’s wife. This process of negotiation 
and transformation of social relations would not only be influenced by her and 
her family’s attitudes and experiences but also, for example, by a cultural dis-
course on gender and kinship. In general, the ideal objective of reintegration 
would be that ex-combatants (or every other group or category to which the need 
for reintegration would apply, e.g. refugees, migrants) shift socially and cultural-
ly into other social identities that facilitate their insertion into bonding networks 
with the potential for linkage, or that the connotation and meaning of being an 
ex-combatant (or e.g. a refugee or migrant) is positively renegotiated in the com-
munity. The former option addresses the structural dimension of social networks 
and identities, the latter relates to the cognitive dimension containing perspec-
tives and attitudes. It may become clear from this example that the role of the 
individual is one of an actor, making his or her agency intelligible within this 
fabric of social relations. Hence, people are not being reintegrated but they rein-
tegrate.  
From this theoretical framework on reintegration, different sets of qualitative 
variables can be gathered to analyze the empirical data presented in Table 1. The 
three columns correspond to the spheres of interest for data collection. The ap-
proach reflects the concept that reintegration encompasses society as a whole. 
The first column refers to the individual stories and experiences of informants. 
The second addresses the relationship between the individual informants with the 
communities they are now a part of and the dynamics of reintegration that can be 
observed within the different research fields, Makeni and a village. This is where 
local (or regional) differences in the course of processes of reintegration are 
rooted. Elements from the first and second columns are mostly explored in the 
third part of this thesis (Chapters 6 and 7). The third column contains variables of 
relevance when the reintegration process is viewed from a national and cultural 
perspective. Chapter 4 on youth and Chapter 5 on gender correspond to these 
variables. The top half of the table holds the variables that refer to the structural 
dimension of reintegration and the bottom half mirrors the cognitive dimension. 
The six cells in the table are separated by thin lines to symbolize that the 
disconnection of these spheres is artificial and for analytical purposes only. In 
practice, a two-way dynamic relation of influence exists both vertically as well as 
horizontally between the elements that are represented by the variables. 
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Table 1 Qualitative variables for the analysis of data on reintegration 
 
Individual 
Informants 
Community 
Town/Village 
Society 
Country 
Relations 
 
 
 
Identities 
• Bonding relations between 
the individual and groups 
(integration)  
 
• Role identities (e.g. sister, 
daughter) 
• Bridging relations 
between groups 
(linkage) 
 
 Personalized category 
identities (e.g. village 
youth – village elders) 
 
 Social/cultural fabric 
 
 
 
• Social institutions 
and culturally 
relevant categories 
(e.g. kinship, 
ethnicity, marriage) 
Experiences 
 
 
 
 
Meanings 
 Personal experiences and 
life history (e.g. while 
being captured) 
 
 
 Personal meanings, beliefs, 
perceptions (e.g. towards 
‘bush marriage’) 
 
 Local experiences and 
history (e.g. with 
fighting factions) 
 
 
• Communal percep-
tions, meanings and 
attitudes (e.g. towards 
ex-combatants) 
 National discourse 
and history (e.g. the 
political background 
of the conflict) 
 
• General cultural 
discourse (e.g. on 
youth and gender) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3 
In Sierra Leone: Method and fieldwork 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the methodological framework. It describes the selection of 
location and cases, the way fieldwork was set up and the method of data col-
lection. In addition, it explores my position as a researcher in the field and I 
reflect on some ethical questions that became prominent while conducting a 
study within the context of a humanitarian emergency. Finally, some remarks are 
made concerning the study’s specific focus, limitations and validity. 
Entering the field 
On a late Monday afternoon in September 2003 I arrived at the helipad in 
Freetown. While picking up my luggage, the first thing on my mind was the 
conscious observation that I had actually survived the helicopter flight that took 
me across the bay that separates the international airport from the capital. In one 
of the conversations I had with Paul Richards when preparing my fieldwork in 
Sierra Leone, he told me − in an attempt to assure me that safety and security 
would not be a major risk during this study − that this helicopter flight would 
probably be the scariest thing I would experience while there. “Once you’ve 
survived that flight, you will survive six months in Sierra,” he said. Before I 
arrived in the field, I had no idea what to expect. I had travelled through African 
countries before and the latest security report on Sierra Leone from the Inter-
national Crisis Group was in my hand luggage. I had even taken it out during the 
flight. My nerves prevented me from concentrating on the information but at 
least I had created the illusion for myself that I was on my way to something 
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important. But still, I did not exactly know what to expect in a country that was 
trying to recover from a ten-year civil war. In the days immediately following 
while I was wandering through downtown Freetown, the images I still had in my 
mind after watching a movie that pictured the centre of town as a battle field1 
faded and were replaced by the sight of daily life in the commercial centre of an 
African capital, which basically means large numbers of people and a lot of 
traffic. That was something I was familiar with. At the same time, my curiosity 
grew. Eagerness to explore the story behind this scene determined my mood. 
Looking at the ruins of burned-out buildings that had been taken over by either 
bushes and trees or laundry and people, I realized that in a way I was here to 
search for the remains of a war, the traces of war in a changed social landscape. 
What was there to find underneath what was visible on the surface? 
The evening I arrived, Paul Richards was at the helipad to let me know that 
he had arranged for me to join one of the consultants he was working with, 
Khadija Bah, for a three-day trip to the Northern Region. The team of consultants 
was conducting a social assessment study of the Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration Programme (DDR) in Sierra Leone commissioned by the 
World Bank for the National Commission for Social Action of the Government 
of Sierra Leone. A small survey needed to be done in Makeni, Bombali District, 
and in some villages along the road towards Kabala in Koinadugu District to 
gather data on the way women were left out of the DDR process and how this 
had affected their current economic and social position (see Richards et al. 2003, 
2004). During this trip we met Khadija, Aminata and Mary who later would 
become key participants in my fieldwork. These three young women, who live in 
Makeni, gave us a brief impression of the problems they, and other women in 
similar circumstances, had faced since the rebels captured them. Mary, a female 
ex-combatant, represented a group of Mende speakers who were not willing to go 
back to the south or east where they originally came from for fear of reprisals. 
This information was the starting point of fieldwork in Makeni, an urban area in 
which women, formerly associated with the rebels, both from the north (Temne 
speakers) and from the south or east (Mende speakers) were trying to rebuild 
their lives. Another case of interest appeared on my plate when we visited one of 
the villages along the road to Kabala where a group of women seemed to have 
resettled more or less successfully with their ex-combatant husbands, some of 
whom were also Mende speakers. A brief assessment of the interview data 
suggested that these women had been able to play out their female roles as wives 
and daughters in favour of their reintegration in the rural community. Taking the 
two fields together, representing the different groups of women sharing some 
features but showing variety on others, would offer the opportunity of bringing a 
                                               
1  S. Samura, Cry Freetown (2000) and Return to Freetown (2002). See also http://www.cryfreetown.org  
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comparative element into my fieldwork. So the decision was taken to follow up 
on the information we gathered on this short trip and at the end of September I 
went back to stay in Makeni for the next five months.  
Betwixt and between  
Many players move around in the field of post-war transition and humanitarian 
emergencies but two worlds seem to emerge. One is inhabited by local people, 
women affected by the war, children, ex-combatants, refugees and returnees, 
trying from day to day to make the most out of life with very limited options. The 
other is predominantly expatriates driving around in big white four-wheel drives. 
The two worlds are linked because they are both engaged in reconstruction, 
rehabilitation, reintegration and emergency aid, though in very different ways. 
The group of expatriates also seems to be divided with scholars (and journalists) 
on one side and aid workers on the other. Scholars are busy trying to grasp a 
situation and are looking for insight and understanding; while aid workers are 
keen to do something about it. The aid workers blame scholars for being the 
back-seat drivers and, in return, scholars accuse aid workers of moving about like 
bulls in a china shop. The two need each other or can at least benefit from each 
other’s contributions. 
I mention the above to locate this study – and myself – in this particular field. 
I did not ‘go native’ or disappear for five months in a local community as a more 
classical anthropological method might have forced me to do. I lived in a house 
rented by an NGO with their logo on the wall, but never actively engaged in their 
activities. I spent much of my time at the neighbour’s cooking place sharing rice 
and palm wine but from time to time I did escape to the beach in Freetown where 
I had dinner at a restaurant whose parking lot provides a complete overview of 
the international presence in Sierra Leone. 
The means of transportation I used in the field shows how I was positioned as 
a scholar with ties to aid workers. During the day I walked, used my second-hand 
bicycle or made use of the motorbike taxis. The latter option drew appreciation 
from local people and worries from my UN friends who found the risks of 
getting physically hurt too high. Travelling to the villages, I took local taxis or 
Poda Poda but for trips to Freetown I usually arranged a ride in an NGO or UN 
car. This travel in the different parts of the field also resulted in the collection of 
different data. While in a local taxi, I would discuss developments in Sierra 
Leone with the passengers and driver, while in the UN car I discussed the same 
issues but from the perspective of international politics. I explored and analyzed 
my experiences and perspectives with informants as well as with representatives 
of the world of international aid workers. This made me develop a scholarly 
anthropological view on the issues in the field, but at the same time I explored 
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the potential implications of such insights as they might affect, for example, 
NGO policy.  
In my personal opinion, academic studies undertaken in a context of a 
humanitarian emergency – which Sierra Leone still qualifies for – tend towards 
arrogance if they do not carry any implications, either implicitly or explicitly, for 
dealing with these emergencies. This is, after all, the basis of these studies’ social 
and public relevance. Scholars should attempt to reach more than an academic 
audience only. On the other hand, aid workers should not ignore or dismiss 
scholarly knowledge as being irrelevant or not fit for implementation. It is their 
responsibility to do whatever is in their power to achieve a better outcome, and 
academics can definitely make a contribution in this direction. I deliberately 
chose to conduct my research independently of any organization working in 
Sierra Leone because my specific interest was in the people who fell beyond the 
reach of such aid most of the time. By using sociological theoretical concepts 
together with an actor-oriented approach, I aim to walk a line between theory, 
practice and policy. This does not imply that the study wishes to develop and 
hand over easy-to-adopt policy recommendations. By emphasizing the repro-
duction and transformation of large-scale phenomena and processes into the 
individual’s daily life, the data and knowledge it provides do not reflect theory 
opposed to practice but the dynamic between them. I hope my findings and 
opinions will find their way back to field, whether this is in Sierra Leone or other 
countries where the context might differ but the issues of importance are the 
same. 
Data collection 
Data was collected through participant observation, formal interviews and nume-
rous informal conversations with people on the streets, in the markets, in taxis 
and in the town centre while I was chatting to the motorbike taxi drivers and 
money changers who were waiting for an opportunity to make some money. 
During the fieldwork period I lived in a small neighbourhood on the outskirts of 
Makeni. The next-door neighbours turned out to be an ex-combatant couple now 
busy establishing an agricultural cooperative in a village nearby. Later on, from 
pictures taken during the war and in the DDR camps, I recognized more of my 
neighbours wearing combat clothes. 
Three key participants – Khadija, Aminata and Mary – introduced me to more 
young women in similar circumstances who were willing to contribute to my 
study. I spent time with them on the porch, often watching how food was pre-
pared or joining in by offering comments on the scene in the street. Not only did 
they make arrangements for me to meet other women and interview them, they 
were also able to explain or interpret information for me or provide me with 
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necessary background information. Throughout the whole fieldwork period, I 
was keen to pick up anything I could hear or read that would be of help in 
understanding existing notions on youth and gender, on the war and the current 
social and economic situation and the relation between them. Participant observa-
tion in practice meant sometimes picking up a single remark made by a bystander 
and at other times taking the opportunity to have an animated conversation in the 
street on political, economic and social issues. The situation in the village was 
slightly different because I did not live there. Data was collected through inter-
views during multiple one or two-day visits. The process of data collection was, 
therefore, far more planned, structured and formal. One of the key sources of 
information (and a gatekeeper) was a former RUF commander who now had a 
central role in coordinating reintegration and peace-building activities in the vil-
lage by an international NGO. 
The language barrier – the fact that I could not speak Temne, Mende or even 
Krio2 properly and that six months was not long enough for me to become 
proficient even in the latter – limited my access to certain data. Most of the time, 
my key suppliers of information doubled as interpreters. Informal conversation, 
as part of everyday life, was done in English but this forced both the researcher 
and the informants to switch to a language other than their mother tongue. It also 
meant that I had no access to information given indirectly in gossip or informal 
comments and every-day conversations within my hearing. Although I often 
bothered people around me with my numerous requests to translate jokes or 
small talk for me, I had to accept that this information was always filtered by the 
translator’s perception of what was and what was not important for me to know; 
or what it was in my interest to know or, importantly, was not intended for me. It 
made sources of information and people in the field even more involved and of 
influence in determining which data were within reach for the scholar. 
Nevertheless, towards the end of my fieldwork period, my passive knowledge of 
Krio had improved and I became slightly less dependant on people translating 
conversations for me. I also became more confident about the data given to me 
through key sources. 
I am aware that by assigning the role of translator and interpreter to my key 
contacts, I made them an influential partner in the data collection process and in 
what this study does and does not discuss. The assumption was, though, that the 
main theme and objectives of the study touched on socially and culturally 
sensitive information. Bringing in someone from ‘outside’, someone who did not 
share the main experience of having spent time in the bush with the fighting 
                                               
2  Krio is a Creole language derived, among other languages, from English. It serves as the lingua franca 
in Sierra Leone. Temne is spoken in the north, Mende in the south and east. There are several other 
smaller languages spoken by people from different ethnic groups.  
30 
 
forces, could also prevent people from feeling free to speak. I guess I attempted 
to create to some extent a feeling of being ‘among each other’ for my contacts.  
In the process of gathering data through interviews, both the interviewer and 
the interviewee shape the process and the data collected. The original plan was to 
focus on the life histories of the interviewees. Life histories are a methodological 
tool and allow people to reconstruct their experiences in a coherent story in 
which continuity of person exists, and reflect the way they give meaning to their 
experiences during the war in the present. As a scholar, I would thus force myself 
to see my sources not as just people affected by war and in relation to conflict but 
as persons who grew up while the social and economic context around them 
changed. In the field however, this concept turned out to be very difficult to 
retain. Almost all the sources had trouble starting to tell the story of their lives at 
the day they were born or with a description of their childhood. They usually 
started telling me about the problems they faced in their present daily lives. It 
never became clear to me why this was the case. I could speculate (e.g. on 
psycholinguistic explanations) but I would rather limit myself to observations. I 
finally chose to let the interviewees decide on chronological order while I made 
sure that all the issues were addressed.  
Interviewees also gave the impression that they were not used to talking about 
themselves on their own initiative, which meant that the structure and content 
were also highly influenced by the researcher. While I hoped to conduct 
interviews only loosely structured by topics, during some of the conversations I 
got the uncomfortable feeling that I was interrogating these women. We arrived 
at a situation where I had to probe on every question. This is one of the reasons 
why I decided to get rid of my tape recorder and started to just take short notes in 
an attempt to make the interviews less formal. It did not prevent the interviews, 
at least the formal ones, becoming more structured and it is here that participant 
observation supported the additional data collection. From the insights I gained 
by being there, I learned what the right questions to ask were, and every inter-
view I transcribed and analyzed gave hints for the next. In the other direction, 
information given to me in the interviews or in conversations with one of the key 
participants could often be used to start informal conversations elsewhere. The 
same kind of input came from issues that I picked up by reading newspapers or 
listening to the radio. Participant observation gave me the knowledge to see the 
relevance of what had not been said, which was then brought up in discussions 
elsewhere in the field. 
The data collected from interviews and field notes and my interpretations 
were discussed with national NGO and UN staff I met in the field and who were 
directly or indirectly involved with relevant issues or with the same group of 
people that my informants represented. In this way, background information and 
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accounts of historical events given by informants could be checked. Stories that 
came up during interviews and interpretations given by interviewees were dis-
cussed and compared with the stories other professionals had access to. During 
lively discussions on the topics, I received comments on my opinions and ideas, 
additional information was given and new ideas generated. These conversations 
also kept me from floating away from the real life relevance of the study. 
Limitations and focus of the study 
I have already explained how certain choices, such as the role assigned to inter-
viewees, shape and influence both the process and the outcome of the study. 
During the course of my fieldwork and the writing of this thesis, other choices 
were made regarding method and style that affected the final content. I believe 
that these choices were to a large extent personal and do not automatically follow 
on from the central theme and objectives as defined earlier. These choices are 
discussed here explicitly to put the research into its proper context. 
The first choice is the decision to use an actor-oriented approach. Such an 
approach in this particular study means that the point of reference is the sub-
jective perception of the every-day life experiences of the interviewees related to 
reintegration processes. I did not, therefore, go on a fact-finding mission of what 
women experienced historically speaking during the war nor did I intend to 
develop sociological surveys – not least because this had been done before. The 
notions, beliefs and opinions related to social identities deriving from social cate-
gories and roles became real through individual behaviour and actions but cannot 
directly be deduced from them. Often these notions are more implicitly than 
explicitly present in society. It was information on a more abstract level that I 
was interested in and this could not be captured in surveys or by simply collect-
ing experiences. In addition, I was interested in the way agency worked for these 
women, which is a concept that has a central place in an actor-oriented study. So 
instead of writing an ethnography on a community affected by war, I chose to 
ground my writing in a topic and a process and in doing so I wanted to place the 
subjects in their social and cultural context.  
This thesis focuses on the social position of women after the war. I therefore 
decided to leave their experiences during the war aside as far as possible. There 
were multiple considerations to support this, not least because of ethics. First of 
all, specific attention for women’s experiences during the war, mainly the way 
they suffered atrocities committed against them, was not needed to answer the 
central questions posed in this study. Notwithstanding the fact that in certain 
situations there is a strong relationship between these experiences and the social, 
cultural and economic position they now find themselves in, I did not feel it was 
necessary to hear these experiences first hand. It is well known – in Sierra 
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Leonean society and in the scholarly literature – that gender-based violence was 
ubiquitous during the war (HRW 2003b; Physicians for Human Rights/UNAM-
SIL 2002). Many NGOs in the field are concerned with the awful experiences 
these women went through during the war. This data has been collected and is 
accessible. To understand what happened to my informants, it was not necessary 
to ask them and hear it directly from them.  
I also took into serious consideration the fact that asking informants explicitly 
about their experiences during the war could jeopardize the psychosocial balance 
they might have found since. To stir up memories could cause this to happen. As 
an independent student who was not affiliated with an NGO offering any kind of 
psychosocial support, I was not in the position to provide follow-up or counsel-
ling if needed. Neither was it within my power to help them gain access to such 
programmes elsewhere. Ethically, I did not consider it right to go too deeply into 
possible traumatic experiences and I held back with questions concerning these 
issues. This does not mean though that I was anxiously avoiding the subject but it 
did mean that interviewees had a high degree of control over what they did or did 
not want to talk about. This definitely influenced the result of data collected 
through interviews but I still feel that the psychosocial well-being of my inform-
ants was more important than this study.  
When I arrived in Sierra Leone, the war was over. Every-day life had re-
sumed. While writing on violent conflict, we can describe the acts of violence or 
we can try to grasp the violence beyond the acts. In our attempts to communicate 
the drama of war, we, the outsiders, often turn to strong images that reflect 
primarily the former. But while doing so, we risk locking the violence in time, 
space and the context of the conflict. However, the violence itself stretches 
beyond that. Referring to this, Nordstrom (1997: 123) observed: 
Yet, when I listened to average Mozambican civilians discuss the war, these barbarous 
accounts, while present, were not the focal point. The destruction of home and humanity, of 
hope and future, of valued traditions and the integrity of the community resonated through-
hout these conversations.  
In this thesis I chose to stay away from the acts of violence and instead focus 
on how events and the context of violent conflict shaped the lives of individual 
young women beyond the exact time and space of the conflict into their present 
and future in the social cultural domain.  
Validity  
This study is a small-scale, qualitative study of meanings and opinions implicitly 
present in society and viewed in relation to the recent history of violent conflict. 
It is centred around the individual life stories and daily experiences of various 
informants. These stories and experiences are highly contextual and subjective 
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and, because of this, there is only a limited possibility to generalize and draw 
conclusions concerning the larger population. I believe this is often inherent in 
actor-oriented studies and although it might result in a loss of wider validity, it 
also means a gain for qualitative data. The selection of interviewees was based 
on the snowball method and was to a large extent arbitrary. Populations and 
focus groups are heterogeneous in terms of relevant variables such as geo-
graphical region, age, time spent in the bush, specific experiences in the bush, 
and type of participation in the conflict. Thus, within the scope and limits of this 
study, data did not come from a representative cluster of interviewees. I believe 
that information previously given on choices made sufficiently explains why this 
particular method was used. Cross-checks on data with the knowledge and 
experience of others in the field with access to the population address validity to 
at least a certain extent. The similarities and diversity that derive from the data 
reflect a link to the social structure and the individual’s agency respectively and 
have been placed at the centre of this thesis. 
The cases in the two different geographical fields, Makeni and the village, 
show a wide variety of ethnicity, experiences, association with factions in the 
conflict, and social geographical context. There was also a difference in approach 
and data collection. The two cases should be seen not as a way to cross-check on 
data but as complementary in finding answers to the questions asked. They are 
separate cases providing additional material for analysis.  
An actor-oriented study – and especially one that uses social identity as an 
analytical concept – has to pay attention to the researcher’s social identity in the 
field. The relevance of the relationship between informants, field and researcher 
lies in the fact that in such a study the knowledge being sought emerges in the 
interaction between all the participants in the field. In such a perspective, context 
is not only the environment but also includes mutually implicit expectations, 
assumptions and opinions. As mentioned before, Sierra Leone is currently a host 
country for many representatives of the international community. And although I 
did not really fit the profile – riding around town on my bike instead of driving a 
white car with logo on it – people in the field often assumed I was working for an 
NGO or the UN and therefore would probably be in the position to offer them a 
programme or ‘assistance’, as it was normally phrased. The concept of a scholar 
travelling all the way to Sierra Leone just to collect data without offering some-
thing tangible in return (e.g. money or a project) was sometimes a difficult con-
cept to understand or accept. Especially during the first weeks, people came up to 
me on their own initiative to be interviewed, even if they had no connection with 
the specific subject of my fieldwork. Not long after such an offer, the request for 
financial assistance or help with getting into a skills programme would follow. 
And I could not blame anyone of them for trying. In contrast to this, I also did 
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not manage to talk to some women who I wanted to talk to. During the first 
months, I encountered fear about the Special Court and the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Committee that kept women from identifying themselves as being re-
lated to former rebel groups and held them in anonymity. Some women said they 
were afraid I would broadcast their names and stories on the local radio. I ex-
plained what my research was about to the women who participated in the study. 
On the streets I kept it a little bit vague, not least to protect the interviewees who 
the community would see in my presence. I usually introduced myself as an 
anthropology student doing a study on ‘war-affected youth’ or ‘war-affected wo-
men’, which was a satisfactory answer in 99% of situations.  
One of the struggles I constantly fought while working in the field was 
finding a workable and realistic middle road between naivety and scepticism 
towards what I was told by participants. Sometimes I doubted whether a story 
was genuine. At other times, respect and emotional concern for the participants 
blurred my critical view. This was linked to the implicit negotiation with people 
in the field about a suitable reciprocity concerning our interaction. Although my 
name is on the cover, this thesis in its content reflects this relationship. 
35 
  
 
Commercial activities around the town’s car park 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Small businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
4 
“We are youth” 
Young men before and after 
the conflict in Sierra Leone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Although the African population in general is young – in some countries almost 
half of the inhabitants are under the age of eighteen – attention to youth in Africa 
is relevant for more than just demographic statistics. Given their participation in 
armed conflict, the importance of perceiving young people as a social, economic 
and political force has been stressed repeatedly: 
The youth factor has had much less attention in debates about conflict in Africa, yet it may 
take over from ethnicity as a consideration of more general future importance in a continent 
with such a high proportion of young people potentially alienated from wider civil society 
by failures of educational systems and employment opportunities. (Richards 1995: 64) 
We need to become more sophisticated in our analysis of children and young people, 
moving beyond conceptions of them as dependent and consumers, to children as contri-
butors and active citizens. The contributions, responsibilities and agency of youth are still 
largely confined to liminal [sic] spaces, whereas they increasingly assume central impor-
tance in the African social landscape. Their agency should be recognized. (Maxted 2003: 
69) 
Symbolically, youth often represents contrasting social concepts and their 
social and cultural identity remains dynamic, hybrid and negotiable. Youth are 
located between childhood and adulthood, between past and present, between 
global and local, between the short and long term, between tradition and mo-
dernity. Youth represent a community’s future and at the same time often oppose 
and challenge hegemonic relations. Youth in Africa nowadays construct their 
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expectations for the future through processes of ‘glocalizing’ but at the same 
time their lives are unfolding in local communities and on the margins of both 
national and global economic systems (de Boeck & Honwana 2000). Child 
soldiers and youth combatants challenge existing notions that perceive young 
people as innocent victims. It is in this social space that their agency comes into 
play (Honwana 2000). Youth actively engaged in armed conflict, being morally 
not yet fully mature but physically capable of participating fully, seek negotiation 
as to their social identity. With their participation in civil conflict, they challenge 
existing power relations but at the same time motivate their choices with a call 
for perspectives on the future. 
Social and economic developments throughout Sub-Saharan Africa make 
youth vulnerable to recruitment in violent conflicts. The African context in which 
youth grow up is, in brief, characterized by the existence of a small urban elite 
that is developing strong connections with global networks but at the same time 
losing touch with the rest of the society from which it originated. In addition to 
this, there is economic decline leaving many in poverty (Maxted 2003: 52-57). 
With capital and resources building up with the elite and a lack of public social 
services, people are being thrown back on social structures that are also under 
pressure (Zack-Williams 2001: 75-78). In such a context, families at the base of 
the economic structure tend to develop survival strategies that are of direct 
influence on the daily lives of children and youth. They are more often mobilized 
for labour, mostly in the informal economy. Another feature is the lodging of 
children with often richer families outside their own communities in return for 
domestic labour. One of the results is that children lose the connection with their 
own community at a very young age.  
On the other hand, the opportunities of gaining economic independence are 
limited and the social independence that is linked with this therefore becomes 
more difficult to acquire (Ibid.: 76). The additional destructive and endemic 
character of HIV/AIDS is further increasing pressure and leading to the break-
down of social structures. In total, the social reality of youth in Africa can be 
understood as: life in weak states that have lost their monopoly on the use of 
violence; broken social structures; total deprivation; poverty; limited economic 
opportunities; and numerous health risks and a lack of health care (Wessels 2002; 
Zack-Williams 2001; Maxted 2003). While cherishing dreams and expectations 
coherent with modernity, they find themselves frustrated in vertical social mo-
bility by traditional power systems providing for people based on who you are 
instead of what your capacities might be (Richards 1998). 
While the above gives a brief impression of the social world of youth in 
Africa and shows that part of the processes that affect youth should be seen as 
global or regional influences, the following sections in this chapter focus on the 
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meaning of youth in the Sierra Leonean situation. A line is drawn from the pre-
war socio-economic and political context in which the roots of social exclusion 
of youth are found, through the period of participation in conflict and the 
demobilization programme to the present period of post-conflict reconstruction 
and development. The objective is to place the construction of meaning of youth 
in a wider political and historical context in order to move beyond the perception 
of youth as an arbitrary age bracket to an understanding of youth as a cultural 
identity of relevance in Sierra Leone. The negotiation on youth as a social 
identity in a post-conflict context is illustrated by the example of the Makeni 
motorbike taxi drivers, on which I have drawn for fieldwork data.  
Political-historical background 
When the RUF crossed the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone and started 
their insurgency on 23 March 1991, they claimed their aim was to liberate the 
Sierra Leonean people from the suppression of the All People’s Party (APC), 
which had held political power for decades. During the war, a debate started 
about whether this claim was genuine or not and what the real motives were of 
youth who decided to join the rebel movement.1 Participants in this debate seem 
to be attempting to resolve two central issues. The first question is whether the 
political and revolutionary expressions of the RUF should be understood as 
ideology or rhetoric. This thesis does not attempt to elaborate on this. However, 
the other central issue, the social, economic, cultural and political background of 
those who joined the movement, is of relevance. Who are these people and what 
were their motives for joining? 
At the moment, there is a more or less general consensus that the RUF 
attracted those who felt marginalized by APC politics. Two main groups of youth 
became excluded by their politics. The first was formed by the underclass – those 
who did not have a regular job; those who depended on the informal economy to 
earn some money; those who became involved in criminality; those who became 
caught up in the drug and gambling scene; and those who had no or little 
attachment to any social structure and were footloose (Abdullah 1997: 51, 73). 
Some of these youngsters, the urban section, spent time in their own pubs in 
town where they met, during the 1970s, the second group: students and middle-
class youth who had a special position in society, especially concerning political 
opposition but who had not yet been silenced by the APC. The encounter 
                                               
1
  Richards (1996) opposed the by then dominant perception that the violence and atrocities committed 
by the RUF have roots only in barbarism, chaos, anarchy and personal economic gains. But by 
offering a different account, he is in return criticized for ascribing too much rationality to the RUF and 
the way they manifested their war and resistance. He would also have presented the RUF as a well-
organized group of excluded intellectuals who were trying to provoke a revolution guided by 
Ghadaffi’s Green Book ideology (Bangura 1997: 119). 
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between the two groups of youth resulted in a youth subculture that used 
marijuana as a status symbol and played reggae music as a way of distinguishing 
and expressing their aversion to ‘the system’ with plenty of rhetoric (Ibid.: 51-
53). Abdullah (1997) argues that the RUF emerged from this particular youth 
culture but that when it came to using violence, the students and the middle-class 
youngsters withdrew. The RUF therefore became the product of an excluded 
underclass, a group of marginalized people, and never developed into a real 
people’s movement due to a lack of grassroots support. This is most likely 
related to the discrepancy between the expressed aims of the RUF – over-
throwing the government and the re-establishment of a multi-party democracy – 
and the methods they used to reach this aim through atrocities committed against 
civilians (Bangura 1997: 129-130). This discrepancy was indeed recognized by 
the youth who were recruited during the conflict and who participated in the 
violence (Peters & Richards 1998: 200).  
The marginalization of youth in Sierra Leone is related to the decline of the 
state, the deterioration of public services, insufficient economic growth, high 
unemployment rates and a political system based on patron-client relations 
(Bangura 1997; Kandeh 1999; Zack-Williams 2001; McIntyre & Thusi 2003; 
Maxted 2003). The country gained independence in 1961 and started with a 
multi-party political system. Although parties did not differ much in terms of 
ideological content, they each reached their own grassroots support. The APC, 
led by Siaka Stevens, emerged as the opposition during the early years and 
gained power in 1966. In the first instance, the APC attracted those who had not 
yet found a home with one of the other parties: northerners, people with a low 
level of education, wage labourers, and representatives of the lower-middle class. 
The party had the potential to become a real people’s party (Conteh-Morgan & 
Dixon-Fyle 1999: 69-70).  
However, Siaka Stevens perpetuated and secured power by the strategic use 
of patronage relations, through which he obtained the loyalty of civil society, 
union leaders, traditional leaders and the intelligentsia but was not as successful 
with the students. At the same time, he resisted the political opposition and 
transformed the multi-party system into a one-party political monopoly. Many of 
the contemporary problems in Africa are, in fact, related to the patronage system 
whereby politicians commit themselves to only a limited group of supporters. 
But this is hardly ever the sole cause of problems and other political factors help 
contribute to making patronage only a part of the problem it is accused of 
causing (Bangura 1997: 130-135). The above-mentioned transformation to a 
political monopoly and the banning of political opposition are two aspects of the 
Sierra Leonean political context that have led to the exclusion of youth. The third 
factor is the centralization of power in the capital and neglect of the rural areas 
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and the provinces. Local traditional chiefs, who often came into power along 
traditional but more or less democratic paths, were set aside by Stevens and 
replaced by chiefs appointed for their loyalty to the APC (Conteh-Morgan & 
Dixon-Fyle 1999: 106-107). In the end, violence was also used to eliminate 
opponents of the party (Ibid.: 135).  
In a political patronage system, the political leader acquires grassroots sup-
port by redistributing influence, material goods and access to resources to those 
who remain loyal to the leader. “It involves redistributing national resources as 
marks of personal favour to followers who respond with loyalty to the leader 
rather than to the institution the leader represents” (Richards 1996: 34). Patrimo-
nial rule does exist in the multi-party system as well, where it is accessible and 
beneficial for larger groups of people through the strategic use of their votes in 
these patron-client relations. But by transforming the political playing field into a 
one-party monopoly, the people have lost this one option of political influence. 
In patrimonial rule, the leader has the responsibility of securing a perpetual flow 
of goods and influence. A political loss then also means a loss of access to re-
sources and, with that, the loss of grassroots support.  
In the decades before the start of the war in Sierra Leone, the country suffered 
serious economic decline, with increasing unemployment and poverty as a result. 
The natural resources meant to provide the national administration and public 
sector with financial support – of which the diamond mines are the most 
important – were moved into the informal economy. The political elite used 
income that was generated in this way to sustain their patron-client relations. 
Capital was thus removed from the public sector, and health care, education and 
infrastructure deteriorated. Government institutions did not receive the needed 
money to remain functional (Bangura 1997: 133; Conteh-Morgan & Dixon-Fyle 
1999: 93-95; Kandeh 1999: 351). On the one hand, the government became 
weaker, while on the other patron-client relations became more important. This 
caused those without such relations to be excluded and left with no state to offer 
protection. This hit the youth particularly hard regarding education. Momoh, as 
president, reflected the attitude of those in power by stating that education was a 
privilege, not a right. This statement effectively discharged the government of 
any responsibility for providing education for all. Youth became dependant on 
patron relations to gain access to education, with the result that education became 
something within reach of the political elite only (Kandeh 1999: 357; Peters & 
Richards 1998: 187). With the road to education blocked for the majority, and 
employment in the public sector at a minimum due to declining state services and 
government finances, almost the only option for survival for youth was to be 
found in the informal economy where, again, the same political elite pulled the 
strings through patrimonial rule. But, as Aning & McIntyre (2005: 69) state: “in 
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rural areas […] without sponsorship and protection more and more youths found 
themselves unable to attend school and without income possibilities”. 
The RUF attracted those without strong social ties and therefore those who 
suffered generational exclusion, while the CDF was composed of youth under the 
command of local authorities (Peters 2004). However, the unequal power rela-
tions between the youth and elders, which turned youth into a majority in the 
position of a minority, affected all youth regardless of the side they took in the 
conflict. It was in this social, economic and political situation that the differences 
between the RUF and CDF faded.  
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
While the previous section gave the contextual roots of youth participation in the 
civil war in Sierra Leone, this paragraph moves on to position youth in the 
aftermath of conflict. The first step in the transition from a country in civil 
conflict towards a society involved in post-conflict reconstruction and develop-
ment – after a peace agreement has come into effect – is the disarmament and 
demobilization of the different warring factions. The Disarmament, Demobiliza-
tion and Reintegration (DDR) programme in Sierra Leone, funded by the World 
Bank and coordinated by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobiliza-
tion and Reintegration (NCDDR), has worked with different international NGOs 
to implement the programme. UNICEF was mandated to take special care of 
young children, and UNMASIL played a key role in disarmament and demobi-
lization activities. At the start, the DDR programme was designed to oversee the 
demobilization of an estimated 45,000 combatants, of whom 10% were expected 
to be children and 12% women. The aim was to reinstall national security in the 
short-term by disarmament and demobilization and to prepare combatants for 
long-term economic reintegration (Kai Kai 2000: 113-115; Thusi & Meek 2003: 
24-27). The Sierra Leonean DDR was a case of demobilization with cantonment 
(Knight & Özerdem 2004). After registration, combatants were taken to 
demobilization camps where they could sign up for skills training and orientation 
on return and they received financial benefits (Kai Kai 2000: 117-120; Thusi & 
Meek 2002: 27). Combatants from all parties were demobilized together. This 
can be seen as the first step in moving away from identification with rebel groups 
and warring parties. By attending the DDR programme they all became ex-
combatants. The DDR started back in 1998 but was affected by the country’s 
relapse into conflict. Eventually, between September 1998 and January 2002, a 
total of 74,490 combatants (24,352 of which were RUF and 37,377 CDF) were 
disarmed and demobilized, including 6,845 children. The latter figure was higher 
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than expected but this could be explained by the fact that children did not have to 
hand over a weapon to register with the DDR.2 
The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes have been 
criticized for setting expectations too high and for a lack of attention to the 
underlying causes of the conflict (Foray 2000). After disarmament and demobi-
lization, the central theme is return and reintegration. A great deal of focus has 
been placed on education since youth ex-combatants missed out on education and 
training while fighting in the conflict. Now, they are often too old to go back to 
school and catch up but still lack the knowledge and skills required to have a 
chance of finding employment in the formal sector (Foray 2000: 109; Ginifer 
2003: 43). Another problem is the limited capacity of the urban and formal 
economy to absorb all the ex-combatants. The best option is to stimulate the 
agricultural and mining sectors (Richards 2002: 275; Ginifer 2003: 44) but in 
order to find employment in these sectors, ex-combatants need access to land, 
which they often no longer have. For a long time, the recognition of individuals 
as civilians has been arranged by local bureaucracies, with chiefs being the main 
authorities to register citizens and grant access to land, protection and political 
power. Individuals therefore need connections with a village community to be 
acknowledged as a citizen. This system of local bureaucracy and citizenship does 
not, however, seem to be capable of integrating those who were formerly ex-
cluded (Fanthorpe 2001: 385). 
Other problems also occur concerning social reintegration. Ex-combatants 
may harbour suspicions as to the community’s response to them. On the other 
hand, there can be fear or feelings of revenge from affected communities towards 
ex-combatants. By providing attention and assistance for ex-combatants within 
the scope of the DDR process, civil communities can have the impression that 
violence and participation in the war is being rewarded. Some ex-combatants can 
be reluctant to give up the power and status they acquired during the war. And 
there may also be a discrepancy between former RUF combatants who perceive 
themselves as revolutionaries and society that sees them as representing the cruel 
face of the war (Ginifer 2003: 46-48). 
DDR programmes often have problems reaching female ex-combatants. In 
Sierra Leone 4,751 women (6.5% of the total) have been through the DDR. 
Among the girls in the RUF, only 6% have done the DDR, while for the CDF 
and the AFRC the figures are even lower (McKay & Mazurana 2004: 100-101). 
Where the women did join DDR programmes, the programmes were badly 
designed when it came to addressing women’s specific needs related to – among 
other things – security and health care during the encampment period, and to 
                                               
2
  Source: NCDDR, August 2002, in Tushi & Meek 2003: 33-34. 
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social, cultural and psychological issues during reinsertion and reintegration 
(Shepler 2002; de Watteville 2002; Farr 2002).3  
In general, the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, many of 
whom fall into the category of youth, has been seen as successful although this 
conclusion is premature regarding reintegration. The formal DDR programme 
ended in December 2003. At a practical level, there were many complaints from 
ex-combatants that the promised benefits had not been delivered (Richards et al. 
2003: 27). As mentioned earlier, there were also social problems with reinte-
gration. Most of the youth that became involved in the conflict refer to social 
exclusion as a reason for joining but it seems reasonable to ask whether this will 
change after their return to society. Do they now come within reach of govern-
ment and the community and, if so, is it in a way that sends them back to the 
margins or are power relations changing? 
The Makeni motorbike drivers 
If one wants to get around in one of the provincial towns in Sierra Leone that are 
too small to make a car taxi profitable and too large to cross on foot, it is 
common to call for a ‘Honda’, a motorbike taxi driven by young men, many of 
whom are known to be former rebels: 
In Makeni (a major RUF base until the end of the war) the association [of motorbike riders] 
is smaller [than in e.g. Kenema, South East of the country] (between 100-200 members) and 
has a rather unruly, predominantly ex-combatant membership (the executive is struggling 
with basic issues like trying to get riders to ride less recklessly, to register their machines 
and to pay for insurance) Some of the bike owners appear to be ex-combatant commanders, 
who rent the bikes to riders who were formerly under their command. (Richards 2004: 37) 
Although I later learned that at least some of them are students trying to make 
money by sharing bikes depending on the hours they have to attend class, being a 
former rebel was in fact the way others introduced themselves to me when I 
approached them for the first time. Urban inhabitants often refer to the way these 
youths drive their bikes as ‘rebel behaviour’. Not uncommonly, their reckless-
ness was explained as coming from a lack of fear due to their experiences in the 
war as former combatants.  
The taxi drivers usually linger around the town’s central circle, the car parks 
and main crossroads while waiting for customers. At many of these places one 
can also find youth earning a small income exchanging money with international 
visitors and staff. While this activity used to be carried out quite fairly and 
openly on the streets, the police and town’s representatives forced them, amid 
much indignation, into the back alleys when a commercial bank opened a branch 
in town. The youth felt they were trying their best to earn an honest income 
                                               
3
  More on women and the DDR programme can be found in the next chapter. 
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having found a niche in the market but were now being treated as illegal traders 
who should not carry out their activities in public. It is the same feeling of 
outrage caused a few months before after the town’s administration called for 
‘Operation Free Flow’. During this operation, the town’s streets were cleared 
overnight of all the street vendors and other commercial activities that usually 
took place on the sidewalks. The main complaint from those who felt swept away 
from their business spots, however, was that the authorities did not bother to 
assign an appropriate place for them where they could continue to trade and, 
because of that, they felt that their serious and genuine attempts to make a living 
were being frustrated merely because the authorities wanted to show their power. 
Tension between the motorbike drivers and the police as representatives of 
law and order was tangible. From the police side, this was directly linked to the 
violence they had suffered at the hands of the rebels. It appeared that their 
attitude towards the motorbike drivers, who they strongly associated with former 
rebel combatants, was based on a combination of grudges and fear. This feeling 
was not only directed towards male youth but also towards the women who were 
associated with the rebels. In an informal conversation with a police officer about 
whether he would consider remarrying a woman who had spent time with the 
rebels during the war, he said: 
“It would not be possible for me to marry a woman originally from the south or east 
[Mende] because I would not want to go there and ask their parents for me to marry her. 
This people killed too many of my colleagues. I don’t believe these people went with them 
by force. Maybe the girls who were taken from the villages. But those who came from the 
towns, they went with them to gain, to loot. For me as a police officer it is not possible to 
marry one of them. It is against our code of conduct. It is because I live between the 
civilians, you know. It is different for the soldiers; they live in their own barracks outside 
town. But for us from the police, we live here between the civilians and what would happen 
if she behaved like she did in the bush and other people would come to me….”4 
The motorbike drivers in their turn were suspicious of the police’s real 
motives in their actions, saying that they were always ready to fine the bike riders 
for minor (traffic) offences as a revenge for acts of war. Mistrust came to a 
climax and nearly led to a violent eruption when a motorbike taxi driver was 
killed in a car accident and fellow drivers did not trust the police to handle the 
body respectfully on the way to the surgical ward of the hospital in the next 
town. 
This incident led to an intervention by UNAMSIL CivPol in an attempt to 
bring together police and bike riders to cooperate in a common cause. With the 
help of the Makeni Motorbike Riders Association, a small survey was carried out 
to find out who was and who was not registered for insurance and had a driver’s 
                                               
4
  The English used in the interview fragments has not been edited. Any irregularities in the use of 
grammar derive from my attempt to translate and transcribe close to the Krio that was used by the 
interviewees and the interpreters. 
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licence. Strikingly, the drivers who participated in the survey were honest about 
the fact that almost none of them were actually registered, which meant they 
were open about the informal character of their activities. Those who took part in 
the survey and subsequent registration were offered an opportunity to acquire a 
formal driver’s licence free of charge (to be paid for by DFID) after they had 
attended a short training course, given by local police officers, in proper traffic 
behaviour including traffic regulations. An interesting detail was that one of 
these officers was a woman who herself used to ride a motorbike and because of 
her experience, she apparently gained some extra respect with the bike riders. In 
the end, over a hundred drivers were registered as official drivers and their 
licences were presented to them at a final ceremony at which community stake-
holders were also present. During the ceremony, which included the distribution 
of specially made t-shirts for the participants, speeches by the stakeholders and 
soft drinks and food afterwards, the new responsibilities of these drivers were 
announced, and hopefully consolidated. The drivers were explicitly presented as 
having been transformed from youth engaged in informal, uncontrollable, semi-
criminal activities into service providers who could now be held accountable and 
be expected to demonstrate specific responsibilities, obligations and behaviour. 
In a metaphorical sense, what happened was the transformation of the bike 
riders as a group representing alleged rebels, proven ex-combatants and symboli-
cally rebellious youth into their own group linked with the community through 
commercial service. It was also an attempt to neutralize the tension between 
representatives of authority and a group associated with ex-combatants based on 
recent history and memories. Through the ceremony, the drivers who participated 
gained acknowledgement of their activities and moved from exclusion in the 
informal sector to inclusion (through formal registration) in the community as 
professionals. However, all this did not fully clear the air of the tensions between 
motorbike drivers and police officers. By creating a formalized group, those who 
did not become part of it became more illegal and more informal than before 
when there were no formalized drivers at all. Some of the drivers who did not get 
onto the training course (for reasons that remained unclear to me) expected to be 
hassled by the police even more. Unfortunately my fieldwork period was not 
long enough to conduct any follow-up on this issue.  
Meaning of youth in contemporary Sierra Leone 
Once the Sierra Leonean war had started, youth found themselves in an environ-
ment of general economic decline and with little or no access to education or 
employment opportunities due to political and economic exclusion and social and 
cultural marginalization. This made them prone to recruitment. Ten years of war 
did not increase the availability of education and employment, and it is still very 
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difficult even today for youth to make a living in contemporary Sierra Leone, 
which is even more ravished than ten years ago. “We are strained” is what many 
of them said every-day. What has changed, however, is the national discussion of 
youth as a category of relevance, which has drawn attention to their social and 
cultural position. The National Youth Policy (GoSL 2003) subtly defines youth 
along the lines of social and economic needs instead of as a bare age bracket: 
The policy [national youth policy] defines youth as all Sierra Leonean female and male 
between the ages of 15 and 35. This bracket is exposed to multiple influences and requires a 
variety of social, economic and practical support to realize their full potentials. […] This 
does not exclude any young Sierra Leonean liable to youth related needs, concerns and 
influences. (GoSL 2003: 2, 6) 
In Sierra Leone, the social and cultural understanding of adulthood is to a 
large extent linked to economic independence. To make the full transformation 
from child via youth to adulthood requires them to be able to support a family 
(wife and children) of their own. “The transition from youth to adult depends on 
the success achieved by the individual” (WCRWC 2002: 11). Sometimes it is 
argued that in communities in Sierra Leone one only finds women, children, 
youth and elders, with the dichotomy between youth and elders reflecting mainly 
a difference in power and status. The political history of Sierra Leone shows how 
far the difference between elders (or ‘big men’) and youth can go in conse-
quences. In addition to that, the understanding of youth is also gender-biased, 
meaning that it refers to boys and young men. “This is in large part because girls 
are considered children until they are married, when they become women” 
(Ibid.). It is not difficult to understand that in the problematic contemporary 
social, political and economic situation in which Sierra Leone finds itself, the age 
bracket of youth is stretched to a maximum. Not uncommonly one can hear adult 
men (meaning physically adult and according to international age standards) say: 
“We are youth, what is there for us to do?” Within this comment, frustration is 
stated about unfulfilled potential. They do not refer to a phase in personal 
development but to a position in society in which the economic, social and 
cultural have become entangled. Hence, the society’s break line runs along gene-
rations, with the majority being youth and in the position of a minority. 
Through participation in the war, youth have become highly associated with 
violence. This is reflected in the National Youth Policy in one of its explicitly 
mentioned objectives: “to mobilize youth of all ages to replace the culture of 
violence with a culture of peace, dialogue and responsible citizenry” (GoSL 
2003: 4). However, to focus on youth as a group in itself with the potential to 
agitate, forces attention away from the problematic relationship of youth with 
society. The problem of youth in Sierra Leone does not lie with the group itself 
but in the place they are given in the social and cultural landscape. The violence 
they participated in was not their violence as part of their youth culture but youth 
48 
 
became prone to being pulled into violence stirred up by others as a result of 
general cultural understanding and the practice of generational relations. 
Knowing now that they are associated with the ability to rebel, they can 
manipulate fear in society against them. They are conscious of the recognition 
they might receive for being marginalized in the past and they now choose to 
participate no matter what. On the one hand, youth are exploiting the fear in 
society and their own eagerness to participate in illegal activities and using it to 
legitimize these activities by suggesting that society is not giving them the 
opportunity to do otherwise. On the other hand, they are constructively negoti-
ating their position in the community and using their empowerment to appeal to 
elders to transform power relations. 
The National Youth Policy addresses the responsibilities of youth to actively 
refrain from violence against the national community, as well as the responsi-
bilities of adults (read: elders) to provide space for youth to develop and prosper 
in different domains of every-day life (see Box 1). How this will work out in 
practice within communities depends on local history, socio-geographical  
 
 
Box 1  Responsibilities as formulated by the Sierra Leonean government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responsibilities of youths (GoSL 2003: 8) 
 Youths should strive to meaningfully contribute to the social, cultural, economic and 
political development of this nation.  
 Youths must respect and maintain the laws of Sierra Leone. 
 Youths must refrain from all forms of violence, substance drugs, and practice safe 
sex habits. 
 Youths must strive to promote the policy of national reconciliation. 
 To promote peace, security and development. 
 To respect and protect public property. 
 To promote gender equality and respect for the rights and dignity of girls and 
women. 
 To discourage acts of violence, crime, exploitation and oppression of vulnerable 
groups. 
 To actively participate in the fight against STDs (STIs) and the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. 
 To honour and respect Sierra Leone’s national symbols. 
 To promote and defend democracy through active participation in the democratic 
process at all levels.  
 
Responsibilities of parents/guardians/relevant authorities (GoSL 2003: 9) 
 To ensure protection, affection and stability for youths within the age bracket 15-18. 
 To enhance physical, psychological, sociological and economic developments of 
youths. 
 To ensure protection without overpowering them. 
 To recognize the potentials of young people and guide them to develop their abilities 
and talents. 
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features and the attitudes of community members, both elders and youth. A 
constructive acknowledgement of the position of youth in the community would 
focus on inclusion and approach, promoting links between representatives of 
different generations. Such a relationship between community and individual 
social life would carry the recognition of youth participation in conflict being a 
matter for the community. A negative relationship between youth and others in 
the community or family, based on fear and mistrust or disempowerment and ex-
clusion, perpetuates the root causes of the massive youth participation in Sierra 
Leone’s civil war. After being disarmed and demobilized, many of the former 
combatants shifted in social identity from being a rebel or combatant to being 
considered youth. The logical next step is to assign them an appropriate place in 
communities and in society as a whole to prevent them from turning against these 
same communities again, which actually means they are given opportunities to 
reintegrate. The example of the Makeni motorbike drivers illustrated how such a 
change in relations might come about. 
During my fieldwork, the general discourse on ways to relate to the recent 
experience of war was expressed by the Krio phrase ‘the war don don’. People 
were eager to forgive and forget in order to finally leave the war behind and 
move on and they appeared to be very conscious of the fact that this would only 
happen if revenge and mistrust were kept out of the public domain, notwith-
standing personal feelings and attitudes.5 Shaw (2005) explores the rationale 
behind this attitude, which in western perception appears to be too noble to be 
true. While contesting the use of truth telling (through Truth and Reconciliation 
Committees) in the process of social reconstruction in Sierra Leone, she con-
vincingly argues that Sierra Leone’s deeper historical legacy of violence consti-
tuted a grassroots practice of social recovery based on ‘social forgetting’: 
Social forgetting is a different process from individual forgetting, in that people still have 
personal memories of the violence. But speaking of the violence – especially in public – 
was (and is) viewed as encouraging its return, calling it forth when it is still very close and 
might at any moment erupt again. […] Social forgetting is a refusal to reproduce the 
violence by talking about it publicly. (Shaw 2005: 9) 
The social identity of combatants is linked to violence. Social forgetting helps 
to ‘unmake’ past violence and ‘remake’ ex-combatants as new social persons 
(Ibid.). Although youth themselves walk a fine line when they refer to the use of 
violence to back up their negotiations with the community about their position, in 
the process of the reconstruction of Sierra Leonean society there seems to be 
space to renegotiate the social and cultural positioning of youth. 
                                               
5
  See also Chapter 7 where I elaborate further on the notion of ‘the war don don’. 
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Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the core of this thesis, which is the case of young women 
who became affiliated with fighting factions during the war, specifically through 
non-combatant roles. The objective is to clarify these women’s experiences and 
roles during the war in relation to the larger framework of gender relations. The 
following section elaborates on the meaning of a female gender identity and 
women’s social and cultural positions in Sierra Leonean society in general. In 
doing so, it is hard not to mention initiation into Bondo society because it plays a 
key role in the construction of a gender identity for girls turning into adult 
women. In the next section, the context of conflict comes to the fore when 
exploring the meaning of gender-based violence used during the war against 
women. Following this, I elaborate on women’s positions in conflict. I will try to 
break down the false victim-perpetrator dichotomy that still often features in 
presentations of women in conflict. Next, an analysis is offered of the possible 
meaning of the forced marriage arrangements in which these women were 
involved after being captured by rebels during the war. It is based on the 
hypothesis that these marriages carried elements of victimization and survival at 
the same time. The final section shows how the gender blindness of the 
demobilization policy excluded many women from the programmes and benefits 
offered to ex-combatants in the transition phase from war to peace.  
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The construction of gender identity 
While I am working on my field notes at the back of the house on the outskirts of 
Makeni, a loud noise disturbs my concentration. Its rhythm reminds me of 
drumming and it seems to be coming closer. When I go onto the front porch to 
see what is happening, a large group of girls – probably between ten and twenty 
years old – is passing along the street in a typical half-dancing half-running 
fashion, while singing and clapping their hands. They are all carrying big bundles 
of wood on their heads. Dust from the street swirls up from under their feet. 
People around stop their activities for a while and some of the women in the 
neighbourhood join in with the singing and clapping. My next-door neighbour, 
Fatmata, jumps up and down on the veranda shouting: “This is Sierra Leone 
culture!” A few minutes later, after the girls have disappeared out of sight, she 
and I are sitting at the kitchen table on the veranda of her house where she 
explains to me that these girls from a nearby community are on their way to be 
initiated into Bondo society. In a very revealing way, she tells me how genital 
mutilation is part of the initiation. At the end of her ‘lecture’ Fatmata emphasizes 
again that this – ‘the secret society’ – is a part of Sierra Leone culture which she 
is proud of. She makes a promise to arrange for me to be present a few weeks 
later for, what is called ‘the pulling out’ of the girls, which for them will mark 
the end of the initiation period. Then, they will be presented to the community as 
marriageable women.  
Bondo society, in English also referred to as the ‘secret society’, is to be 
found throughout Sierra Leone, with the Krio being an exception, and is 
organized along gender lines (WCRWC 2002: 32). The male equivalent is known 
as Poro.1 One might say that next to kinship and marriage, it is the most 
important social institution in Sierra Leone. In the context of this thesis it is of 
interest because it is such a clear example of an institutionalized form in the way 
collective cultural perceptions and values are impressed upon individuals, thus 
mediating the construction of social identities. The secret society creates strong 
ties between members and specifically among age groups who are initiated at the 
same time (Richards 2004: 15). The female society is strongly associated with its 
controversial practice of female genital mutilation (in Sierra Leone also referred 
to as female circumcision). Although there are NGOs, both national and 
international, that are trying to discuss the practice in public, it is still very much 
a taboo subject (WCRWC 2002: 32-33).  
Jane, a nurse who I asked about Bondo, did not open up until I assured her 
that my interest was not so much in the practice of female circumcision itself as 
                                               
1
  In Mende the secret society for girls is called Sande. 
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in the secret society as a form of cultural education on gender issues.2 After that, 
this is what she told me about what is taught to the girls during initiation about 
becoming a woman: 
“Well, they teach you how to show respect to an elder. How you show that you know that 
the one you greet is an elder, you don’t just stand up straight, but you kneel like this [she 
shows me how]. They used to take you into the bush for a long time, weeks or months, 
sometimes up to six months. And when you then came out, you would be all changed. You 
put on very nice clothes and these beads around your waist and then you would be the finest 
woman in the community. In former days they also used to take you into society just before 
you got married, when you were big, like me [she is in her early twenties].  
So then they would teach you about man and woman and about your body. If you would 
not go into the society you would be afraid of men. You would be scared if a man touches 
your breast. But in the society they teach you about these things. And they tell you how to 
run the house and to obey your husband and to be humble. If they then take you into the 
society by the age that you can get married you will be prepared.  
And if they initiate you, they can see if you are still a virgin. If you are not a virgin 
anymore they tell your parents and they will tell the man who marries you. If he loves you it 
is not too big a problem. Today it is not a big problem except in the rural areas.  
But nowadays, they take little girls from five years into the society. And by the time they 
will get married they have forgotten about what they have been taught in the bush.3 They 
don’t stay in the bush for weeks anymore. Just two or three weeks. They also tell you stories 
and history. About the people in the community, about what happened to who and the 
history of the community. They tell you all that when you are in the bush.  
The society is everywhere the same and you can hear from the songs. They teach songs. 
There is sort of a national song that is about the same for the whole society and then they 
teach you more personal ones. If you can hear them sing you can go in and then they will 
take you into society. You will hear the drums and the songs soon. They do it with the 
harvest because then there is plenty of food and it is cheaper. Now, because of the schools 
they do it for Christmas holidays.  
Going into the society will make you change, you change, when you come out, people are 
nice to you, they prepare food for you, you dress nice, and you will be different. If you 
don’t go through the society you don’t belong. If you want to go to community meetings 
you have nothing to say, or they chase you away. They say that you are not one of them. 
They will laugh. You are different if you did not go through society, we are all women but 
still you are different. Like there is a door and you cannot go through.  
Today we are more educated; there are girls who refuse to go into the bush. When you are 
a teenager they cannot force you that is why they now take them at such a young age 
because they cannot say anything. The society really changes you but now it is not as nice 
anymore. Now it is just a waste of food.” 
Jane’s first reluctance to share with me what Bondo is about is related to the 
fact that it is indeed a ‘secret’ society. Almost all the participants in the fieldwork 
                                               
2
  Although I do have my own concerns about the practice of female genital mutilation, I also believe 
that a debate on the issue should not isolate it from its cultural, political and economic context. This 
particular thesis is not the time or place for an in-depth discussion on the issue. 
3 
 When I checked the information on the average age for initiation with Ms Kh. Bah she stated that it 
was always the practice to initiate girls at a very young age starting as young as six years old. It has 
also been the practice to initiate before the age of 20. The average age then will be in a wide range 
between nine and sixteen years old (personal communication). 
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had been initiated but apart from mentioning that they had been ‘to the bush’, 
which is the way they refer to the initiation, they did not want to reveal any more: 
“You know, those things, we are not supposed to talk about it. It is just forbidden to talk 
about it. So I cannot tell you why we do it and what happens in the bush.” 
Baindu (Mende-speaking, initiated) 
People from outside, meaning those who had not been initiated and also some 
international NGO workers would question this secrecy: 
“I don’t know why they don’t want to talk about it, it is not that secret anymore. People 
know about it. They write books about it, they discuss it on television, in the newspaper. 
Even around here, they don’t even try to keep it a secret. You hear them and you see them 
on the streets. And then they can even do it in the next room. They will only make a lot of 
noise so you don’t hear the screaming.” 
Mary (Mende-speaking, uninitiated in Bondo society) 
This however, I would argue, shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of 
the secrecy in Bondo. The existence of secret knowledge that is kept and trans-
ferred only within the society creates a distinction between those who belong and 
those who do not (yet) belong. In addition, the precept of secrecy serves to instil 
social discipline (Richards 2004: 13-15). It is, therefore, not the existence of the 
society itself that is subject to secrecy, but certain knowledge that is passed on 
within the society is withheld from those who have not been initiated.  
The Bondo society mediates culturally valued and shared knowledge concern-
ing the approved attitude towards elders with respect to age and authority and 
gender notions.4 As became clear from Jane’s account, the initiates are taught to 
show respect and obedience towards their elders. Subsequently they are taught 
what is expected of them in the role of wives and mothers. While they stay for a 
period of weeks or even months in a closed compound ‘in the bush’, they learn 
whatever they are supposed to know about maintaining a household, their posi-
tion in the marriage, sexuality and childcare. What is most important though is 
that this is all not just acquired through cognitive learning (indeed the informa-
tion itself is usually already known by the initiates) because rituals form the key 
to learning. Thus, the real knowledge is located in the experience that the initiates 
undergo while in the bush. The essential meaning of the initiation period is to 
transform girls into adult women, ready for marriage. It is not solely about ‘get-
ting the message’ across on what is culturally expected from women but it aims 
to generate a change in social personhood, which can only be reached through 
participation and experience (Bah 2000: 10-43).  
                                               
4
  At this point it might be clear why in-depth data and analysis on Bondo is scarce and difficult to 
obtain. Therefore I am very grateful that Ms Kh.A. Bah granted me permission to use her MPhil thesis 
on the subject (Kh.A. Bah (2000) Making persons: Female initiation rituals and formal education in 
Africa as structures/practices of transformation) as an additional source. Born and raised in Sierra 
Leone herself, her account of the meaning of Bondo in her thesis is based on personal knowledge and 
information derived additionally from discussions with initiated family members and relatives.  
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As mentioned earlier, the ‘secret society’ is organized along gender lines. 
Children who are initiated are not transformed into adults as such but acquire a 
gendered social personhood. Bah (2000: 39) argues that the initiation’s outcome 
is different for boys and girls: 
The gendering of boys into males results in their attainment of manhood, which then results 
into their participation in public life, which is largely the domain of men. For women, it fits 
them for reproduction. Hence while male initiation makes men, female initiation makes 
wives and mothers.  
The cultural notions on gender and generational differences, positions and 
relations that are mediated by the Bondo and Poro as social institutions, trickle 
down through society and into daily life in a wide variety of manifestations. 
Although the meaning and form of the initiations into Bondo and Poro are liable 
to change (e.g. due to the long period of war and processes of urbanization), the 
underlying notions concerning gendered personhood are, as far as I have wit-
nessed and heard, still widely supported in contemporary Sierra Leone. In the 
light of the multifaceted relations between gender and violence, which is our 
primary concern in this chapter, I want to draw on Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic 
violence, to point towards a form of structural gender-based violence present in 
society, that is related to the inequality of power embedded in gender relations 
(or in other social relations, which are shaped by domination, e.g. between gene-
rations, religion or ethnicity). The key to understanding this symbolic and deeply 
structural violence is found in his argument about the domination of men over 
women: 
Symbolic violence is instituted through the adherence that the dominated cannot fail to grant 
to the dominant (and therefore to the domination) when, to shape her thought of him, and 
herself, or, rather, her thought of her relation with him, she has only cognitive instruments 
that she shares with him and which, being no more than the embodied form of the relation 
of domination, cause that relation appear as natural […] the schemes she applies in order to 
perceive and appreciate herself, or to perceive and appreciate the dominant […] are the 
product of the embodiment of the – thereby naturalized – classifications of which her social 
being is the product. (Bourdieu 2004: 339) 
According to Bourdieu, the violence is found in processes of upbringing and 
education through which notions of domination that shape the social relation 
between the groups concerned (e.g. between men and women, between elders 
and youth) are internalized by individuals and subsequently applied in their 
perception of the other, in self-perception and in the perception of the relation-
ship between the two. Hence the domination is reproduced and perpetuated by 
both the dominated and the dominant.5 Initiation into the secret society could be 
                                               
5
  While discussing this section with my supervisor, we came to talk about the problem with Bourdieu’s 
notion of symbolic violence and how it blurs the distinction between structures that predispose 
violence to happen and violence itself. The conceptual question is whether we should define power 
inequalities (e.g. gender inequalities) that provide space for violence as violence in itself. Though I 
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seen as an institutionalized form of this process. Attitudes of obedience and 
humbleness, as Janet mentioned, are taught as characteristic of ‘good women’ in 
Sierra Leone and reflect the subordination of women in relation to men in general 
and the subordination of the wife to her husband in particular as the natural order 
of things. Furthermore, obedience and humbleness are not just taught as proper 
behaviour for women but express a form of subordination that is, through initia-
tion, supposed to be internalized into a female personhood. Although Bourdieu 
refers to symbolic violence as distinct from physical violence, but does not ex-
clude either one of them, the two do meet in situations where physical violence is 
employed and “structured to harness cultural notions of femininity, masculinity, 
procreation and nurturance […]” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004: 22) The 
ritual of female genital mutilation can be placed in this light, in that it is a form 
of physical violence used as part of a process in which femininity is internalized 
into a gender-specific personhood. 
For individual persons, self-perception and perception of social relations does 
not often result in a straightforward, one-dimensional idea on gender relations 
but rather in paradoxical and ambivalent notions. A survey among refugee and 
internally displaced women on the prevalence of war-related sexual violence in 
Sierra Leone showed that concerning attitudes toward women’s rights and roles 
in society in general, 
more than 90% of the women agreed that women and girls should have the same access to 
education as men and boys. More than 80% of women agreed that women should be able to 
express themselves freely, that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, and 
that women and girls need more education about their reproductive health. However, more 
than 80% of women also indicated that a good wife obeys her husband even if she 
disagrees. […] More than 60% of women expressed the view that a man has the right to 
beat his wife if she disobeys, and that it is a wife’s duty/obligation to have sex with her 
husband even if she does not want to. [However] The same proportion of women indicated 
women and girls need more education about their right to refuse sex. 
(PHR 2002: 55) 
We cannot understand the impact of gender-based violence in relation to vio-
lent conflict in its full dimension if we do not trace the roots of gender-based 
violence all the way back to the society in general. Conflict does not take place in 
a cultural vacuum nor can the impact and meaning of this violence be solely 
defined within the time-span and context of the conflict. 
If we criticize policy and perspectives on the subjects of our attention as 
male-biased, we should not do so by adopting a female-biased perspective in 
return. Gender as a cultural and analytical concept is not about ‘women’s issues’ 
                                               
 
acknowledge the problematic implications of Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence, I have still 
found it useful in this case to link gender-based violence committed within the context of civil violent 
conflict with a larger framework of gender relations that exists parallel to the context of civil conflict.  
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but about the cultural construction of both womanhood and manhood. Hence in 
the case of Sierra Leone, these particular gender notions also imply that, for 
young men, their potential for becoming a proper adult (or ultimately an elder) 
within the community lies in their social-cultural, political and economic 
achievements. As we saw in the previous chapter, their inability to do so, due to 
social and political exclusion together with lack of development, creates a large 
group of youth with problematic access to education and a minimum of econo-
mic opportunities. In addition to this, it could be argued that the crisis of youth 
for young men also represents a crisis in cultural and social fulfilment of person-
hood. In this line of reasoning, being considered youth then means sitting in the 
waiting room for manhood.  
For women, the status of social and cultural adulthood, or more specifically 
womanhood, is linked to marriage and motherhood. This does not mean that 
women are not present in the public domain in Sierra Leone society. They 
certainly are, at work on the land, as traders at the market or as teachers or nurses 
in the formal sector. A gendered personhood is not as much about what you do in 
society as it is about who you are in the community, although in practice the two 
are linked. Nevertheless, a woman’s social and cultural status is much less 
related to her individual achievements in the public domain but predominantly 
depends on her role as a wife and mother. Fulfilment of these particular – repro-
ductive – roles lies primarily in women’s socio-biological capacities which are 
less dependent on the socio-economic context. Hence the relationship between 
individual feminine roles and public position is directed in the opposite direction. 
As Janet uses the metaphor of a door in her story, women cannot acquire access 
to certain domains of public and social community life if they have not yet 
acquired the full status of womanhood, whereas for young men the key to the 
door to adulthood is found in public achievements. For women, to become a wife 
and mother also opens doors to other positions within the community. Sometimes 
these domains are symbolic in the sense of being consulted for decisions, while 
at other times they are tangible in the sense of women actually being allowed to 
be present at community meetings where decisions are made by community 
stakeholders. 
Although young women are affected in daily life by the same problems as 
young men – such as poverty and unemployment – the social identity of youth in 
terms of political, economic and cultural exclusion from a gendered adulthood in 
effect refers mainly to young men. Young women are regarded as adults once 
they are either married or have gone through pregnancy. I would argue that this 
particular difference offers an explanation as to why male youth tend to focus on 
negotiating their position in the public domain, while young women, as we will 
see in the following chapters, focus on marriage as a strategy for social reinte-
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gration. While young men and women follow different roads, they are all hoping 
to find a respectable place and position within society from which to participate 
as adult men and women. Hence, the individual and the social-cultural self are 
entangled at the point where reintegration is found in restoration of gendered 
personhood.  
Gender-based violence in the context of conflict 
The relationship between gender and violence is made up of two directions. All 
forms of violence, whether political, economic or social, affect women and men 
differently due to gender stratifications that are inherent to all cultures and 
societies (Moser & Clark 2001: 34-39; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004: 22). 
Any analysis of such violence should ideally be informed by these gendered 
differences. Some forms of violence though, whether they are carried out within 
a context of violent civil conflict or not, do indeed qualify as being specifically 
gender-based, by which I underline the fact that this range of violence is 
grounded in existing gender notions and related disparities that are acted out by 
means of violence. 
In this section I elaborate on the meaning of gender-based violence commit-
ted in the context of violent civil conflict but before doing so I want to clarify 
what I mean by the term gender-based violence. When discussed in relation to 
violent conflict, the terms ‘sexual violence’ and ‘gender-based violence’ are 
often used interchangeable. However, I prefer to differentiate between the two. In 
their report on the use of sexual violence in the conflict in Sierra Leone, Human 
Right Watch defines sexual violence as  
an overarching term used to describe “[a]ny violence, physical or psychological, carried out 
through sexual means or by targeting sexuality.”6 Sexual violence includes rape and 
attempted rape, and such acts as forcing a person to strip naked in public, forcing two 
victims to perform sexual acts on one another or harm one another in a sexual manner, 
mutilating a person’s genitals or a woman’s breasts, and sexual slavery. (HRW 2003b: 2) 
Gender-based violence, however, should, in my opinion be perceived as 
violence which is not only carried out by means of unequal gender relations but 
which can or should be understood as a direct or indirect aggressive and harmful 
manifestation of social-cultural gender constructions. Furthermore, it encom-
passses all violence that physically, psychologically and/or socially affects some-
one’s gender identity. Gender-based violence can thus either serve to confirm a 
gender-specific identity (genital mutilation) or harm an individual’s gender-
specific personhood. Sexuality and gender are inextricably linked and gender-
                                               
6
  United Nations, Contemporary forms of slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like 
practices during armed conflict, Final Report submitted by Ms Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur 
(New York: United Nations, 1998), E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1998/13, pp. 7-8. 
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based violence is essentially about power. Sexual violence is the most obvious 
but not the sole form of gender-based violence. Although the forced marriage 
arrangements that women in this study experienced during the war are often 
referred to as sexual slavery – and thus a form of sexual violence – I prefer to 
understand them as a prolonged form of gender-based violence in which repeti-
tive sexual violence was embedded.  
Whereas outside the context of widespread civil conflict, gender-based vio-
lence is often perceived as interpersonal and impacting on the individual wo-
man’s psychological and social wellbeing, the politics of the conflict shape the 
meaning of the gender-based violence used. The occurrence of gender-based 
violence during some contemporary African civil wars brings its social-cultural, 
economic and political dimension to the fore. This is not least because of the 
massive scale on which it is employed and the fact that it has usually been carried 
out in the open in full view of the community. Gender-based violence does not 
only violate someone’s bodily and personal integrity. Through the way it affects 
the victim’s gender identity it also violates social and cultural personhood (with 
stigmatization as a result), which has consequences for the economic, political 
and social relations that are connected with it. Furthermore, everything a 
women’s bodily and social person stands for in a community is victimized by 
gender-based violence. Sideris (2001: 148) argues that the ways in which women 
are raped, for example, pervert social norms and thus are an attack not only on 
the woman herself but also on the social and cultural integrity of the community 
she is part of. Widespread gender-based violence strategically used in civil 
conflict aims at social and cultural destruction. To acknowledge the social 
dimension of rape does not degrade the impact of the attack on the individual, 
nor does it ignore the individual’s personal experience. I agree with Sideris 
(Ibid.) when she states – while explaining that the trauma of rape is multi-
dimensional – that “this interdependence of the individual and social dimensions 
of the trauma of rape in war provides victims with an opportunity to avoid pri-
vatization of the damage and to recognize the socio-political intent of the 
attacks”. Subsequently she argues that although women who are raped during a 
war are not at all confused about who is to blame for what they had to suffer, this 
does not always free them from feelings of shame (Ibid.: 149-150). After all, 
guilt and shame are two different things. 
Turshen (2001) links rape as an example of gender-based violence directly to 
the political-economic domain by posing the thesis that large-scale wartime rape 
and abduction of women rests on the recognition of, first, women as property 
and, second, women’s links with property. She argues that women’s assets reside 
in their productive and reproductive labour and in their access to assets like land 
and livestock. Women are often captured as war booty. Being used as cooks, 
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prostitutes, porters or wives means that their productive labour is transferred to 
their captors. The acquisition of their reproductive labour becomes even more 
cruelly evident in ethnic wars when women are either strategically made preg-
nant in order to give birth to the enemies’ offspring or they are violated in such a 
way that they become unable to give birth at all. To target women’s ability to 
bear children also means depriving a community of its future. Women’s links 
with property are found in the notion that I mentioned in Chapter Three, that 
social and cultural identities are very often linked to access to resources. Through 
social relations around marriage and kinship, women’s access to these properties 
is often arranged. The harm done to women that break this link with property 
lasts well into the aftermath of the war: 
The economic consequences of the loss of current assets and of the ability to generate future 
assets resonate for a lifetime. The political consequences of loss of status or standing in 
one’s community, which is the first instance of women’s citizenship, are not well studied or 
understood. For African women whose economic self-sufficiency is tied to their community 
standing, the political and economic consequences of rape [or forced marriage arrange-
ments] are inextricably intertwined. (Turshen 2001: 67) 
In the following chapters on women’s daily situations and life experiences 
regarding their reintegration, it will become clearer how the social, cultural and 
economic effects are related and are of great influence in their day-to-day 
livelihoods. The stories the women tell show how they are trying to re-establish 
social relations to regain access to existing networks and resources or to create 
new networks and find new resources. As stated in the previous section, we 
cannot begin to understand what it means for a young girl or woman to be 
captured by a rebel and taken as his wife and through the course of events to give 
birth to his children, if we do not first understand what it means to be a wife or 
mother in a given cultural context. Pre-conflict gender notions might be subject 
to change due to the often massive scale on which gender-based violence is 
carried out in times of violent conflict but that transformation of meaning is not 
something that goes without saying. From what I have seen in the field, I believe 
that many of the problems that the women who participated in this study had to 
face in their reintegration show that society’s systems of meaning have not 
changed in a way that constructively addresses the outcome of recent history. 
While, for example, the group of single mothers probably increased in number 
throughout the war, the community’s perceptions of single mothers may not yet 
have changed accordingly. This can explain why women opt to stay in their 
wartime marriage arrangements and, for the sake of survival in the aftermath, do 
not escape the violence that affected them during the war. Women can only 
partially escape from the gender-based violence that they experienced during the 
war, such as being captured as a ‘wife’. The structural gender framework that 
links the social position of adult women to the status of marriage is still in place 
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and if it does change at all, its pace does not seem to keep up with the women’s 
reintegration.  
Women’s positioning and roles in conflict 
In various presentations on women’s positions and roles in conflict I have found 
that the victim-perpetrator dichotomy often features, with women being pre-
sented as mere passive victims as opposed to the male perpetrators. Though its 
empirical validity has been repeatedly contested by academic work on the subject 
of gender and conflict, this dichotomy still appears to be difficult to eliminate. I 
argue that it should be understood as predominantly reflecting a spectator’s view 
that arises from conceptual simplifications of the complex social reality of vio-
lent conflict which serves as an analytical tool for our outsiders’ understanding of 
this reality. A problem arises when we subsequently use and perceive the same 
concepts as being descriptive of social reality.  
Let us first explore the issue of women being perceived as passive subjects of 
the acts of violence they faced. While working on this thesis I have been con-
fronted many times with images of women living in conflict-prone areas and 
presented by the media as the mere victim of cruel acts of sexual atrocities. I 
have attempted in the thesis to draw attention to and create an understanding of 
the situation in which these young women find themselves. Attention is easily 
drawn by focusing on violent acts. When we ‘see’ an act of violence we often 
perceive the situation as interaction between a (passive) victim and a(n) (active) 
perpetrator. The most predictable emotional response then is outrage towards the 
perpetrator and pity for the victim. The risk of locking the participants in these 
single-dimensional roles lies right around the corner. Outrage and pity which the 
violence calls for reflect to a large extent our emotional and moral reactions to 
what we witness and do not automatically imply an understanding of the impact 
(short- or long-term) of the violence for those who are affected by it. The 
essential point I want to make here is that especially when conducting qualitative 
research on emotionally filled topics like (gender-based) violence, the researcher 
(or the spectator for that matter) is at risk of addressing his/her own feelings of 
outrage towards this violence and pity for the victims by seeing those involved 
only as clear perpetrators and victims.  
I believe that in this case, apart from high levels of researcher reflexivity, it 
helps to focus on participants’ strategies rather than on the violent events they 
were drawn into, which then provides space to emphasize the participants’ 
agency in coping with such situations. It does not deny that women have been 
victimized by the violence they have faced but it moves beyond the actual 
situation to see how their positions and roles change in time and in the situations 
that follow. I want to emphasize that in doing so the account and analysis offers 
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an additional narrative in relation to existing ones on the acts of violence, not an 
alternative one.  
Most of the women who participated in the fieldwork clearly stated that they 
had been captured, by which they meant that they had been drawn into the 
conflict by force.7 With this remark they dissociate themselves from the real or 
feared accusation of voluntary participation in the conflict. During the time I was 
in Sierra Leone, I got the impression that for the communities I lived in, the 
dichotomy between victim and non-victim was not so much a distinction between 
victim and perpetrator as it was the difference between voluntary and forced 
participation in the conflict. With this, the social reality of violent conflict in 
which the distinction between victim and perpetrator becomes blurred and 
inconsistent is partly acknowledged. However, perceptions of either forced or 
voluntarily participation are also inconsistent throughout the course of the con-
flict, something which is not always equally acknowledged. McKay & Mazurana 
(2004: 34-39) state that the time that girls spend in the bush is often linked by the 
community with voluntarism. This means that the community might feel that the 
longer a girl stayed in the bush the more likely it is she stayed there voluntarily. 
In addition, in the eyes of the community, the longer she stayed in the bush, the 
more likely it is she participated in all kind of atrocities and became an associate 
of the rebels instead of a captive. And Shepler (2002: 56) found in her study, 
which was conducted at the end of the war, examples that showed that within the 
communities they wanted to reintegrate into, boys and young men were much 
more likely to be accepted on the assumption that their participation in the con-
flict had been on a forced basis while young women who had suffered gender-
based violence were more or less blamed for the situations they had found them-
selves in during the war. In my own interaction with participants, I chose not to 
question how they had been captured, and took their account of their participa-
tion being on a forced basis as an uncontested ‘fact’. By so doing, apart from 
reasons of ethics, I hoped to create space in which the participants did not feel 
the need to stay fixed in their role of victim in order to convince me of their 
participation being involuntarily. Furthermore, by not contesting the status of 
their participation, I sought to pay attention not just to what they had been 
victimized by but to what they themselves had done to survive this. I thus moved 
my focus beyond the period of the violent conflict itself and to their current 
situation and problems.  
Another implication of the – as I would thus argue false – victim-perpetrator 
dichotomy is the myth regarding women not fitting the combatant’s role and 
                                               
7
  The only exception to this was some of the young women and girls in the village who stated that some 
of the combatants who occupied their village said that they wanted them ‘for marriage’. They were, 
therefore, not actually captured and taken away by the combatants as the village itself was taken over 
by the rebels. See also Chapter Seven. 
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position. I believe that the central misassumption that keeps this myth alive is the 
confusion of conflict in general with militarized conflict and a subsequent focus 
on women’s minor participation in armed conflict as combatants. Nevertheless, 
the position of women being both passive victims and non-combatants have been 
challenged and deconstructed by several case studies that focus on women’s 
agency and their diverse roles in conflict (see e.g. Turshen & Twagizamariya 
1998; Moser & Clark 2001; Meintjes et al. 2001). Notwithstanding the observa-
tion that female fighters do exist, only a few of the women in this study did, 
according to their own accounts, actually pick up a gun. My focus was not 
specifically or exclusively on female fighters but predominantly on those young 
women who had been captured and were taken along with combatants as the 
‘civil group’ or the civil attachment, which was how some of them referred to 
their status. These groups were comprised of women, young men and children 
who supported the combatants mainly in non-combatant tasks and roles. How-
ever in the eyes of the affected communities, one does not have to handle a gun 
and become an armed combatant to be a perpetrator or active participant. Some 
women described how they were forced to participate in so-called ‘food-finding 
missions’: 
“We moved from another village to another village. There were more women with us that 
were also captured. I did the housework. We also went into the villages for food finding. 
When they entered a village with fire the civilians would ran away. And they would leave 
the food. The goats, sheep, chickens, rice everything; we would take it and carry it to our 
base. This was the way that we lived. We women also had to go on these food findings. If 
you were from the south, you come here to the north and they would harass people, take 
their food from them. They sometimes would kill you for your food. And they took 
everything away.” 
Women in conflict to a large extent take on traditional gender roles as they 
are taken into the bush with their captors. Although women may not have been 
prominent as combatants (which is still very much a masculine domain), the 
fulfilment of these roles and tasks did not prevent them from being perceived as 
an accessory in the crimes committed, whether forced or not. Thus, if we want to 
oppose the perception of women involved in conflict as passive non-combatant 
victims, we should not only point to those who become combatants and have 
taken on roles that are normally perceived as masculine but we should also see 
how women become participants through non-combatant roles and note that they 
are sometimes perceived as perpetrators because of the feminine roles they 
reproduce in the course of the conflict.  
Forced marriage arrangements  
Many women were directly affected by the war when they were captured during 
raids on their villages or schools and subsequently held in forced marriage 
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arrangements with their captors in conflict zones. Women generally refer to this 
as ‘being taken to the bush’. It is interesting to note here that the same descrip-
tion is used for initiation rituals. Not only did these activities literally take place 
in the bush (in contrast to the locations of settlement, e.g. town or village) but 
‘the bush’ is a strong metaphor in Sierra Leone with multiple meanings depend-
ing on the context in which it is used. It is beyond the reach of this thesis to 
elaborate on all these meanings. However the phrases ‘bush marriage’, ‘bush 
children’ and ‘bush behaviour’ are used in reference to the war and at the time of 
the study had a negative connotation. Notwithstanding the aggressive nature and 
cruelty of this captivity, after being captured, taken into the rebel movement and 
away from home, the construction of relations with people within the group in 
parallel with friendship and marriage served as a way of surviving for some 
women. 
“I was not feeling happy, but when they captured me, because of my life, protecting my life 
I decided to live with them, feeling lively, for me not to be killed. I made friends in the 
group, for me not to sit lonely, because if I would sit like that they would kill me. So that’s 
why I decided to make friends.” 
Marriage in this context refers to a relationship between a (rebel) man and 
(civilian) woman that is extended in time and behavioural patterns beyond the 
actual moment of capture or act of sexual violence, like rape. Women were taken 
from their homes and in many cases were forced to live with the man who had 
captured them. Sometimes they were given to other men in the group as wives. In 
cases where the captured girls were considered too young to be placed in a 
marriage-arrangement they would be given to a couple within the group to help 
with housework such as fetching water.  
“The man that captured me took me to his wife. And the wife was taking care of me. I was 
their until I was matured and then one man told me to get this sort of marriage. Not legal but 
we should be together. This man was also with the rebels. The people accepted and I 
accepted also, so I went to live with this man and I gave birth to a baby boy. This boy is 
with my mother now. At this moment my man is in prison. He was arrested in Makeni, six 
months ago now.” 
“I was 22 years by then. When I was captured I was taken to the base. We as women 
would take care of preparing food at the base. The boy that captured me gave me to his 
commander as a wife. I did this because of my life, I was not happy with it, but it was the 
only thing I could do to save myself. He had three wives. During that marriage I gave birth 
to two children, boys. They are with my mother now in Kenema and they are going to 
school.” 
Many of the women who were captured spent months or even years in the 
rebel group until finally peace came. Some of them are still living with their 
‘rebel husbands’. The use of the word ‘marriage’ seems misplaced when defining 
such a relationship. In the interviews, women also appeared to struggle to find 
the right word to refer to the ways they were or had been attached to rebel men 
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during and after the war, using phrases like “I was with this man”, but never-
theless the outcome was often the word ‘marriage’ although many of them stated 
that it was at the same time not ‘a real marriage’. Indeed, romantic notions of 
love as a basis for marriage and voluntarily preparedness to share a long life 
together were not the basis of most of these relations. However, seen from a 
perspective of social organization, the implications the forced arrangements car-
ried for attitudes, responsibilities and behaviour between captured women and 
rebel men do reflect, in some ways, the cultural notions of gender relations and 
marriage arrangements existing in Sierra Leonean society irrespective of the 
context of conflict.  
“The man that captured me, I am still with him now and we have three children now 
together. If I would have been asked I would not have chosen him as a husband, but it was 
because of the gun. I was captured and forced to be with him. During the whole time I was 
with this one husband. Some of the other men in the unit had more women; some have 
three, just like in normal life. [Giggling] Some women got three men during the war.” 
As mentioned earlier, being attached to one man in particular within the rebel 
group and having a husband offered a way of survival. Where the wife is res-
ponsible for housework, cooking and cleaning, for providing sex and taking care 
of the children, the husband’s responsibility would have been to offer physical 
protection against additional acts of violence and the provision of an income 
either in money or goods.  
“The one that captured me took me to be his wife. I have one child with the man. The man 
was killed during the war. My child is four years old now. I stayed with this man five years. 
It was not a real marriage. It was because it saved my life. If I would refuse, they would kill 
me. If he [the RUF husband] was around town I was fine, but if he was not around then 
another RUF man came to harass me. This is the way they do. Because it was their own 
time, you know, there was no government, it was the RUF time.” 
Women were cut off from civilian life outside the world of the bush camps, 
disconnected from supportive networks such as family and community, with 
options for escape being at best limited and at worst impossible. Opportunities 
for finding refuge were uncertain because of the way former rebels or partici-
pants were viewed by the surrounding, victimized communities. Women were 
therefore conscious that they had to find strategies for survival within the rebel 
groups. The marriage arrangements, being a bonding relationship within the 
group, offered access and entitlements within the enclave of the rebel movement. 
Once in the group, friendship and ‘marriages’ opened up networks of reciprocity 
and the result was a certain degree of personal security within the larger context 
of chaos, violence and uncertainty.  
In addition to the physical dimension of survival, the reproduction of forms of 
social organization could be interpreted as survival in what I would call the 
relational sphere of day-to-day life. This was then reached through the recon-
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struction of the social world at a more symbolic and conceptual level. To under-
stand this completely, we should again grasp how and where violent conflict in 
certain civil wars has affected the social world. Nordstrom (1997: 169) argues 
that:  
What a civil war like the one in Mozambique does is remove the battlefield and the place of 
torture to the civil area; both the public and the private got pulled into a war zone. […] The 
torture is haled into the centre of home and community. The social universe itself becomes 
the victim. 
The interconnection between civil life and the context of violent conflict 
evolved in Sierra Leone in two directions. Some towns and villages were taken 
over by the rebels and daily life in the affected areas became saturated with war-
related activities. The war entered the women’s social world and when women 
were captured they were literally pulled away from civilian life into conflict 
zones. In both situations, part of life in the affected communities and within the 
bush camps still evolved around mundane day-to-day activities. Children had to 
be taken care of, food had to be prepared. The division of labour and relations 
between persons were to a large extent shaped in line with the codes of conduct 
in Sierra Leone prior to the war.  
Taking this into account, I would argue that part of the agency of people 
being dragged into violent conflict that enters their social worlds and confronts 
them with unfamiliar situations lies in their ability to reproduce and transform, 
where necessary, elements of social and cultural structure in order to be able to 
relate to changed circumstances. Survival in this interpretation becomes a matter 
of upholding the normal as far as possible within a context in which normality is 
placed under constant threat. To take part in the construction of the social world 
along familiar paths and patterns, women move from being passive victims of 
rebel cruelty to survivors whose agency is found not as much in the decon-
struction of the world around the bush camp through participation in violence as 
in reconstructing a social world to survive under given circumstances. Through 
marriage arrangements, women either consciously or intuitively addressed the 
non-rebel social roles of their male counterparts. In relational terms, one could 
say that interaction between male rebels and captured wives was not only shaped 
through perpetrator-victim roles but also through husband-wife positioning. 
Stories told by the women suggest that there were differences between the rebel 
groups regarding the treatment of women. Some women stated that in the group 
that captured them, the commander had some sort of control over the other 
combatants concerning their behaviour towards women.  
The husband-wife relationship, however, also implies space for good and bad 
husbands. Some women stated that their husband-captors treated them well, 
meaning that there was no further violence within the relationship, while other 
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women were not as lucky and suffered additional domestic violence. This can 
also be understood as the reproduction of non-conflict-related behavioural pat-
terns within a context of conflict. But the context of conflict does make the 
women in such situations even more vulnerable and their options to control, in-
fluence or escape the situation are limited. At the same time, the context of 
violence can enforce the occurrence of domestic violence with the rebel-husband 
being in a more powerful position (with the woman perceived as war booty that 
can be treated as one pleases) and all of them being surrounded by violence in all 
its dimensions. Notwithstanding differences between husbands’ attitudes, it could 
be said hat while women were victimized by being captured, war violence and 
the rebel-captive relationship, survival was partly found in the construction of 
husband-wife positioning. This placed women in the ambivalent and paradoxical 
position that arises from becoming an agent in their own victimizing situation.  
Gender-based exclusion from disarmament and demobilization 
For many who were involved in the conflict through participation in one of the 
fighting forces, registration in the main disarmament, demobilization and rein-
tegration programme (DDR) marked the transition phase from war to peace. 
Several authors have pointed to the practical reality of how these programmes 
have often turned out to be badly designed when targeting women associated 
with the fighting forces and serving their specific needs during and after encamp-
ment (e.g. Farr 2002, 2003; de Watteville 2002). Heyzer (2003), for example, 
distinguishes three trends regarding gender in DDR processes. She argues that 
these programmes tend to target mainly male combatants. Secondly she states 
that in these programmes the so-called civil groups (e.g. women who were ab-
ducted and served as ‘wives’) are not recognized and, thirdly, that the special 
needs of (female) dependants of (male) combatants are often not included in the 
different phases of these programmes (Ibid.: 9). Stories I heard from ex-com-
batants and women who have been associated with the fighting factions in Sierra 
Leone suggest that problems for these groups began right from the start with the 
way selection and registration for the DDR programme in Sierra Leone was 
arranged. Disarmament and demobilization are, as the words connote, essentially 
highly militarized events. The main objective is to get arms and guns out of 
society and to break up the organized fighting groups. The benefits that often 
accompany such a programme – like skills training, a toolkit and ‘start off’ 
money – are not only meant to smooth reinsertion and reintegration but are also 
needed as trading material for guns and warfare (though this is not expressed 
openly). 
Initially, registration for the DDR programme in Sierra Leone was done using 
a one-man-one-gun criterion. This meant that anyone who wanted to qualify for 
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DDR registration, with the exception of children up to the age of fifteen, had to 
hand over a gun. Since women were less likely to carry a gun or arms, this policy 
made it difficult for them to register. Later, when it became clear that this policy 
of registration was not bringing in enough combatants for disarmament, group 
registration became possible. If handing over a certain number of arms, guns and 
munitions, a larger group of combatants would be registered at once. At first 
glance one could say that this strategy improved access to the DDR programme 
for women in so far as it offered an opportunity for women who had not 
explicitly been combatants themselves to register. However in practice, for a 
group of combatants to be registered it was up to the commander to identify 
those under his responsibility. Since the captured women were linked to a group 
of combatants through their captors, they still had to depend on male combatants 
to be registered. In exchange for access to the DDR and its alleged benefits, 
forced marriage arrangements for some women were extended into the transition 
phase. Another effect of this policy may have been an ethnically based practice 
of swapping women just prior to registration. Some participants have suggested 
that captured Temne women and girls were left behind as single women and 
mothers, while other Mende women were identified as wives by their Mende 
commanders. Policy blindness for the specific female roles and positions in 
conflict also led to exclusion in some situations from the DDR of those women 
who tried to register for the programme independently, as Khadija mentions in 
her account:  
“During the war we stayed here in Makeni, the house is still there. We were with more than 
twenty. We were left behind with only the girls and we went together to the UNAMSIL. 
When the peace came they said let us go to the Town Hall, for us to go and register. They 
want to come and disarm. But we went there and they said let us wait. So the place where 
we wait, the UNAMSIL met us there and they told us that they can only talk to those who 
have guns. For we, we don have guns so they don consider us. Only those who had guns 
they disarm, they pay them, they give them some instrument. If you say you want to do 
tailoring, after the course they would give you the machine and other things. If you say you 
want to do gara tie-dyeing, any job you want to do, after you’re finishing they have things 
to give you. But some of us we don have arms, we don disarm and we don have benefit 
from them. None of us got into DDR, only those whose husband left them with guns.” 
Other women told me that they had also been sent away by UNAMSIL with 
the comment that they were now free. Though this might reflect the perspective 
of the military involved and the fact that they had actually freed the women from 
their male captors and this was a positive thing, it did not indicate an insight into 
the complexities of the positions and roles these women found themselves in 
throughout the war.  
Not only do data suggest that the DDR programme was difficult to enrol in 
for single (captured) women without a gun and thus to gain access to help and 
benefits, it has also been suggested that women were less likely to opt for 
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entering formal DDR programmes. I would argue that to some extent this has to 
do with the militarized and masculine discourse used in DDR programmes. 
Women who were captured and tried to stay away from the actual fighting while 
in the bush were less likely to identify themselves as being combatants who 
qualified for disarmament and demobilization. Nor did they politicize their 
position in the conflict as much as male combatants would and thus feel that 
joining the DDR was something they were entitled to do in exchange for keeping 
the peace. Shepler (2002: 56) found that women were more likely to be subjected 
to stigmatization in the aftermath of war than male combatants and therefore 
were more likely to choose strategies that would not reveal their status as former 
combatants or ‘bush wives’. Hence, they were less likely to participate in DDR 
programmes because this might emphasize their connection with fighting 
factions during the war. 
Problems with designing DDR programmes to ensure they achieve their aims 
as well as fitting the needs of those who are supposed to be reached arise from 
the difficulties of making policies in such a way that they fit the complex social 
reality of violent conflict and its aftermath. Categorization is used to assign help 
and access to programmes for specific groups of people. However in reality this 
provides access to one group but inherently excludes others, which easily 
provokes those excluded, especially in a context where expectations of outside 
help are very high. Some of the women’s bitterness in Sierra Leone was reflected 
in their statement that if the country were to relapse into violence they had 
learned that they would need to make sure they got hold of a gun, if only to be 
able to get benefits afterwards. 
Women who missed out on participating in the DDR programme missed out 
on the chance of getting additional skills training and starting capital. Conse-
quently, they had to start afresh and had nothing to rely on. Nevertheless, even 
those who did follow such training have had to face severe problems in daily life 
in post-conflict Sierra Leone, living in a country in ruins and suffering from 
severe poverty. While the focus in the following chapters is on their reintegration 
under difficult circumstances, we should realize that in the end the success of the 
reintegration of these women and the country’s recovery as a whole will be 
defined not only through dealing with the heritage of the conflict itself but also 
with Sierra Leone’s general development in all its dimensions.  
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Introduction 
“I was born in 1978 in a village in Bo district. I was the eldest of six. One boy, five girls. 
My father’s sister also lived with us with her daughter. My father was a driver for a 
Lebanese, my mother used to sell some small vegetables. I went to school up to form five 
[secondary school]. I stopped school because the war came to us. I was captured in 1995 
when they attacked our village. All the people got scattered and many of us were captured 
and taken to the base into the bush. 
I got a husband there. That was the way you were protected. I did not get any children 
with him. He did not treat me bad. It was bad time because of the war, but the man himself 
was nice to me. He did not make me work hard labour. I just had to fetch food. Before the 
end of the war we separated because of another woman. Then I went to live with my friend 
and her husband who were also in the bush.  
I was disarmed in Makeni. The friend that I was with by that time gave me some arms to 
get registered. I was registered at first but when these people came back from Freetown my 
name was not on the list anymore and therefore I did not get into reintegration. When I was 
in Makeni I met a man who liked me and he took care of me. He rented a room for me and 
we lived like boyfriend and girlfriend. I did not have to do anything in return, except for the 
love that was between us. But now he went to Freetown to stay there.  
I don’t have any work to make a living. I live with a friend who is with a husband and he 
has a job, so he brings in money and she gives me some small money and food. There are 
about five of us at the house that depend on her. Here in Makeni I have my Mende friends 
and we take care of each other. We all ended up here because of the war.  
Sometimes I would wish to go home to my village. My parents got separated during the 
war, but my mother lives in my village and my father lives in a village that is very close. I 
am a stranger in Makeni and that means that I have no right to land here. Home is home. In 
the village my family has land so if I could go back I would always have something there. 
My parents would accept me but the other people in the community would say: your 
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daughter has been in the bush for a long time and now see what she came back with, 
nothing at all.”  
Baindu, taken by RUF, 25 years old 
This chapter presents and analyses fieldwork material on reintegration pro-
cesses with the focus on the establishment of highly personalized social relations 
which harbour basic human security at the level of the individual and community 
life. It places the women’s personal accounts, which were gathered in Makeni,– 
like the one above –at the centre of the discussion. The group of women I was 
interested in were those who had spent time during the war in the bush with one 
of the fighting forces – the majority of whom had been with the RUF – and were 
very diverse. Some of them went to school for a few years, some had never done 
so; some of them grew up with their parents, others were raised by members of 
their extended families. Some of them had spent years in the bush; others were 
captured and held by the rebel movement for a period of months only. Some of 
them originated from the southern province and were Mende; for others the 
northern part of the country was their homeland. However, similarities such as 
their position as ‘bush wives’ and the reintegration strategies they developed 
derive from the events they describe. Their stories could also therefore be read as 
representing a much larger group that remains largely invisible in the literature 
on reintegration as well as in the country’s reintegration policy. In my opinion, 
the similarities can be interpreted as the outcome of a shared social and cultural 
context in which the individual lives of the women and their reintegration come 
about. 
The chapter shows that the process of reintegration is highly influenced by 
the options women chose to shape their lives on a day-to-day basis in the after-
math of the war. Though most of the women had already (temporarily) settled in 
Makeni during the war together with the RUF, after the final peace they had to 
relocate in the social fabric of this urban community. The following section ex-
plores Makeni town as the context for this process and as a place that had to be 
shared by former combatants and civilians. It gives examples of how the ex-
combatants’ presence in town has been negotiated. For the women in forced 
marriage arrangements, the transformation from war to peace meant the moment 
to reconsider this situation. In the next section I discuss how women relate to 
their ‘bush marriages’ and what the meaning of marriage is in relation to reinte-
gration. Given the fact that kinship networks are one of the most essential social 
networks in Sierra Leone, I elaborate in the following section on the options for 
women to go back to former communities to re-establish kinship relations. I 
argue that their reluctance to do so is rooted in the fear of reprisals as well as in 
cultural notions on their position as daughters and adult women. In the following 
section the link between day-to-day survival and social relations is made and I 
73 
 
explain how social relations have an important influence on access to the assets 
and capabilities needed to develop livelihood strategies. If these livelihood stra-
tegies remain insufficient, reciprocity can make a difference in survival. In the 
last section, I explore examples of the social relations that women are maintain-
ing in which reciprocity plays an important role. It shows how the exchange of 
commodities based on personalized relations turns these very relations into as-
sets. 
Makeni: A place to be shared 
Surrounded by green hills and bare rock formations, Makeni town is a two- to 
three-hour drive from Freetown depending on the road, one’s car and weather 
conditions. It serves as the capital of Sierra Leone’s Northern Province.1 Al-
though people in Freetown, Sierra Leoneans as well as members of the inter-
national community, consider Makeni to be a post ‘in the provinces’ or ‘up-
country’ − by which they basically mean ‘in the middle of nowhere’ − the town 
has the atmosphere of an urban centre in a rural area. Three main, surfaced roads 
connect Makeni with the other corners of the country, making Makeni the admi-
nistrative and commercial heart of a rural area. Economic activities are concen-
trated around the town’s centre, Independence Square, and the car parks where 
the shared taxis and poda podas2 depart from.  
Ethnically the population of Makeni (and the north in general) is predomi-
nantly Temne. Most of the Northerners are Muslims but Christian churches are 
also to be found and at the time the fieldwork was conducted I did not pick up on 
any obvious signs of religious division that bore the potential for violent conflict. 
Both Christian and Muslim prayers precede every group or community meeting. 
One of the interviewees phrased her attitude towards religious differences as a 
matter of sharing the same concepts using different modes of expression: “Every-
one calls on God, but we have different names for God, which is the dialect to do 
so.” At least on the surface, the people of Sierra Leone seem to have mastered 
peaceful coexistence when it comes to religious diversity.  
Before the war, just over 100,000 people lived in Makeni but during the war 
the population decreased to half of that number.3 By 2004 Makeni was growing 
                                               
1
  Sierra Leone is divided into three provinces and one area: the Southern, Eastern and Northern Pro-
vinces and the Western Area which covers the Freetown Peninsula (see Map on p. x). The Northern 
Province includes five of the twelve districts: Tonkolili, Koinadugu, Kambia, Port Loko and Bombali 
district. Makeni is located in Bombali District.  
2  Poda poda means literally ‘back and forth’ or ‘up and down’ and is the Krio name for the mini-buses 
used for public transport. 
3 
 It turned out to be extremely difficult to find reliable data on the current population, which is under-
standable as a country recently emerged from ten years of civil war. NGO workers, government 
statistics and all kinds of websites give figures that range from 50,000 to 100,000. Often it is not clear 
whether satellite villages are included in the count or not. The main point I want to make here is that 
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again, although not all the facilities it once had were back in place. The running 
water system has not been restored and although the pylons are still standing, 
there is no electricity unless you can afford to pay for petrol to run a generator. In 
a country devastated like Sierra Leone, it is not surprising that only a few find 
themselves in such a fortunate position. During the dry season Makeni is known 
to be the hottest place of the country and the water wells tend to dry up for a 
couple of weeks each year. People (mainly women and children) then have to 
walk to places outside town or into the swamps to fill their buckets with water.  
As in any West African town, the streets are full of women and children 
carrying plates on their heads and selling small foodstuffs like fruit, groundnuts 
or cakes. Carpenters use the sidewalks as a shop-window and the tailors do the 
same with their porches. There are a few nightclubs, a government hospital, a 
teachers’ training college and a stadium.4 Celtel recently connected Makeni to the 
country’s mobile phone network, roads are being fixed and at the beginning of 
2004 a branch of the Sierra Leonean Commercial Bank opened in the town. In 
the future, these improvements may encourage the return of former inhabitants 
which could again make Makeni the bustling town it once was before the war. A 
handful of NGOs, bilateral donor organizations and UN organizations that 
developed and implemented programmes for the North have set up their regional 
offices in town. On the outskirts of town are the UNAMSIL offices where, until 
mid-September 2003, peacekeeping forces were based. With the planned pull-out 
of UNAMSIL, these military forces were transferred to Liberia. A small team of 
Milobs, CivPol and Civil Affairs officers have remained and were still there 
during the period when this fieldwork was conducted.5 
The town was not directly affected by the war until late 1997 when the RUF 
lost power in the south and east and moved north. By that time, inhabitants who 
had an opportunity to find refuge elsewhere had left the area and Makeni became 
a ghost town. The RUF took over the town and turned it into their headquarters 
and stronghold. It is said that the population in the north was less politically 
opposed to the RUF than in the south and east. Several people in the study also 
                                               
 
the population of Makeni experienced huge changes throughout the war and it is still changing in the 
course of reconstruction and rehabilitation.  
4
  I was told that the stadium was one of the first community buildings rehabilitated with help of 
UNAMSIL peacekeepers. The logic behind this is that it serves as a gesture to the local people, to 
boost sports activities (which are often seen as bringing together inhabitants in an atmosphere of 
friendly competition and community) and it is a good place from which an evacuation can be 
organized in the case of security problems. (A stadium surrounded by walls can be secured and the 
football field makes a perfect helipad.)  
5 
 Milobs are a multinational team of military observers whose main task is to stay up to date on security 
issues in the region. CivPol stands for Civil Police, a multinational team of police officers that 
supports the local police force. Civilian Affairs is helping to support and re-establish the town’s 
administration.  
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stated that the RUF used less violence against civilians in this area than else-
where in the country. Resistance from civilians might have been less marked 
because stories of atrocities committed against civilians in other areas could have 
made Makeni’s residents more reluctant to openly oppose the rebels. Examples 
were also given of the RUF sharing food and materials with the civilians. This all 
probably contributed to the decision of many former RUF combatants to stay 
here after the final peace was announced and the DDR had finished.  
“Even in our own country, they [RUF] did some terrible things. They did so many wrong 
things there that no one could stop them. If they wanted somebody’s place, or if they 
wanted to take rice, they used to kill our brothers. I witnessed it. I saw them doing that. But 
in Makeni they would say “you leave your habit across the river”. Here it was a different 
thing, you can see Makeni, you can see that houses have not been so destroyed here but 
these people who came from here, they destroyed our country. But when we reached up to 
here [Makeni], he who was in power by then [in the RUF] he stopped everything. That is 
why some of us, we don’t like the behaviour of these people [those who committed the 
atrocities against civilians], they are very tribalistic [sic].”  
Mary, in the RUF since 1991 
At the time when the final peace accord was about to be signed and imple-
mented, Makeni not only accommodated those combatants who had already ar-
rived during the war but, with the town being a stronghold, it also attracted com-
batants from the surrounding areas: 
“When the ceasefire came we were still in Tongo and we travelled to Makeni, where the 
defence headquarters was. So everyone tried to come here for security reasons, so we were 
here when the final peace came.” 
In addition to this, it served as a place of refuge for those who were excluded 
or explicitly sent away from surrounding villages due to their activities during 
the war.  
For many, the decision to settle in an urban area was fuelled by very pragma-
tic but not always realistic expectations concerning jobs, training and trading 
opportunities. Disarmament and demobilization also meant that former rebels 
and combatants came out of the bush back into public and civilian life. An urban 
community offered a place where they could participate in the civilian domain 
while still under the protection of anonymity. They could go public while still 
being hidden. As far as Makeni was concerned, it is likely that feelings of being 
free from reprisal were related to the local history of the town being an RUF 
stronghold, which also offered protection to numerous ex-combatants. 
Nevertheless, the transition from war to peace meant a change in status for the 
former combatants present in town. While they had been the occupying force that 
secured power through arms and a constant threat of violence, they now had to 
negotiate for space with civilians. Encounters between civilian homeowners 
(some of whom had recently returned to town) and ex-combatants who had made 
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it their place of residence during the war involved micro-negotiations on the 
place in the community (house, compound or neighbourhood)6 assigned to 
former rebels. 
“Some of them [RUF ex-combatants] were driven away out of the houses after the disarma-
ment. The house owners came back and asked them to leave the houses. Otherwise they 
would go to the police and then the police would ask you nicely, but if they did not go, they 
would throw away your things. This chase happened in the first months.” 
“During the time that I came to Makeni there was nobody around. I was not feeling fine to 
stay because all these people have run away for the looting. Makeni was by then taken over 
by the RUF. All civilians were gone. There were only RUF. The houses were empty so I 
just entered one and lived there. That’s how the house became my own. […]. I am still 
staying in the same house. When the people came back to this house and saw that I kept the 
house clean and tidy they decided not to drive me away but they decided to let met start and 
pay. So now I pay rent for the room. This happened a lot. After the war we wanted 
everything to finish and if they would start to drive us away the war would not finish. […] 
The first time I entered Makeni, the civilians that were there provoked me because of I was 
living with the RUF. It stopped when they made announcements to stop the provoking. 
Because if you continue the provoking the war would not really end.” 
Pragmatic motives of commercial practice, the urge to execute some sort of 
people’s justice or actions driven by revenge, and individual experiences during 
the conflict and the meanings attached to them, all resulted in a perception of 
these residents by the homeowners as either unacceptable occupants based on 
their activities in the recent past or as proper and useful tenants. The same is 
relevant for interactions between neighbourhood inhabitants and the women 
associated with the RUF. 
“In the first time I experienced that people blamed me, that they accused me, that they told 
me to leave because it is not my home town that I just came to sit down here. But now after 
it is reported to the police, the police came and stopped those people. That we are all Sierra 
Leonean and that they had to stop fighting.” 
“The paramount chief, thanks to him. He sometimes speaks on behalf of the ex-combatants. 
Because some of them feel, if they go to the chief and say this ex-combatant has done this 
or that, they make an allegation and they want the chief to take action and to lock the man 
up. But this chief is somehow different. Otherwise we would be facing a serious problem 
here. They really intended to fight us. After the war they said they would do some society 
ceremonies to take us away. They will fight the Mendes to leave this town. Some of us 
Mende, the war brought us here, but most of us still voted for the RUF, [by which the 
interviewee attempts to make a difference between forced recruitment and voluntary 
conscription] so lets get them out of Makeni [the people will say]. That fighting, except for 
the chief it was stopped. So that is why we are strangers here, but we are not dead, we are 
alive.” 
                                               
6
  The wide-open streets of Makeni are lined with big houses that have a veranda in front where people 
meet, sit and talk. These houses are mostly rented out per room to families and therefore usually 
crammed with people. A few houses often share a back compound where a cooking place can be 
found. For the individual, the people living in the same house or compound form their closest 
community unit. 
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“At first when we came some people used to look at the houses for long and say these ones 
burned our houses. And they were looking at us in a different way in the society. They used 
to call me bush girl, rebel and they said we had sicknesses from the bush.” 
These remarks underscore the fact that, especially in the first months, the 
outcome of any negotiations was frequently negative for the ex-combatants. 
After a few months, once the moment of transition from war to peace had passed 
and campaigns for reconciliation had started, open stigmatization and the reject-
ion of former combatants seems to have faded from the public domain. None of 
the interviewees mentioned any incidents like these having occurred recently. 
Nevertheless, social relations between former combatants and the town’s civili-
ans were still a subject for negotiation in a more indirect manner, as is described 
in the following paragraphs. 
Reconsidering ‘bush’ marriage arrangements  
In the previous chapter the meaning of forced marriage arrangements during the 
war was explored. By the time the war was about to end and when the DDR was 
going to start, women found themselves in a situation in which they could re-
consider these relations. Some decided to stay with their captor-husband, even 
though their decision often rested on ambivalent emotions and perceptions of this 
relationship. 
“I don’t really like that type of marriage; the war forced me into this. We have been together 
until he has been arrested. I am having some sort of sympathy for him. I cannot leave him 
now he is in prison. I am feeling bad for the child, because it came not out of a proper 
marriage and now the child is under my control and not the father’s. It is like the child has 
no father. If you are legally married the father has control over the child.”7 
“But for now things are better. I am still with the same man, but he is not doing that to me 
any longer because he knows that the war is finished and he has no longer that power to do 
that to me. I want to stay with my husband for the time that I am here in Makeni, I would 
not want him to go to look for another wife, but when I get the chance to go home, then the 
thing between him and me would be finished.” 
From these extracts we can see that women have feelings of responsibilities 
towards the men who captured them, towards their children from these relation-
ships and also towards themselves as wives. As I argued before, for women in 
Sierra Leone to be married by a certain age plays a key role in acquiring a 
respectable social status. To become a ‘proper’ woman means becoming some-
one’s wife. It also means they are taken care of. And in Sierra Leonean society 
people implicitly expect that behind every woman there is a man to take care of 
her, either her father, her brothers and from a marriageable age a husband. This 
helps to explain why the woman in the second fragment wants to be related to her 
                                               
7
  According to kinship traditions, it is common in Sierra Leone that the children born into a marriage 
are linked to the father’s family.  
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husband at least as long as there is no other alternative. She seems to weigh the 
means against the end. Although her personal feelings towards the man and the 
relationship forced on her might reflect the opposite, the marriage does at least 
secure, to a certain extent, her social and cultural identity as a wife and a woman. 
It also provides security for her children with a connection to their father, and 
therefore their position in the community or kinship network.  
Some of the women were determined to leave their rebel husbands. Among 
other influencing factors, this appeared to be associated with the low level of 
self-identification these women had with the rebel group and the extent to which 
their relationships were perceived as contextual and situational: 
“When I came to town I decided to fall apart with my man because what we had was just a 
war issue. That is why my husband did not disarm me. I chose to leave the marriage because 
it was a forced one. I stayed in Makeni from that time. I did take my children with me.” 
Subsequently these women focused on getting into a new marriage to re-
establish an accepted social position but at the same time they are worried about 
their chances with men. Considering their position in the community, they de-
fined their status as unmarried women or single mothers as the key problem. It is 
this that differentiates them from their peer group and makes them a potential 
laughing stock.  
“They only laugh at us because we are not yet married. And at this age I am supposed to be 
married. I want to be married now but there is no husband. The difficulty is that most of 
them they know that we have been captured by the rebels and they are afraid of us. The fact 
that we were with the rebels makes them afraid of us. Local men prefer women that were 
not captured. At this moment I make a living to keep boyfriend. He gives me money and 
buys clothes and food. My mother does not have money to do that for me because there is 
no business. So my boyfriend now gives me money to buy clothes and food for my son and 
me. So that’s the way that I live for now. I found him in Freetown. He met me to the house 
and he asked me if I had husband. I said no but I have a son. So he said he wants me to be 
his wife, but I don’t know whether it is going to be true or not. Since I left here I did not see 
him, I did not receive any letter or money. I do think that the community looks different at 
me than at the ones that were not captured. For example those that have not been captured 
they have now been married. But we that have been captured we have no husbands, so you 
see the difference. The difference between them and we is that they are now married and we 
are not married. Only God knows if we need to get married to get respect, but for me I don’t 
feel good about it. I want to get married.” 
That they were captured at a marriageable age and have now moved a couple 
of years beyond that, that they have been with another man and that they might 
have children to take care of does not help them as candidates for marriage. This 
is especially true considering the fact that their potential husbands are young men 
who find themselves socially and economically in a difficult position. Currently 
in Sierra Leone (and in other African societies) male youth tend to marry at an 
older age because it is more difficult for them to become economically indepen-
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dent enough to take care of a family of their own. This makes them even more 
reluctant to marry a woman who has children from a previous relationship. 
“It is difficult to find an actual husband that I can like to marry. The men are telling lies 
around here because of the war. Some of them if they want to know you as a woman, if they 
want to use you, they would just come and lie and say that they want you for marry. So you 
will have hope and trust them, you just live with them because of this man promised me a 
marriage. They know that she has no money, so I can stay with her and tell her to marry. 
You stay with him for a long time but if he has to start giving money he will just leave you 
for another woman. This is the way the men get rid of women now. Even if they tell you 
they want you for love, they have awareness that we women don’t want anybody for love 
now. It is time for us now, time for love has passed. They know that we need marriage for 
now and that is what they promise us now and when it comes to that they leave us.” 
In a society where the social, cultural and economic position of women is 
inextricably linked to their reproductive roles, women become dependant on men 
for survival. This makes them vulnerable in their relations with these men. This 
resulted during the war in bush marriages being to a certain extent a survival 
strategy while, in the aftermath, marriage has become a tool for social reintegra-
tion. Women tactically reproduced existing social patterns in a context of war, 
violence, chaos and destruction. In the end it has helped them to survive. In a 
changing situation from violent conflict to peace, they have had to re-evaluate 
their situation. Although the decisions made among the participants in this study 
differed, they are all to be understood within the larger cultural framework that 
defines gender relations and assigns a key role to the social institution of marri-
age. Although women are vulnerable in such a framework, they are also actors 
who reproduce it based on a hegemonic understanding of the relations. For many 
of these women, marriage appears to be a tool for reintegration and at the same 
time marriage becomes an important indicator of successful reintegration. 
Coming home, going home? 
Women currently living in Makeni who were taken into the bush with the RUF 
during the war had different reasons for coming to Makeni in the first place. For 
some it was their hometown when the war affected them. For them to return to 
town after the war meant coming home to a familiar place and often coming back 
to relatives. In this situation, women’s reintegration was indeed a re-establish-
ment of social relations within a community that was once familiar. An example 
is the story of Khadija, who grew up in Makeni where her mother supported the 
family by selling pans, plates and buckets. Even during the war she returned to 
town with the RUF, with whom she had spent time in the bush. After the final 
peace agreement she managed to re-establish relations with her family and now 
lives with her mother and grandmother in the same house in which she was 
captured. She is responsible for two of her four siblings: 
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“When the war came they captured me. That was in 1998. I lived with them and I became 
pregnant. When they captured me they took me to Magburaka, to the base there and we 
stayed there for one year. We went back to Makeni with the whole group. […] After the 
peace came I came back to this compound. Before coming to the house I met some of my 
friends and I asked them to go to the house and talk to my parents to tell them that I was not 
willing to live with those peoples [the RUF]. But because of my life and they said they 
would give me I decided to live with them, so please let them [her family] forgive me. They 
came and talked to them to accept me back, to come to the house. Some of the other people 
are not willing to accept us, some of the community they laugh at us. They say they 
captured us and in the end we have no benefit. I was not feeling good about that. Now they 
have stopped laughing at us.” 
A slightly different situation is found in the stories of other young women 
who are Temne speakers from the north and who were taken away from their 
villages by the RUF. They either ended up in Makeni with the rebel movement 
during the war or they came to town to settle after the DDR started. Aminata’s 
story represents the young women who decided that resettling in the village 
where they were captured would not offer sufficient economic or social opportu-
nities. Apart from survival opportunities, these women sought anonymity in the 
urban region and the fear of reprisal and stigmatization appears to keep them 
from going home.8 At the time of this study Aminata was 28 years old and the 
mother of two children born before the war. She is now also responsible for 
taking care of her mother and little sister. When the small town she lived in 
before the war was attacked by the RUF, her husband was killed and she had the 
choice of either joining the RUF or being killed. She then became separated from 
her children and the war ended when she was in Lungi but she did not qualify for 
DDR. She found one of her sons, who by then was a former child combatant. 
Because of this she did benefit from any financial support for transportation back 
north. Later she found her other son in Port Loko. She decided to go to her 
mother’s village, being afraid and ashamed to return to the place she had lived 
before with her husband. Her mother was happy to see her back alive and 
Aminata was able to explain herself (as she phrased it) and received under-
standing for the fact she was forced to join the RUF. To her mother (and also to 
me during interviews) she repeatedly stressed that she hated the atrocities the 
RUF had committed and that she had never participated in them. Together with 
her mother she then decided to settle in Makeni. They feel their options for the 
future are better there because everyone in the village knows she spent time with 
the RUF. In Makeni they found anonymity and only a small network of people 
now know about her past. She believes that in general, former RUF combatants 
are accepted in Makeni but nevertheless having been previously associated with 
                                               
8 
 The director of one of the NGOs in Makeni that provided training, counseling and assistance for ex-
combatants, child soldiers and former rebel wives confirmed that after a reunification process with the 
family and community some women eventually decided to leave to return to town in the hope of 
finding better opportunities (personal communication, November 2003). 
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the rebels, they have to be careful not to make a mistake. From time to time her 
mother travels back to the village where they still have access to land.  
Most of the women represented in this study, however, are Mende speakers 
who came originally from the south and spent a long time with the RUF. Baindu, 
whose personal account opened this chapter, is one of them. After the war had 
officially come to an end, like the other women, they also faced the choice be-
tween going back home or staying in Makeni. Although the Mende women often 
expressed their wish to return home during the conversations I had with them, 
they also gave the impression of being reluctant to act. The initial answer given 
when asked what held them back was a complaint of having a lack of money for 
transport. This however proved to conceal more complex reasons and ambivalent 
emotions.  
As the war started in the southeast and these young women were captured in 
the early years of the war, they had spent a long time with the RUF and had often 
moved around from place to place with them before they finally arrived in 
Makeni: 
“When the war ended I was in Makeni. We travelled around in the country, we used to walk 
on foot, form Kailahun to Kono, from Kono to Makeni. If they want to move, we all moved 
together. The group was very big. There were too much of women and children. The men 
would be in front with arms, we the women, and other people who are having a problem, 
who are sick or have anything that is heavy to carry would follow and armed men would 
also be behind us to guide us. I arrived in Makeni in 1999.” 
The rebel group became their point of reference for a long period of time in 
demanding and insecure circumstances of violent conflict. While the social world 
around them was characterized by chaos, violence and threat, these women tried 
to carry on as much as possible with daily life as they knew it with the group of 
rebels who had captured them. Disconnected from their family and home com-
munity, they spent their mid-teens with the RUF, matured over the years, 
acquired husbands, became mothers and in the end they survived. Most of them 
stated that although the situation was not what they would have wished for, they 
also had to cope with it once they found themselves in that situation as the alter-
natives were limited.  
From the moment when the final peace agreement was signed, the future was 
about to change but was still very uncertain. Within the rebel group, relationships 
had been constructed that served as reciprocity networks. Most of the women 
knew friends in the RUF who they could turn to for help because they could not 
be sure of how civilians would respond to them: 
“When I needed food or money I went to the RUF. They assisted me small small. I would 
prepare food for them also and eat with them. But sometimes there was no food and then I 
would just drink water with my baby and sleep. I decided to stay with the RUF because I 
knew them, I was used to their habits and I had stayed with them for five years. I was afraid 
to stay with the civilians because of the civilians they would have a problem. If you had 
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been with the RUF they might treat you in a way that you don’t want. So I decided to just 
follow the RUF. When I think of the family I lost and remember my mother, father and 
sister I cry and feel like a stranger in Makeni. There is nothing to go back to for me in 
Kailahun. The house is burnt, the family is killed. So I stay in Makeni. I am not afraid, but 
there is nothing there for me and I make a living now in Makeni.” 
As is also mentioned in this interview fragment, for some of the women there 
simply was nothing left to go home to. Family members had been murdered or 
separated from each other or had gone missing in the war. But often it was fear of 
the way people back home might respond that made them reluctant to return after 
all these years of war. Many women stated that they expected family to be posi-
tive about them having survived the war, but that the community would respond 
negatively since they had spent years with the rebels:  
“There are other reasons why I still cannot return home. Apart from the issue of money I 
have some hesitation about my reception home because in the Tongo area there are so many 
Kamajo9 who are against the RUF very much. I’m afraid that if I go as soon as possible they 
will ill-treat me or see me very different. Except if I happen to get some sort of good 
encouraging information from the place, from a family member then I would go. But up till 
now I did not have any contact with someone there. In Makeni I still feel like a stranger. I 
don’t feel fine about my life here. We have tried to get into some programmes, but no way, 
so maybe that is because people still see us as rebels. It is not easy for us to make a living 
here. Maybe it is better at home, but I’m still afraid to go.” 
“My family would be happy to receive me because they know that I was captured. I have a 
baby over there now that I am supposed to take care for. It’s the baby that was born in the 
bush. I sent him there two years ago. I could not afford to travel myself. And the boy with 
me meant a lot of problems so I decided to send him to my mother. My brother took him. I 
was afraid to go there myself because the Kamajo was still fighting there and I was with the 
RUF. These Kamajo people are very bad. They even fight their own people. If you go to the 
village they would harass you and harass your family. They would even come and give 
some of us to marry to the elderly.” 
Sometimes interviewees expressed fear of unexpected reprisals that might not 
happen in the open. At times I encountered situations where people were on their 
guard against being poisoned. For example, I was warned many times not to 
finish a soft drink that had been left out of sight for a while in case someone had 
put something in it that would make me sick.10 A friend who organized a huge 
party for his daughter’s name-giving ceremony in the south where he originated 
from afterwards expressed his relief that everything had gone fine and no one got 
hurt. When I asked why anyone would get hurt at such a party, the answer was 
                                               
9 
 Kamajo refers to the traditional hunter groups that played a leading role in civil defence groups 
fighting the RUF. Although CDF combatants were included in the DDR programmes, the Kamajo 
itself cannot be demobilized for it is in essence a culturally embedded organization.  
10
  I have observed the fear of feuds being dealt with by poisoning the enemy’s food or drink on previous 
visits to West African countries. Apart from the vicious intent behind poisoning, taking care of food 
and drink is of course wise in an environment where disease is often spread by poor hygiene and is a 
serious threat to one’s everyday health.  
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that there were so many ex-combatants there that someone might have taken the 
opportunity to get even over past experiences. Someone else stated that: 
“They might say that everything is normal now with the ex-combatants but they take re-
venge in secret. They could poison you, invite you for a drink and say to you that they are 
now friends again and then put something in your drink that makes you sick. Or you might 
be taken into the bush for the society and then something might happen there so you don’t 
come out of the bush again.” 
Although none of the women actually knew of any specific incidents, the fear 
of reprisal was definitely present. This particular fear seems to also capture the 
more generally present fear about the way things might evolve in the near future, 
related to uncertainty over what their position might be within the community.  
In addition to these emotions, another complex cultural mechanism appears to 
be at work that prevents these young women from going back to their families. 
They all said that they felt they could not go home empty-handed: 
“My uncle took my children there. [Back to where she came from.] He came to look for the 
children when the peace came. When he came and found me I decided to give my children 
to go with him. I could not go with him because I had nothing by that time. And I am the 
eldest. I did not want to go and just sit with these people doing nothing for them. I have 
children and the burden then again would be with the people I stay with. So I told my uncle 
to go with my children. If God will provide for me I can find a job and earn some money 
and then go and join them. […] Because by that time [before the war] I was considered not 
to be able to do anything for myself and my parents would assist me. But now I am at this 
age it is not to easy for them to do anything for me now. […] Makeni is not my home, but in 
Kenema people knew me very well and they know that somehow I have been captured. If I 
would go there now in this condition people would provoke my mother. They would say to 
her, your child was in the bush and after the war she came with nothing. She is just from the 
bush. So I don’t want that kind of statement to be made about me. For my children it is 
different, because my mother gave birth to me and I am the first. If it is my own children 
than my mother makes no difference, she takes care of them. Because it is what she got 
from the higher. The other people are not that concerned about the children so they don’t 
treat them different. Them coming from the bush is not that big a problem for children.” 
As I mentioned earlier, most of these young women were in their mid-teens 
when they were taken by the RUF. Not yet fully mature (physically and, more 
importantly, culturally), they grew up away from home. Through the relationship 
they had with men, the ‘bush marriages’ and by becoming a mother while in the 
bush they became adult women according to existing cultural perceptions and 
meanings. This implies that they are now supposed to be taken care of by their 
husbands and have lost their rights to rely on their parents or older members of 
the extended family. They are in fact expected to make their own contribution to 
this family network so that younger members are supported. This probably ex-
plains why the children born in the bush, mentioned in the interview fragment 
above, are integrated in the family network and taken care of, while their mother 
decides she cannot return to her own parents because she would become a burden 
on the family. 
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In the normal (non-conflict) context, temporarily moving away from home for 
job opportunities or travelling around in the country for trading is generally 
accepted in Sierra Leone. Although a long period of migration away from home 
could result in a loss of entitlements within the community, I got the impression 
from interviewees that a period of absence is acceptable as long as one returns 
with a substantial contribution to make to the extended family and community. 
However, coming back empty-handed would be interpreted as having failed and 
would not justify one’s absence. And if one returns as an adult woman with no 
contribution to make to the family network, that would mean having failed in 
one’s role as a daughter and as a woman.  
Women like Baindu did not leave home for trading purposes or jobs else-
where in the country. They left because they were captured by a rebel movement 
at a time of violent conflict. If they did not return home empty-handed but with 
some gains or profits, they would risk being accused of having profited from the 
war. The home community would doubt their reason for leaving and whether it 
was indeed a case of enforced participation. They would be vulnerable to allega-
tions of having tagged along with the rebels on a voluntary basis and therefore 
the community would perceive them as perpetrators instead of victims, guilty in-
stead of innocent. 
This reveals a complicated dilemma for these young women. By going home 
empty-handed they expose themselves as well as their families to the negative 
moral judgment of the community. They would be seen as a cultural failure as 
daughters and women and that would have a negative influence on their own and 
their family’s position within the community. They would become the laughing 
stock of the community. However, if they had been able to somehow profit from 
their absence and brought this profit back with them to the community, they 
would risk being accused of having gained from the conflict. This would also 
place them in an unwanted position in the community. However, most of the 
women I spoke to did not appear to have gained from the war and they were 
particularly concerned about avoiding a situation in which they became a burden 
on the family. Some of them who have given birth to children while in the bush 
have sent their children to be taken care of by their own families. With the 
decision not to go back home, they not only prevent themselves from being in an 
uncomfortable position within the community but also fulfil a daughter’s respon-
sibility for maintaining the social position of their family. Through their absence, 
they protect their family from community provocation and disdain due to having 
a daughter who came home either as unsuccessful or as a perpetrator.  
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Surviving day by day: Assets, capabilities and entitlements  
Countless times during afternoons on the veranda waiting for rice to cook or 
evening to fall, I heard the women lament “we are strained”: they were strained 
in day-to-day survival and livelihood. Even before the war, Sierra Leone was 
suffering large-scale economic decline and by the time it had ended it had be-
come a war-ravaged country where opportunities were very limited. The majority 
of the population now lives in extreme poverty. In this section I focus on the 
ways women are trying to design livelihood strategies in a country where the 
possibilities to do so are restricted. Central to this is the link between these 
strategies and social relations and identities.  
At the heart of any livelihood strategy lies the use of assets, capabilities and 
entitlements. Assets (possessions like land or capital and resources one has con-
trol over) and capabilities (a person’s skills and competences) can both be em-
ployed in income-generating activities. Entitlements are rights or claims that 
groups or individuals can appeal to and derive from social and cultural structures 
and political organization. They are essential for the opportunity to acquire assets 
and capabilities. The right of access to community or family land and access to 
education are examples of entitlements relevant to livelihood strategies. Assets 
and capabilities are linked to social relations and identities through entitlements. 
Who you are socially, culturally and/or politically in a society influences what 
you are entitled to, subsequently influencing what you can acquire in terms of 
assets and capabilities. One of the things the women in this study share is their 
lack of assets and capabilities to generate sufficient income. This is due to a loss 
or a lack of entitlements related to a combination of gender notions (structural 
causes) and a wartime legacy.  
First, an illustration of what the role of assets can be in ways of making a 
living. The use of land – either to grow food for personal consumption (during 
the war the agricultural sector almost completely reverted to subsistence farming) 
or to produce a surplus crop that can be sold or exchanged for other commodities 
– is a common way in which entitlements and assets provide people with a 
tangible livelihood option. Although the privatization of land by buying and sel-
ling is taking place in some limited areas (e.g. around Freetown), access to land 
is still predominantly through kinship and community ties. Many women who 
were captured by the rebels feel that their way back to their home community 
and family is blocked and they have, consequently, lost their entitlement to 
access to land and with it an important opportunity for making a living. This loss 
of a very basic asset is a long-term consequence of the position they were put in 
during the war.11 If they want to make a living by growing crops, they now have 
                                               
11
  Three systems of law co-exist in Sierra Leone: General Law that contains statutory law and common 
law, Customary Law that is based on local tradition and customs, and Islamic Law that is only 
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to rely on negotiating access to land with those with whom they do not have a 
strong relationship. This may turn out to be less reliable because it is not as 
strongly based on a shared perception of rights, duties and regulations among 
each other as it would be among members of the same community. One parti-
cipant told me that she had made a deal with a neighbour in town to grow 
cassava on his piece of land squeezed between the houses, for which he would 
later receive part of the profit. At the end of the day, he claimed the total harvest. 
The woman herself was reluctant to claim the part of the crop she was entitled to 
because she did not come from the town and had previously been associated with 
the rebel movement.12 
In an attempt to cope with their loss of access to land, many women ex-
pressed the wish to start a small business. This is probably related to the fact that 
they lived in a more commercially oriented urban area. On the streets, in the 
markets and around the car parks of Makeni, petty trading is a very common 
commercial activity. To begin trading though, one needs either capital or 
products. Married women are commonly given an amount of money by their 
husbands to start a small business. Women who went through the DDR have 
sometimes decided to use their benefits to start a small business, for example by 
travelling to nearby villages to buy agricultural products like cassava leaves and 
selling them for a small profit in the town’s market. However, the market 
economy in post-conflict Sierra Leone does not yet appear capable of absorbing 
all these trading initiatives or of providing everyone in the market with a 
substantial daily income. I have often asked myself while looking at all the 
people: who were selling, who is buying? Petty trading seems to be a strategy for 
women and young children to acquire additional family income but is not 
sufficient to provide the lion’s share of it.  
Apart from these, what I would call asset-oriented, livelihood opportunities, 
one can improve one’s position on the labour market. Education in its broadest 
sense as a means of acquiring skills and competences is the most obvious way of 
doing so. Access to formal schooling is another example of how the available 
opportunities to increase capabilities are related to entitlements and social identi-
ties. Though the practical possibilities for attending school decreased in the 
course of the war, access to formal education had long since more to do with 
structural matters. In the chapter on youth in Sierra Leone, I explained that one of 
                                               
 
applicable in marriage, divorce and inheritance for Muslims. Customary Law and Islamic Law are 
predominantly employed in the provinces. By law, women cannot inherit property and many of the 
women who lost their husbands in the war experience problems gaining access to land because they 
are no longer entitled to the land they owned when married (HRW 2003b: 15-19).  
12
  It is important to note here that the general law system is not easy to access for women (without 
money) nor does customary law appear to have the answers yet to address these problems. 
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the pre-war complaints of youth was that access to the formal education system 
had become available only for the lucky few who maintained productive client-
patron relations. This was expressed in the phrase “education is not a right but a 
privilege”. In the context of this paragraph, I argue that a right is an entitlement 
that can be demanded by someone whereas a privilege is an entitlement that is 
granted to someone. Youth did not have the ability to empower themselves by 
using their rights to acquire assets and capabilities. They had to depend on others 
to open up opportunities to do so. The socio-cultural and political exclusion of 
youth meant a lack of entitlements which has prevented them from gaining 
control over resources and assets and from developing capabilities which are 
necessary for them to make a decent living and to become respectable adults.  
For girls and young women in Sierra Leone, being able to attend, let alone 
complete, their schooling is even less likely. If we take into account that edu-
cation is very costly and families often have to make sacrifices to send their 
children to school, then we can also understand that parents find themselves in 
the situation where they have to choose to allow only some of their children to go 
all the way through school. General gender notions instead of individual features 
(like the individual ability to learn) appear to result in girls being taken out of 
school at a younger age. Sometimes they leave school right after they have been 
initiated and when they are expected to get married. People in and around 
Makeni also used to say that girls are taken out of school once they have learned 
to count well enough to start working in the market.13  
To compensate for their lack of capabilities due to limited education, many of 
the participants are trying to get into a programme that enables them to acquire 
new skills: 
“[…] you know we have almost lost our first change. So we just try again and again, we 
have children coming up. So if we have the opportunity, if we have the money, we can 
continue schooling, but I think skill training is better … with that you can make some 
money, Le 5,000 or Le 10,000, but I make it by myself. This is self-help. Lot of these girls 
cannot pay for official schooling, but rather than sitting down and do nothing it is better to 
try and make some money.”  
Many of the national and international NGOs active in post-war Sierra Leone 
offer such training as part of their intervention and aid packages. The skills that 
women can learn in these programmes typically include Gara tie-dying, soap 
making, dressmaking and hairdressing. Some NGOs also provide literacy train-
                                               
13
  Some statistics to illustrate gender inequality concerning education:  Adult Literacy Rate, female (% 
ages 15 and above), 2003: 20.5; Adult Literacy Rate, male (% ages 15 and above), 2003: 39.8; Youth 
Literacy Rate (female rate % age 15-24), 2003: 29.9; Youth Literacy Rate (female rate as % of male 
rate), 2003: 64. Figures were retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data and reflect data 
included in the Human Development Report 2005. Sierra Leone ranks 176 out of 177 on the Human 
Development Index. On the gender-related development index, which is adjusted to account for 
gender inequalities, the country is ranked number 139. 
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ing and health education during skills programmes. National and local NGOs are 
often religiously based and, consistent with the NGOs’ main policy and goals, 
their programmes are designed to target specific groups. While many of the 
organizations work within a larger framework and discourse that addresses post-
war processes of reintegration and reconstruction, one can easily find program-
mes for ex-combatants, women and children affected by the war and for internal-
ly displaced people. I noticed different attitudes to these kinds of training pro-
grammes. Women did not always choose to register for the DDR programme and 
they are at times reluctant to participate in programmes offered by an NGO that 
is openly meant to help groups that carry a strong connotation with the recent 
history of war. Some women had social and psychological objections to identify-
ing themselves with the registration categories for certain training and aid.  
However for others, the offer of free education and training is more attractive 
and identification with certain categories is something that one can be very 
pragmatic about. While I have been in touch with both givers and receivers of 
help and aid programmes and development projects, including skills training, I 
have sensed a subtle difference in the perspective of these projects and aid 
provided between the NGOs (particularly the international ones) and the people 
(women) who are supposed to receive this help. NGOs ground their work pre-
dominantly in an ideology of ‘doing good’, as they strive to help people. Their 
primary goal is not to make money but to spend it on help and support based on a 
discourse of relief and development. Inherently this creates a situation in which 
the NGO perceives itself and the ‘other’ as participants in a relationship between 
a giver and a receiver. The result is that NGOs have a preference for receivers 
who are vulnerable or in need, which inevitably results in an unequal relation-
ship. Skills training programmes designed for war-affected women are supposed 
to help victims of war not survivors of war. To justify helping, the other is per-
ceived as being in need of help, and therefore helpless or needy. Furthermore I 
would argue that, whether it is explicitly communicated or not, the receiver is 
someone who will be uplifted by the help they are given, in the perception of 
many of the NGOs. 
From the perspective of the receivers (such as women joining a skills training 
programme), however, NGOs are merely filling the gap left by the government, 
civil servants and other institutions during the years of social and economic 
decline and ten years of war. NGOs are institutions that provide medical and 
psychosocial care, education and training, agricultural support and banking facili-
ties (micro-credit programmes) and are at the same time an important source of 
employment opportunities. Women in this study were well aware which NGOs 
offered what kinds of programmes or aid and what terms were assigned to 
individuals. They were very pragmatic and down-to-earth about the way they 
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presented themselves according to the criteria set for accessing a programme. I 
have noticed this way of anticipating an NGO’s presence, specifically among 
women who were bitter about being excluded from the DDR programmes. Also, 
women who previously did not want to participate in a DDR programme because 
they did not see themselves as ex-combatants attempted to make up for having 
missed out on the benefits by trying to get into another programme in a later 
stage of the post-war period. In their eyes, the NGOs were not as much helpers 
for the needy but alternative players in the socio-economic field. I argue that, just 
as they are not reintegrated but reintegrate, women were not waiting to be helped 
by a willing NGO worker but try to benefit as much as possible from the oppor-
tunities that have come with the international community and aid industry’s 
arrival in their communities. 
Reciprocity and the necessity of new networks 
If circumstances do not generate sufficient daily income, reciprocity can make 
the difference. Reciprocity refers to the exchange of goods, food and money 
among social equals. Not only does it reside in personalized social relations but 
at the same time affirms the same relations. Reciprocity moves back and forth on 
a double-defined continuum made up of a level of unselfishness and of closeness 
(Kottak 2000: 325-327). This implies that reciprocity does not always need to be 
altruistic. If one can get as much as possible out of the relation while giving as 
little as possible (a low level of unselfishness), it is still reciprocity-based. If the 
exchange is between two individuals who do not have any relationship apart 
from that moment of exchange itself, reciprocity slips into forms of trade. 
Because reciprocity and social relations are tightly connected, one might get an 
indication of the extent to which individuals are reintegrated in social networks 
by looking at the direction and form of reciprocity to which they have access: 
“But home is still home, there you have ways to keep your money. For example, if you have 
this pen and I come and ask you this pen, and you don’t want me to have that pen, you say 
that you don’t have a pen but that you know someone who has a pen and so and so is the 
price. And then you tell me to give you that money so you can go and buy me that pen. 
Then you just go and run to get your own pen and give it to me for that money. But you 
really don’t want to help me. That is what we are experiencing here.”  
Women who came from Makeni have now re-established relations with 
family and former friends. Some of these relations may have changed due to 
recent experiences but they all share a common history, of which the war is a 
significant part. But, as mentioned earlier, a town like Makeni hosts many who 
are not on familiar ground and live far from the community they originate from: 
they are relative strangers in town. They have not returned to networks in which 
reciprocity might renew and reconfirm social relations. They either establish new 
relations forming new networks or transform the character of recently built 
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networks which have remained from the war. I will now elaborate briefly on 
three types of relationships women have established and in which reciprocity 
plays an important part. First are relationships among those who were in the bush 
together; second is participation in a church community; and third are different 
types of individual male-female relationships. 
Mende women feel like strangers in town. Many of them complained of being 
the subject of gossip in the neighbourhood or at the market. They felt discrimi-
nated against, for example when trying to get into a training programme offered 
by local NGOs. Apart from not being able to speak the local language, which 
differentiates them immediately from other inhabitants, they are experiencing 
being perceived as the embodiment of recent history: 
“Well, it is like so, also because, if you are a Mende and you can speak Temne, if they know 
you can speak Temne they will know what to talk even if you are present. For as long as 
they know you cannot speak the dialect you are in trouble. You dress good, but they will 
talk about you. If you approach them they will start talking about you. Yes, that is the way 
most people do here. They were saying … even for us, the war came from somewhere to the 
Mende land and then they capture us. The war was brought here by a Temne man but 
because we came together with them here, they used to say we Mende brought the war. But 
the Temnes were in the war, the Mendes were there, the Konos were there, the Limbas were 
there, all of us were there. All the tribes in Sierra Leone. But because the war passed 
through the Mende land to here, they say the Mendes brought the war. They blame us for 
what happened here. They say it even if you are not responsible. Sometimes if you have 
problems, they say these are the people that spoiled our places.” 
Whether it is rooted in tangible situations of discrimination and the apparently 
hostile attitude of civilians or it is based on subjective experiences and percep-
tions, the common result is that some Mende women showed a tendency to rely 
on mainly each other’s company. Although previously captured women nowa-
days dissociate themselves explicitly from the rebel movement as a political 
entity, in practice they maintain relations with those who they knew from this 
time in the bush. In some cases, when local women are part of the rebel group 
that captured, the opportunity to get acquainted with local people does occur. In 
all situations it can be said that violence and force no longer uphold relations and 
reciprocity, in many cases found between people who were in bush together, has 
become the affirmative element.  
“When I need money now I go to different people in Makeni, I go to sisters when I know 
that they have food. Friends sometimes give me Le 1,000 or 2,000 and that is how I 
manage. I knew these friends in the bush. We were all together. Some of them came from 
here or are now married to a man and therefore they have some assistance. I don’t associate 
with the RUF anymore. These friends are just helping me, doing good.” 
“It is difficult for us, because even if there is someone willing to talk for you they will be 
afraid that people see that as a connection with the movement. I am getting by now because 
there are some friends of my man around and they assist me sometimes. But I don’t have 
nothing at all to do. The people that assist me some of them are from the RUF, some of 
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them are not, but all of them I know them from former times and the war also brought them 
to Makeni.” 
Membership of a church community offers access to a social network and this 
has often been mentioned by participants. It distinguishes itself from former 
relations in that it is not rooted in the idea of shared experiences of the war. 
Religious values such as forgiveness and charity not only provide a basis for the 
relationship of church members but also offer a framework in which women can 
find truth and meaning that helps them to relate to their own war experiences. 
Many times I have heard women call on God to explain what has happened to 
them. The church and the religious values it supports have the potential to con-
struct bridging relationships among former combatants, captured women and 
civilians. 
“I gave my testimony in church about my past, that they killed my husband, that they took 
me with them for two years, that I went to Lungi for disarmament, but I did not have a gun. 
So I explained myself in the fourth month after I came back to Makeni. I went to church and 
said I am a stranger from Freetown, but I am a Christian, so I come to join this church, I 
have no husband, I am suffering from the rebel war, I did not have any benefit. There is one 
thing; if you come alone without a husband they have this look upon you. They just think 
that you are passing by, meeting with anybody you feel like. So to let them not look at me 
with that local eyes I explained myself. That the rebels killed my husband so they 
sympathized with me, they made friends with me, they come and greet me, I go to meetings 
for the church, they know me more. Some of the ex-combatants gave testimony, some of 
them did not. Sometimes you will not know what to do. You don’t have way to get money, 
early in the morning you have to eat, you have to pay rent, and you have to do something 
about the financial problems. So if you don’t explain yourself, even though you explain 
yourself you cannot always find a person to assist you, but if you explain yourself people 
will know more about your problems. Like for myself, one of my church members found 
this place for me. When I came I said I wanted a place for rent, so he made the change for 
me.” 
“Well, the church that I go to, the pastor is a Mende but that is not why I go there. I know 
him through the institution [where she received her DDR training] He used to go to the 
institution to talk to us, to preach to people, especially the ex-combatants, on how to 
become a good citizen. He invited us to go to the church. But we meet with people in the 
church and those who we met there, if we meet them now in the streets we call ourselves 
sisters in the church. We know them, they ask you what is your name, where do you live, 
sometimes in the evening they will take the bible and visit you to talk about God. 
Sometimes there is friendliness. That helps to feel little less like a stranger.”  
Previously I argued that male-female relations are important in the process of 
socio-cultural reintegration. Women focus on getting married or choose to stay in 
a former forced marriage arrangement expecting to either acquire or maintain the 
status of being a married woman. But there is more to a marriage than social 
respect. Within a marriage the relationship is usually affirmed on a regular basis 
by reciprocal exchange. The gifts that are given and received are, depending on 
the level of wealth, sometimes the bare necessities as a bag of rice or something 
more luxurious such as a bar of soap or maybe even – and only useful in the 
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urban areas – a top-up card for a cell phone. These gifts communicate the con-
nection, commitment and mutual responsibility between two people. In these 
situations the intention of establishing a relationship or the already existent rela-
tionship is underscored by reciprocity. However, the connection between the 
social relationship and the practice of exchange might also be switched from time 
to time. Sometimes women get into a relationship in order to gain access to 
reciprocal exchange. During my fieldwork period I had noticed that one of the 
young women who participated in the study became acquainted with a young 
local man who she said worked for an international NGO. I spotted them fre-
quently sharing drinks on one of the street corners. One afternoon while she 
plaited my hair, I asked her what the deal was with this man. Did she like him? 
She started giggling and explained that she did like him a lot and that he was 
good to her. But on my question as to whether she liked him enough for marriage 
she answered firmly: “No! He is only for caretaking!” If we stretch this scale of 
relational reciprocal exchange to its end, we can also see that at the end of the 
scale the male/female interaction itself becomes the subject of exchange, when 
the relationship is good for trading, which is prostitution (in Sierra Leone pre-
dominantly referred to as commercial sex work). For some women, selling their 
own bodies in short-term encounters with men is their last option for survival. In 
terms of reciprocity, the level of unselfishness is then at its highest and the level 
of closeness at its lowest.  
In circumstances where physical survival is a day-to-day challenge I have 
seen that social relations may be affirmed, defined and preoccupied by the ex-
change of goods necessary for a livelihood and living. Through the concept of 
reciprocity, social relations become additional assets in themselves where broken 
social structures and changed socio-cultural relations result in a loss of assets and 
entitlements. Socio-cultural reintegration is not only a matter of repositioning 
oneself in a society and community but becomes a matter of survival.  
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Introduction 
Today I am again on my way to pay a visit to a village north of Makeni to gather 
additional data on reintegration in a rural setting. On previous visits to the 
village, I successfully arranged a ride with a UN or NGO car, but this time I 
decided to go by local transport. Not out of any practical motivation, nor sup-
ported by a noble ‘going native’ anthropological impetus drive but because in a 
sentimental way I missed the ‘travelling in Africa’ feeling. As I had to spend a 
couple of hours at the car park, I used my time to chat with motorbike drivers, to 
buy kola nuts for the village chief and to find cassette tapes with popular music 
for some of the participants, while I waited until the driver had gathered at least 
seven passengers, myself included, to make it profitable to get on the road. I 
turned out to be privileged to share the front seat with one of the other pas-
sengers. In the car, despite the natural air-conditioning, it is hot and the smell of 
human sweat and pojo1 mixed together tickles my nose.  
We make so many stops that the long-distance taxi drive resembles a slow 
train. At almost every village or settlement passengers board and alight. After 
some time we pick up someone who will be the ninth person in the car! I wonder 
exactly how he will be squeezed in. With astonishment and a touch of indig-
nation, I observe how this person is directed to the driver’s seat. The driver 
pushes him as if he is a package to be stowed so far towards the middle of the car 
                                               
1
  Palm wine. 
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that the man has to lift his right leg over the gear stick. Luckily the car is an 
automatic so we will not be needing it that much during the ride! Then the driver 
himself gets into the car. Before he closes the door he lifts his body up a bit, then 
slams the door and then he lowers himself, with a little help from gravity, 
between the door and the eighth passenger. I am happy to see that at least he 
holds the steering wheel with both hands – although for that he has to push the 
passenger sitting next to him in the chest and all the way into the back of the seat 
with his elbow. As a final step, the driver slings his right leg over his passenger’s 
left leg to be able to press the accelerator. We are on our way again!  
“Are you crazy?!” I ask the driver with an evident lack of empathy for 
African circumstances. “No”, he replies, “crazy, but without other options.” And 
then he shows himself as an eager teacher to explain to me how he struggles to 
make enough money to make an actual profit out of these trips. His expenditure 
for car maintenance, petrol and informal pay-offs (for example at the police 
roadblock just outside town) is high. The small amounts of money that short-
distance passengers pay him make a difference to his profit. Then one of the 
passengers in the back asks me who I think is really crazy, the driver for taking 
so many – too many – people in his car or the passengers who choose to travel 
this way? He clearly agrees with the driver: “we do things this way because there 
just is no other way available to do it”. 
The reason why I have included this passage here is that, though it is an anec-
dote without any direct relation to the conflict, for me it nevertheless strikingly 
reflects the fundamental attitude of many people in Sierra Leone regarding the 
task of living together after ten years of brutal war cracked society’s social fabric 
and unity. It also confronted me with my tendency to approach this issue with the 
wrong question in mind. I have often caught myself wondering how people in 
Sierra Leone can move on together, while the question should have been how 
people do so. ‘Can’ suggests that there is an option not to move on together, 
whereas in the social reality of Sierra Leone this option is limited or absent. 
There is hardly an opportunity not to live together because the war in Sierra 
Leone was not fought against ‘the other’ (defined along ethnic or religious lines, 
for example) but among ‘ourselves’. What remains are only various options on 
how to live together. This difference in perception which sets a clear division 
between the outsider as an analytical researcher and the participants as the ones 
who live this social reality every day became particularly clear to me during my 
visits to this village. Reintegration there was not so much a matter of individual 
trajectories of ex-combatants and/or their wives but appeared to be far more of a 
process that concerned the village community as a whole. In this village reinte-
gration seemed to be not just the (re-)establishment of social relations between 
individuals and the community but derived from these relations.  
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As mentioned earlier, during the first week of my fieldwork in Sierra Leone I 
was given the opportunity to join Khadija Bah, a consultant working for the 
World Bank, on her trip to some northern villages to gather data on female 
participation in the DDR. After this survey was done and I had settled in Makeni, 
I decided to pay some additional one and two-day visits to the village as part of 
my study. These visits became more than just an enjoyable side trip out of town 
into the country’s more remote rural areas. My initial interest was the impression 
made in these brief interviews that at least some women in this village had been 
able to successfully renegotiate their position as daughters and wives after they 
had been forcefully involved with rebel activities. While the focus for my work 
was on the social and cultural reintegration process for women in an urban area, 
these additional visits to this village provided me with an extra perspective on my 
own data. Firstly, it painted a picture of the rural community context from which 
many of the women in town originated. Secondly, the stories from this village 
suggested that notwithstanding the occurrence of large-scale stigmatization of 
formerly captured women in Sierra Leone, other trajectories and outcomes of and 
approaches to the post-conflict processes also appeared to be possible.  
Although the data from these visits are not as comprehensive as those 
gathered in Makeni, I have found it useful to see them in light of this study’s 
entirety. The difference in this data’s validity is mainly rooted in differences in 
the method used for data collection. Instead of living in the village continuously I 
went back and forth for a number of visits. The interviews were always more 
formal and were also with persons from the community in the presence of one of 
the former combatants. This particular chapter is mainly a sketch of a village 
getting wrapped up in war and coming out of it again. Nevertheless, it does show 
that in such a rural context ex-combatants and their wives reintegrate with their 
families and the village community in a more integrated way than the social 
integration strategies that women in Makeni have individually developed. This 
insight adds to our comprehension of the complexity of reintegration as a socio-
cultural process with regard to the context it takes place in. It is for this reason 
that I did not want to omit the data from this thesis, even though the information 
is in a more descriptive than analytical form. 
A community drawn into and coming out of war 
It is midday when we finally arrive at my destination. The tar road runs right 
through the village. On my left-hand side I see the remains of the former chief’s 
house. He was burnt alive while locked up in his house by the rebels as revenge 
for an old feud. On the other side is a small shop where they sell soft drinks. 
They come out of a fridge but are always lukewarm; the generator is broken. The 
sun is at its highest point in the sky. It makes the air shimmer above the road and 
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at the same time it sucks out all the depth of the scenery. People and buildings 
have lost their shadows. The light is sharp, the air is thick with dust. Women sit 
on the porches of houses which are partly or almost completely ruined as a result 
of the war and poverty – nobody really knows which. A few girls carry plates 
with peeled oranges to sell to the people in the cars, poda podas and trucks that 
pass by on a regular but not very frequent basis. There was a time when this 
village close to the district border was a bustling trading centre between Makeni 
and the towns further north. Today there is some activity at the carpenter’s 
workplace. The heat captured under the low roof of the building together with the 
wood shavings lying on the ground make it a damp and sultry place. Here I meet 
James again, a former combatant who will help me with my interviews. 
Like Makeni and northern areas in general, this particular village did not get 
drawn directly into the civil war until the late 1990s when it was first taken over 
by the AFRC.2 This faction was responsible for burning down the chief’s resi-
dence with the chief still in it. (Notwithstanding the horrific intent of this action, 
the story goes that the chief had in fact been warned before the place was set on 
fire but instead of packing his bags and leaving, he had fallen into a deep sleep 
on his bed due to alcohol. Civilians who thought he had fled the place later found 
his remains.) The AFRC was known to use atrocities and widespread terror to 
keep civilians in check. They set up a roadblock near the village to control all the 
main traffic between the two northern districts of Bombali and Koinadugu. The 
paramount chief currently in power stated that this roadblock used to be marked 
with the dead bodies of the victims killed on the spot. Later on, the village was 
taken over by Nigerian soldiers with the ECOMOG troops. When the Nigerians 
withdrew from the village (I did not clearly understand from the conversations in 
the village why this happened), the RUF, by this time separated from the AFRC, 
re-entered the village and remained in control until the final peace agreement and 
demobilization came into effect.3  
The way all three of these fighting factions and parties went about the village 
made it very hard, if not impossible, for civilians not to become involved in one 
way or another. According to the Chief’s speaker, who was the main authority in 
                                               
2
  The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was a Junta regime that seized power in May 1997 
following a military coup led by Johnny Paul Koroma. The AFRC became allies with the RUF. 
ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group which is the military force sent in by the Economic 
Community of West African States) removed the AFRC from Freetown after which President Kabbah 
could return in March 1998. However, the AFRC did not leave the stage of war completely. In 1999 
the joint RUF/AFRC split up again into two separate factions. (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 22-32) Three 
alleged members of the AFRC have been indicted and are due to face trial at the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (http://www.sc-sl.org). 
3
  ECOMOG withdrew from the country gradually while UNAMSIL took over the peace-enforcement 
and peacekeeping activities. ECOMOG’s withdrawal from Sierra Leone was completed in 2000 
(Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 27). 
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the village during the war, the AFRC’s hostile takeover of the village chased 
civilians out of the main settlements to live on their small bush farms.4 The 
speaker himself was forced at gunpoint to take the rebels to his cattle which were 
grazing on pasture further out of town. According to civilians, the AFRC were 
responsible for most of the burnings and the massive looting that took place. 
Women and girls were raped, and young men were mutilated and killed.  
ECOMOG, which attempted to clear the country of rebel activities after they 
had ousted the AFRC from power in Freetown, recruited local youth to fight on 
their behalf against the rebel factions, who then considered themselves CDF. The 
ECOMOG soldiers, however, also employed an ‘if you are not for us you are 
against us’ attitude. Every unknown young man was considered a potential rebel 
and treated as such. The ECOMOG soldiers thus also placed the village commu-
nity in a situation in which they had no choice other than to comply with those 
who had taken over the village and to let their youth actively participate in the 
fighting. When the RUF came back after ECOMOG left, they are said to have 
encouraged communication with the civilians and invited them to work out some 
sort of understanding: 
“But the rebels who occupied the place sent for us to come to town. They said that they 
were not here to harass us. Now they split power with the AFRC Junta, they were not longer 
at peace. We accepted and we left the bush to come to town. When we came here we sat 
down with their big man. We had to provide feeding for the rebels. We were charged to pay 
per months. Five hundred cups of rice, five gallon of palm oil and 5,000 Leones [sic] every 
month. This is what they wanted to receive from the paramount chief. He had seven sections 
under authority. I had to call for all the seven section to pay. This happened for some time. 
Then the road from Freetown to Kabala was reopened and they could supply the people by 
the road. We had to get some peace. When the RUF were here they invited us to leave the 
bush to come back to the town and said that they could then provide us with assistance in 
town. We lived in harmony with the rebels until the peace came with the Lomé Peace 
Accord. We had an agreement with the rebels, you take the town, and we live in the bush 
and provide you with food and that created some sort of peace. This was different from the 
time with the Junta; they would harass us in town as well as in the bush.” 
Chief’s Speaker 
James, who was my key contact person in the village, played an interesting 
role amidst all this. He is a Mende and originates from the Eastern Region of 
Sierra Leone. When the war started, he was working as a plumber for a European 
development agency. His then first wife came from the north and when the war 
came too close to their home in Bo they travelled to the Northern Region to stay 
ahead of the trouble. In the late 1990s, he arrived in the area around the village 
just when fighting was starting between the AFRC and ECOMOG. Though he 
                                               
4 
 Often cultivated fields are located outside the main villages and settlements. A small hut, no more 
than a thatched roof supported by a few poles, serves as a shelter where the family can stay from dusk 
till dawn while they work the land. During my fieldwork, many families were still living on their bush 
farms waiting for the restoration of their houses in the main village. 
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was not very explicit about it in his story, he suggested that this time was 
particularly difficult for him as a Mende because they were then seen as the 
opposition and a threat by the AFRC, ECOMOG and the local militias that had 
recently organized (CDF). By that time, his first wife had fled into Guinea but he 
did not dare to go because he did not expect to be allowed across the border as he 
would be seen as a rebel and potential troublemaker. He chose to stay in the 
village where he hoped people could vouch for him not being an enemy. When 
the RUF arrived in the village and started to negotiate their position in town with 
the civilians, James was asked to take on the role of interpreter and mediator 
between the civilians and the RUF: 
“So the RUF guys came but most of them are Mende. And they can’t speak to the civilians. 
So as soon as they overrun the town, they came and asked about the chiefdom speaker and 
said, look guys we have not come to harass anybody. The only thing is that we have 
information about these guys [AFRC] violating human rights, about raping, innocent 
killing, too much harassment.5 And the whole town gathered and the food that they took 
from the guys they gave it back to the people. So I was directly appointed, they told me, 
between them and the civilians. If they need anything they don’t have to meet the chiefdom 
speaker but I would pass the message. I was already in the community here and the speaker 
recommended me to do that because some of these guys if I am with them they would not 
be able to do any other thing, because I must apologize to them if they do the wrong thing, I 
would say no that is not a good thing to do. They told me to tell the people let nobody to 
have fear to do business. So we were living together, if they need anything they tell me to 
come to the chiefs. Most of the chiefs were on their various farms and the agreement was 
that they [RUF] have no right to go there. If they need anything they come to me and I 
would go to the chief. Any civilian who wants to travel to another point from this end, for 
him not to be harassed he would come to me and I would give him paper and if my 
signature is on that then they would know this man came from RUF controlled area, so let 
him go with no harassment.” 
Apparently this role of coordinator and mediator fitted James very well. After 
the final peace when the DDR was implemented, he was again asked to act as the 
main coordinator and to mediate between the ex-combatants in the village and 
the DDR administration. And with his role as gatekeeper and interpreter between 
me and the village community, his contribution to this study was once more one 
of continuing this position as the man at the centre and as point of access at the 
same time.  
The image that arises from all of this is of a village community that was 
becoming entangled in a situation where clear distinctions between formal and 
informal, legal and illegal, war and peace were fading and where, in order to 
survive, one had often no option other than to engage either actively or passively 
                                               
5
  From this it appears that, at least in this village, the RUF attempted to win the civilians’ trust and 
support by openly turning against the AFRC, accusing them of large-scale atrocities against the 
general population. The RUF seems to differ from their former allies in their behaviour towards 
civilians and by openly rejecting harassment. One former commander told me that sexual violence 
(meaning rape) used against the villagers would be punished by execution on the spot.  
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in the war. The forms are diverse: discretely complying with the occupying 
power; becoming a more active participant; or by just trying to develop and make 
use of livelihood opportunities that were still open and which were somehow 
connected with those who had turned the civilian domain into a war zone.6 
Ahmed, a Sierra Leonean national who works for an American NGO in the 
village, phrased it with a mixture of sorrow and anger: 
“Somehow we all played our part in the war. If you were lucky it was on the side of the 
government. But we were all in war. People around here had to suffer from all of them, the 
AFRC, ECOMOG and the CDF and the RUF. And at the end of the day, everyone was in 
there. I do not blame anyone around here for what happened, they were forced. People here 
know out of experience that everyone carrying a gun is a potential bastard, no matter what 
side they were on.” 
Things changed in the village when the last peace agreement was about to 
establish a real and lasting peace. Most of the combatants, RUF and CDF, joined 
the DDR programme, after which it was up to them to decide where to go. 
According to some of the ex-combatants I spoke to, there had been some sort of 
‘day of reckoning’. Those who were identified by the villagers as being res-
ponsible for or an accomplice in the worst atrocities committed against civilians 
were ‘asked to leave’ the community. This also applied to those who did not 
abide by the new rules of behaviour and who did not put into practice the lessons 
on conflict resolution learned from the DDR: 
“Just after the war some of the former rebels left because they were afraid for reprisal 
coming from the community. Others were asked to leave by the community. Those were the 
ones that committed the worst atrocities and the civilians identified them. The ones that live 
here now are accepted.” 
“Some people went who went through DDR and took the classes in like ‘homecoming’ 
came back but did not behave. They were fighting each other. And those were the ones 
asked by the community to leave.”  
Other ex-combatants were not actually driven out of the village by the com-
munity but chose to leave, looking for economic opportunities elsewhere because 
in the village it was “only farming and cattle”, as one of the former combatants 
phrased it. The general assumption is that quite a few left for the diamond mines 
to start digging for their fortunes in exchange for two cups of rice a day. The 
local women who were married to these ex-combatants left with them. 
                                               
6 
 See also Nordstrom (2004) and Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers (2004) who show that, in countries 
involved in protracted civil conflict, the social worlds of war and peace no longer occupy separate 
domains. Nordstrom argues that within the social reality of war, peace is found in different shapes and 
manifestations and that it occurs over a varied time-span. It comes and goes as a tidal wave. At the 
same time within a domain of peace conflicts do still exist. She also claims that war-peace zones are 
not clear-cut but diffuse or flow into each other. Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers (2004: 13) show, using 
an explicit livelihood approach, that protracted conflicts tend to create a situation in which “the 
‘rational’ pursuit of individual livelihood ends up reproducing the collectively ‘irrational’ phenome-
non of war”.  
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After this phase, the community turned its face to the future. First of all, this 
meant that activities were focused on the reconstruction of the village, which in 
practice meant the revival of material infrastructure and economic activities. 
Many of the villagers were still living on their bush farms because their houses 
had not yet been repaired. The American NGO in the village made it their 
priority to combine reconstruction, long-term development and reintegration in 
the way they organized their activities. For the construction of a health centre, a 
new secondary school and a dam to provide the village with running water, they 
got all the youth and ex-combatants to work together for the benefit of the village 
community. Community labour is a long-standing practice in Sierra Leone and, 
although it can also be used negatively by elders to exploit and suppress young 
men, it is a way of encouraging collective action to affirm community ties.7  
Following this community labour, the NGO wanted to offer a skills training 
programme to all the young people in the village. Unfortunately this was affected 
by DDR policy that dictated that the money given for this training should be first 
used to train ex-combatants. The NGO is trying to provide others in the village 
with the same opportunities by using other funding. Women are hoping to 
receive micro-credit to start a small business in addition to their work on the 
family land. By rebuilding the secondary school, the village hopes that people 
will return from their wartime places of refuge. Those who could afford it went 
to the urban areas, like Freetown, where facilities are much better. The village is 
still suffering from the consequences of the large-scale neglect of rural Sierra 
Leone, which has been identified as one of the original root causes of the war. 
At the socio-cultural level of the village community, the focus on the future is 
defined by the frequent mantra of ‘the war don don’, which has been uttered all 
over Sierra Leone in the last few years. Though it remains a difficult concept to 
grasp for an outsider, I believe it can be captured in understanding that ‘the war 
don don’ is not as much a denial of what happened but a determination to move 
forward; it is not as much a statement of ‘forgive and forget’ as the 
communication of a sense of the fundamental impossibility of escape from what 
                                               
7 
 Compulsory community labour in rural Sierra Leone is related to the history of domestic slavery. It is 
however permitted by the Forced Labour Ordinance of 1932 for a chief to mobilize village youth to 
build and maintain his own residence and basic collective infrastructure, like roads and water supplies. 
Nowadays this cultural practice seems to also fit the idea of community development programmes 
carried out by INGOs (Richards et al. 2004: 18-20). Given the limited time I have spent in the village, 
I want to be cautious in assessing whether in this case community labour should be seen as a con-
structive collective contribution to the community’s reconstruction, as a way for ex-combatants to 
compensate for the harm done to the community or as de facto servitude that might again reflect the 
problematic relations between youth and elders belonging to the village elite. Either way it can be 
seen as an indicator of the integration of former combatants in existing social and cultural structures 
and practices. 
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has happened; it recognizes that those who were part of the war are also part of 
the community or society at peace: they cannot be ‘cut out’ of it:  
“When they say ‘the war don don’, what they mean is that all the bad things that has 
happened, and those who you think did bad during the war we should encourage them. we 
have to encourage those who were our enemies and we have to all live together, not take 
advantage of anybody, don’t abuse anybody, don’t do bad to anyone, we all live together as 
one people. They say “there is no bush where you can throw bad pikin” which means there 
is no bush where you can throw away bad people. Even when we now see them sitting 
together or sitting lonesome thinking about something we take them with us to the farm or 
to go dancing. All these social things. We are all living together.” 
Paramount Chief 
“We have to do this together, it is the only option. The war is over. If we don’t move on the 
war will not be over. The war is over; we have to rebuild this country. We suffered enough. 
So we live together but we don’t trust them. But we take them into our community. What 
choice do we have?” 
Ahmed, working for an INGO 
So those who have actively participated in the war are included, not so much 
because of moral imperatives, but because people have learned that those who 
become excluded, isolated and alienated from society can easily turn against the 
community. While some of the ex-combatants were asked to leave the village, 
those who remained are integrated in the community, if only to make it more 
likely that they will not again turn against it. Peace becomes a collective res-
ponsibility through social relations at all levels of society, not just an agreement 
leading to ex-combatants restraining from picking up their guns again. Establish-
ing a lasting peace and community reintegration go together. 
Ex-combatants wives 
“Before the war we did farming; I did not go to school. I got married in 1997. Just during 
the war. I was living with my first husband. When we met, life was still normal in this area. 
The war had not yet affected this part of the country. We were living together but my 
husband and me were not working on the same farm.  
When I was working on this farm, these guys, the AFRC came and took me. They did not 
actually harass me but we were moving to different places and they took me along. I was in 
there with one man. I was not with them as to service them like others who were there. If 
they wanted to cook, to assist their wives, something like child slavery. I was not one of 
them; I was married directly to the man. I was taken by this man and lived like in a marriage 
with him. As they took me, that was the marriage. I was just like that; it is not that you had a 
choice to disagree. Whatever they say, you have to agree.  
So I was with them from one place to another until after pregnancy, the man disappeared 
finally. By that time I was staying in Kono. This man left us to go to town [Freetown]. After 
some time I was struggling because I was not getting any assistance from the others again. 
The only assistance was getting some food to eat. So I tried very hard to find my way back to 
this village. I managed to find a car to take me there. I could leave the place because I told 
them that I was going to my family to give birth to my child. By that time there was nobody 
to take care of me. They will never refuse that.  
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When I came back to the village, the RUF was still here. I was living with my grand-
mother. Together with my other sisters. I stayed with her until I gave birth. They did not 
really harass me. When I came some of the people of the community the people in the town 
started to identify me as being one lady that was with the AFRC. So they thought I was on an 
undercover mission. So they interrogated me for some time, the RUF men. They got infor-
mation from others in town. But I managed to explain myself and the elders explained that I 
was a citizen of this town. So after some time that stopped and I could stay in the community 
without any problems. I gave birth to this baby, she is a big girl now, and she was born in the 
year 2000.  
By that time there was food to eat from the farm. But money was not in circulation and 
there was no market. So all the other things you need in life, like clothes, were hard to get. 
Some time after I gave birth, my first husband has been observing me and saw that this man 
that took me away was not coming back. So that is when he decided to take me back again. 
He went to the family and things were arranged between us. I did not ask him, it came from 
him. He came to my family and said, let’s forget about what happened and let me take her 
back. So he is taking care of the baby. In the beginning people were talking about me having 
a junta baby. But my husband was overlooking that system. My neighbours were saying that. 
But that went away, it died down. After the peace there was a lot of sensitizing of the people 
so that helped and it stopped. But at the beginning when the memory was still fresh people 
were saying these things. But in the time after disarmament, people were told to stop 
pointing fingers at others, so it died down. It bothered me sometimes and people recognized 
it so that is why it stopped.  
Before that [the war] I was doing business, I had my table. But at times, when my 
memory recalls these times I feel sad. That is why I put everything at the back, to forget 
everything. My father was with the SL police and he was killed by the AFRC. After that our 
house was burned. And they took out everything. Later my mother died because she was not 
able to cope with the restraints of that time. Then this guy took me and there was no 
willingness from my side to get into this marriage. And then after that he disappeared from 
me, so all these things bother me a lot when I recall all these things happening.  
My marriage is important in my life now. My husband is giving me assistance, food, 
clothing. People in the community respect me more now I am in a marriage again, instead of 
living as a single woman with my child. A good woman is a woman who is under control of 
her husband. She has respect for her husband and obeys her husband. She does not roam 
around from one place to another and she gets respect from the people in society and she has 
to do something like learn a job or doing a small business. So being in this marriage helps 
me to gain respect in the community.  
I was misfortunate; I did not get the chance to get through DDR. Now I work on the farm. 
At this moment we are harvesting the rice and after that we start planting the vegetables, like 
hot pepper, the garden eggs …” 
Sally, 22 years old, taken by the AFRC 
On my arrival in the village, the objective was to hear how female ex-
combatants and ex-combatants’ wives were doing in this community with regard 
to reintegration. Sally was one of the women who participated in this initial 
survey. In the first instance, because the interviews were done to evaluate the 
official DDR programme, interest was directed towards those stories that sup-
ported the suggestion that women who had become forcibly associated with the 
combatants had been excluded from the official DDR programme. On later visits 
I added to this the idea that I was interested in the reception back home of girls 
and young women who had been taken away. While I used the category ‘ex-
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combatants’ and ‘ex-combatants’ wives’ without any further specification, it 
turned out, during a review of my data, that I had gathered very diverse stories of 
women who were indeed married to ex-combatants.8 Some, like Sally, had been 
captured by the AFRC and returned later to the village; some had married young 
local men who had then joined the CDF on behalf of ECOMOG; and others had 
been placed in a marriage arrangement with RUF soldiers when they occupied 
the village. The diversity, therefore, in the ways the village community was 
drawn into the war by different factions is also found in the way local women 
became involved through forced wartime marriage arrangements with men be-
longing to these groups.  
If we look at the meaning of these marriage arrangements in times of war, we 
could say that the marriage between local CDF combatants and local girls could 
be considered as ‘normal’ marriages between young members of the village com-
munity that are not particularly defined by the context and dynamics of the war. 
The process of establishing new relations between village members through 
marriage remained to a certain extent unaltered during the war. The male part – 
and at times also the female part – of the marriage more or less happened to 
become involved in the war due to circumstances, just as the village as a whole 
became involved.  
The experiences of young women, who had been taken away from the village 
with the AFRC combatants and were forced to live with them elsewhere, are 
similar to the experiences of the young women who ended up in Makeni, though 
they usually did not spend as many years away from home as the Mende women 
from the south. Some of the women from the village were captured with their 
(potential) husbands (remember that women tend to marry at a young age, 
especially in the rural areas) who were thus conscripted at the same time. In the 
aftermath, the difference that matters is that the women I spoke to in the village 
managed to return to their homes where they could rejoin their former husbands: 
“I was born in this village. Before the war came here I was married and worked the farm 
with my husband. We were at the farm when the rebels attacked. I was pregnant. I was 
abducted together with my husband. They took my husband with them. I was beaten and 
left behind. Civilians took me to a nearby village where I was treated with native herbs. 
There I heard that ECOMOG captured the village. So I went back and ECOMOG treated 
my wounds. Later my husband escaped from the rebels and came back also. He was 
conscripted with ECOMOG volunteer youth. By a rebel attack later he was again captured. 
He was taken away while I was still here. He did not come back until after the peace. He 
was disarmed in Kabala and trained in carpentry. It had no influence on our relationship. I 
know my husband was forced. He did not do anything against the people living here.” 
Fofanah, 20 years old 
                                               
8
  This can be explained by the fact that the combatants have gone through DDR encampment together, 
irrespective of the faction to which they belonged. According to the ex-combatants themselves, the 
term ‘ex-combatant’ does not differentiate between these factions but predominantly refers to those 
who have been through official disarmament and demobilization. 
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Not all the wartime marriage arrangements that affected young women from 
the village were the consequence of being captured and abducted. During the 
time the RUF occupied the village, their combatants became involved with local 
women, as is the case with Fanta and Jacob: 
“Before the war I was doing petty trading, selling different market items. I lived with my 
family. When the war came, we ran into the bush and we did not came out before it calmed 
down a little bit. But then during another attack I was taken away by the rebels with my 
family. They took us to Magburaka where we stayed with the rebels for nine months. I had 
to do housework for the man who took me. When UNAMSIL came to Makeni I was 
released and went to Kabala. The area around here was still held by the rebels. Nearby there 
was a road cut. The rebels made a huge pit in the ground and the cars driving between 
Makeni and Kabala could not cross there anymore. It was there where I met my husband. 
He was with the rebels that held that roadblock. There was no woman there to cook for 
them so they hold me there to do the work for them. I stayed there for seven months. Then 
my husband went to disarm in Kabala. I did not disarm because I had no gun to hand over. 
My parents came to take me to Makeni where they live and they asked me if this man has 
been taken good care of me. I told them that he has never beaten me or harassed me. So they 
said that if he wants me as his wife he should come to Makeni for the wedding. This is what 
he did after the DDR process. Leaving my husband was never an option for me. I never 
experienced any problems with the community when we came to live here because some of 
my other relatives live in this village.”  
Fanta, aged 21 
“Before the war I was a student living in Kono. I was born in Binkolo [a village near 
Makeni] When the rebels attacked Kono in 1991 everyone scattered and I managed to flee 
to Binkolo. By the time the government troops regained control over Kono I went back. 
During the second attack on Kono the rebels took me together with my sisters. I was forced 
to fight with the rebels. They beat us and I was forced to go into training. Participation 
meant survival. With the rebels we went to Makeni. The rebels had different groups. The 
fighting forces, the civil group and the groups of small children. I was in the civil group. We 
were not actual fighters but some of us would carry guns to protect the group. From Makeni 
I again managed to escape to Binkolo but was captured again when they attacked Binkolo. 
From then I was kept under strict supervision. They sent me to the roadblock nearby this 
village. I stayed there until I went to disarm in 2001 in Kabala. I took training in building 
and construction. I met my wife during the war. I saw her in the village and I liked her for 
my wife. I asked Mr R. who was my commander to assist me with this. So he said to my 
wife to go to the roadblock where I was, to greet me. That’s how we met and she stayed 
there with us until disarmament. I did not allow my wife to disarm because she was a 
woman. When disarmament came we were still afraid that the government would persecute 
us as we were identified as ex-combatants. I did not want that for my wife, so she went to 
her family until I came back from the disarmament.” 
Jacob, aged 28, married to Fanta  
The fact that these young women did not leave the village or the immediate 
area might have worked to their advantage regarding their acceptance following 
peace. The women who were interviewed did not report having been rejected by 
the community. If there were any problems for those considered ‘Junta wives’, 
they seem to have faded with time. But it is important to note here that the 
information coming from these interviews is by definition biased in favour of 
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reintegration. This is simply because the people I interviewed (both former com-
batants and their wives) in the village were those who had stayed there or who 
did not choose to go back to where they originated from; nor were they those 
who the community had rejected.  
Though the chief’s speaker, for example, stated in his account that no one 
who had been captured from the community by the rebels went missing or had 
not yet returned, based on the interviews I did in Makeni I have reason to believe 
that some of the young women did not opt to return to the village and now live in 
places such as Makeni. At least one woman told me that she had been married to 
a man from this particular village and that she had lived there on his family farm 
until she was captured. Her husband was killed during the raid and after the war 
she chose not to go back to this village because she did not want to be a burden 
on her family-in-law. She would then probably be at risk of being remarried to 
her late husband’s brother. But at the same time, during the transition phase from 
war to peace, some women had found their way back to the village alone and 
were accepted by their relatives: 
“I was captured in the first attack on the village. Before that I was doing farm work with my 
parents. When they took me they did not marry me. I was there to cook, to do the laundry. I 
was taking care of them. Sometimes they would go for food finding, they used to take us to 
give us the load to carry that to the base. They took me to Kono. That is where I stayed until 
the peace came. I was not given to nobody for marriage because I was too small a girl. After 
the ceasefire we travelled from Kono to Makeni. I told the captain that I wanted to travel to 
my parents and my family. He let me go then. He did not give me a paper to travel because 
he did not really agree for me to go to see my parents before disarmament. But I did not 
want to wait, so I went. I travelled by motorcar. I did not pay. I went to the car park and the 
captain asked for a lift for me, to take me for free. They could do that because by that time 
all the cars belonged to them.  
My family was happy to see me, the whole family assembled and they said they would 
never allow me to move away again. I came back before the disarmament. All the other 
people in the community were happy to see me again. They never called me names like 
junta woman or something like that. At this moment I am married but my husband has not 
yet come to collect me. That will take some time. After I came back this man saw me and he 
went to my parents with kola and asked my parents to give me for marriage. He still has to 
bring the kola, the lappa, the pojo. We are now looking for the second stage. I am happy to 
be married now. I would want to learn a job, to learn skills, like tailoring.” 
As mentioned earlier, some former combatants were asked to leave the village 
and their wives, who they had met and married during the war, left with them. 
The fact that the combatants and their wives were in this particular village during 
the war also implies that for the family and village community there was no 
discussion about whether they actively participated in the war or not. Everyone 
witnessed what happened and who was responsible. (Compare this with the 
situation of the Mende women in Makeni, who had been away from their home 
community for years during the war and, as a result, the home community was 
ignorant about what they had experienced or how they might have participated 
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during that time.) Judgements were made in the village and it appears that these 
women preferred to leave with their combatant husbands than stay in the village 
without their ex-combatant husband and risk social exclusion (or risk being 
married off by their relatives to an elder as his third or fourth wife).  
The women who were married to the combatants who were allowed to stay 
have become the wives of strangers but they are nevertheless still embedded in 
their home community and social relations were maintained. Many of these mar-
riages have been formalized9 afterwards and women said that their responsible 
relatives (parents, uncles) were more bothered by the question of whether the ex-
combatant husband had treated the woman correctly as a proper husband should. 
Whether he was an ex-combatant or not seemed to be less relevant. In addition to 
this, it can be said that these women’s kinship relations also worked to the benefit 
of the male combatants they were married to. One of the RUF commanders, Mr 
R who had arranged for Jacob and Fanta to get together, formalized his wartime 
marriage to one of the local women after he had returned from DDR encamp-
ment. And James even mentioned his marriage as a benchmark for his own 
reintegration in the village community: 
“My current wife is from this village and we met after the war. She was like a gift from the 
community. The elders told me I should not leave and I would get a wife here before going. 
And they did it.” 
What it all seems to boil down to is that during the years this village was 
directly affected by the war, clear distinctions between war and peace faded, 
whether between perpetrators and victims, or between rebels and civilians. 
Nevertheless, during the transition phase from war to peace, selections appear to 
have been made, either by individuals themselves or by the community, as to 
who would be given a chance to settle in the village. Economic as well as socio-
cultural motives appear to have been at play but for those who were allowed to 
stay, a place has been created in the community through basic pre-war social and 
cultural structures. Reintegration in this village seems to come down to trying to 
smoothly assimilate strangers into familiar social structures and to getting ex-
combatants and their wives back onto the familiar social path. The former 
combatants who have been allowed to stay are now mobilized for community 
labour and their wartime relations with local women are formalized as marriages. 
For the young women I interviewed, it has meant that those who were able to 
stay did not report any additional problems. They appear to have picked up their 
life story as it was meant to evolve without a major break. The war did cause 
suffering and as individuals they have had to find a way to cope with the memory 
                                               
9 
 With formalized I refer to the cultural practice that the husband-to-be asks permission from the girl’s 
parents to marry her. Part of the procedure is the extensive exchange of gifts over a long period of 
time. In normal circumstances, there is a period of time between the start of the marriage process and 
the actual moment when the husband comes to ‘collect’ his wife. 
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of the violence they faced. But as far as their social and cultural position is 
concerned, they are now at a point that is not too different from where they 
probably would have been irrespective of the war: married and working the 
family land. At least for some of the young women from this village, key social 
relations have either been maintained or re-established and so they have been 
able to reintegrate into the village community. Their social personhood has thus 
been restored. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
8 
Coming back from the bush:  
Final analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The primary objective of this study was to gain insight into processes of post-
conflict reintegration from an anthropological point of view. It has been ap-
proached from an individual’s perspective but with the emphasis on his/her 
relationship with the social and cultural context. By deliberately choosing not to 
conduct this research from within an NGO working in the field of reintegration, I 
explicitly distanced myself from adopting a policy-oriented discourse on the 
issue of reintegration. The focus instead was on understanding the strategies em-
ployed by individuals who reintegrate into a community, with or without making 
use of an NGO or other policy interventions on offer. This study also rejected a 
single-dimensional focus on the violence used in times of war and the interest 
was instead on reintegration as a social process, which can be understood as an 
attempt to restore or cope with the long-term socio-cultural harm caused by 
wartime acts of violence.  
Central to this study were the young women who had forcibly become affi-
liated with one of the fighting factions during the ten years of civil war in Sierra 
Leone. These women had not specifically taken on the role of female fighters 
during the war but had – at a young age, mainly as teenagers – been captured by 
combatants and subsequently forced to live as their wives. Qualitative data on 
their reintegration were collected during six months of fieldwork in 2003-2004, 
mainly in the provincial town of Makeni in Northern Sierra Leone which used as 
an RUF stronghold in the final years of the war and still harbours many former 
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combatants. In addition, but to a lesser extent, data were collected in a village 
along a main road to the north that was occupied during the war by the 
AFRC/RUF, ECOMOG and again the RUF respectively.  
This study defines reintegration as a dynamic process that revolves around the 
(re-)establishment of relations between the individual and social networks, which 
contains – implicitly or explicitly – a negotiation of social and cultural identities. 
Two questions were central in the collection of data. First, I sought to understand 
how young women and girls who were formerly associated with the fighting 
forces could (re-)establish relations with the communities they now live in. The 
second was to analyze how the social identities of youth and female gender have 
affected the course of this reintegration, as seen from individual life experiences 
at a community level.  
To analyze the empirical data, this study draws on theory regarding social 
organization, social identity and agency. The theoretical framework is based on 
qualitative variables relations, identities, experiences and meanings, which are 
additionally manifested at three levels: individual life experience; the commu-
nity; and society as a whole (see Chapter Two). In this framework, reintegration 
comes about through the (re-)establishment of social relations that can be bond-
ing and create the integration of individuals in groups, or bridging by creating 
linkages between groups and networks. In addition, I have argued that, for 
anthropological studies, recognition of someone’s agency is the acknowledge-
ment of one’s individuality in relation to their cultural context. This approach 
rejects cultural and social determinism whereas it underscores the point that indi-
viduals cannot be reduced to being merely embodiments of social structures and 
cultural meaning. Interaction exists between the cultural context and individuals 
who internalize this context. Through agency, cultural context is continuously 
recreated by people who reproduce and transform social structures and cultural 
meanings in their relations with this particular context.  
To recapitulate the two main research questions, I will begin by elaborating 
the influence of gender and youth as social identities on reintegration. This in-
fluence comes from the cultural discourse on these identities and the way they 
have or have not been linked with violent conflict and how they are or are not 
made the subject of negotiation in the aftermath. The next section reflects on 
reintegration as a social process as it emerged from the empirical data. The final 
section of this chapter and thesis poses some remaining questions and could be a 
starting point for further study. I also attempt to formulate possible implications 
for policy on social reintegration that emerge from this study.  
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Youth, gender and the difference it makes. 
It is generally acknowledged that large-scale youth participation in Sierra 
Leone’s civil war is related to the social, political and economic exclusion of 
youth in the decades preceding the conflict. This notion is reflected in the post-
conflict changes in the general discourse on youth in Sierra Leone. Demographic 
trends in combination with economic decline, the deterioration of civil services, 
together with a political one-party monopoly and the practice of patrimonial rule 
have created a ‘majority in the position of a minority’. I have shown that ‘youth’ 
in Sierra Leone society does not as much refer to an absolute age group as it does 
to a social economic category. This category is one of primarily young men who 
are frustrated in their vertical mobility and are therefore not able to acquire the 
position within the community of an adult or elder with its corresponding assets 
and entitlements. The social identity of youth is, I argue, in fact gender-specific 
and male-biased. Youth are young men in a waiting room for adult social person-
hood who are unable to find opportunities to move on and up.  
Many of the combatants were considered to be youth who, through their 
participation in violent conflict, have proven themselves able to agitate and rebel 
against society. Whether that is out of ideologically motivated choice, revenge or 
as the result of force makes no difference. Either way, their position has become 
politicized. In Sierra Leone, the exclusion of youth has been a potentially 
destructive process. Having been disarmed and demobilized, many of the former 
combatants shifted in social identity from being a rebel or combatant to being 
considered youth again but carrying the identity of an ex-combatant. I have 
argued that, with recent history in mind and the connection having been created 
between youth and ex-combatants, youth can exploit the fear in society and their 
own eagerness to participate in illegal activities to legitimize these activities by 
claiming that society does not give them any other opportunity. They can also 
constructively negotiate their position in the community and use the empower-
ment found in assertiveness regarding their problematic position in the commu-
nity to appeal to elders to transform power relations. The example given of the 
Makeni motorbike drivers, many of whom are former combatants, shows that 
there is a thin line between the two options. While relations between youth and 
society (the elders) are still problematic and constrained by slow economic and 
social development in the post-conflict phase, they are under negotiation.  
The mantra of ‘the war don don’, which encourages the people of Sierra 
Leone to refrain from recalling the war by publicly emphasizing the violence 
committed, in a way supports the reconsideration of the position of youth in the 
community. It is an appeal not to reject those who participated in the violence of 
the war. To a large extent the civil war in Sierra Leone became a conflict be-
tween generations. With youth embodying the continuation of community and 
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society, the future of Sierra Leone as a collective cannot be recaptured from the 
heritage and public memory of war without reaching out to build bridges with 
those youth who have been excluded, and encouraging them to reconsider their 
position in society and community. It is fundamentally impossible to escape from 
what has happened and to avoid those who were involved in the war because 
they are so much an integral part of society and the community. Both the notion 
of ‘the war don don’ and the negotiation of youth’s position in society seem to 
point towards a collective responsibility to address one of the root causes of the 
violent conflict and to transform social and cultural structures accordingly.  
To see (young) women’s involvement in violent conflict as the result of 
women merely being passive victims of violence employed by men would be to 
undervalue them. Women do pick up guns. But having acknowledged this, we 
should also realize that in the war in Sierra Leone, though they were present, 
female fighters were in the minority. So the case for the women’s position in 
violent conflict cannot solely be made by paying attention to those who explicitly 
challenge the idea of women being passive victims by having taken on the more 
masculine and militarized roles in war. In this thesis I have tried to come to a 
more sophisticated understanding of women’s positions and roles in violent 
conflict that would cover the chasm between the perception of women as active 
fighters and that of women as passive victims. The situation of young women 
who got involved with fighting factions through forced marriage arrangements 
proved to be an illuminating case study. It showed that women were clearly and 
brutally victimized by these marriage arrangements as a protracted form of 
conflict-related gender-based violence with repeated sexual violence as an 
integral part of it. It also showed, however, that once caught up in these circum-
stances, women were able to find survival strategies in these same arrangements. 
Through husband-wife positioning, women addressed certain responsibilities 
with their captors that entitled them to a limited degree of protection against 
additional violence and offered them access to the necessities for survival. This 
reciprocity was also at play in the social relations that women established among 
themselves while in the bush. Thus the paradox of women becoming agents in 
their own victimization was created. Secondly, the stories of these women have 
shown that women do not need to take on masculine roles to become a 
perpetrator in the eyes of the community. The female tasks and roles they carried 
out during the conflict (with the example of ‘food-finding missions’) can be 
perceived by those affected by them as active participation in or compliance with 
the violence. The differences in the way women were received in their home 
communities in the aftermath of the war are linked to these perceptions of their 
positions, which are not unambiguously defined but provide space for personal 
and local diversity. 
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To fully understand the women’s challenges, opportunities and limitations 
regarding their reintegration after the war, we need to take into account the larger 
gender framework that constructs female social personhood. I have argued that 
womanhood in Sierra Leone is predominantly defined through their reproductive 
roles as wives and mothers. The forced marriages that characterize their position 
in the conflict are a form of gender-based violence not only because it was rooted 
in the unequal power relations between male combatants and female victims but 
also because it was directed to these very reproductive roles and therefore has 
affected women’s social personhood. Many young women were taken into the 
bush when they were still in their (early) teens. Normally, being taken into the 
bush refers to the initiation of girls into the secret society, where they are 
prepared for their future roles as wives and mothers. For many of these young 
women ‘being taken into the bush’ has now acquired another meaning: they were 
captured, taken away from their communities and kin, they became wives and 
mothers and have now returned from the bush, often as single mothers or as 
unmarried adult women. They have, therefore, made the transition from girl to 
woman in very difficult circumstances while in the bush.  
What then is the most relevant difference here between the discourse on youth 
and gender regarding the link with their position in the violent conflict in Sierra 
Leone and the way it has shaped reintegration in the aftermath? In its simplest 
form, we could argue that young men’s social personhood is defined through 
their productive roles while young women’s social personhood is constructed 
around their reproductive roles. Boys grow up to become men, girls grow up to 
become wives and mothers. Within this framework that constructs a gender-
specific social personhood, a woman’s social and cultural position is in effect 
inherently perceived as relational. Productive roles are public in that they come 
about in society’s economic and political domain. Reproductive roles are private 
because they happen in highly personal relations of women with men. In the 
contemporary discourse on youth, their involvement (as in young men’s partici-
pation) in the war in Sierra Leone has been linked to their problematic position in 
society, which is considered to be a public matter. Their involvement is therefore 
inherently political. Women’s involvement in the war has predominantly been 
perceived as relational to that of men. While the position of youth is acknow-
ledged as a condition that has predisposed this particular group in the society to 
conscription, women’s involvement is still seen as a result of the war itself. In 
public discourse in Sierra Leone it is not linked to any framework outside the 
context of violent conflict that defines gender relations but remains locked in this 
particular context of violent conflict. And though women can be addressed as an 
associate in the violence through their feminine tasks and roles, they are rarely 
addressed as the initiators or autonomous contributors.  
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Youth involvement, which is explicitly and publicly identified as a probable 
root cause of the war or at least as having contributed to the prolongation and 
spread of the conflict, is thus more likely to become an incentive for social 
transformation in the aftermath than young women’s involvement which is 
perceived as having been derived from men’s actions. While this opens up space 
for young men to negotiate and alter their position in the community in the 
course of their reintegration, young women are confronted with a harmed social 
personhood. I would further argue that because women’s experiences in conflict 
are merely understood within the context of conflict, this obscures gender rela-
tions and ideas on women’s roles that subsequently limit their options to escape 
the violence and its consequences once the conflict ended. The underlying 
notions on gender that define this womanhood remained unaltered during the 
war. To survive, women are trying in their reintegration to restore their damaged 
personhood. And though in practice adjustments can and will be made, in the 
process of restoration the existing notions of gender-specific personhood and 
gender relations are more likely to be reproduced than to be transformed.  
The implications this has for women are most clearly visible in the way they 
perceive their forced wartime marriage arrangements in the aftermath of the 
conflict. Women who had either left their ‘bush husband’ when peace came or 
those who were left by ex-combatants were often highly concerned with their 
status as an unmarried adult woman (or single mother). For them, this was what 
visibly distinguished them from other women in the community and also placed 
them in a less privileged position within the community. Although forced 
marriages were a controversial aspect of the war, its widespread practice has not 
changed the importance of marriage as a key social institution in Sierra Leone 
society. Nor has the importance assigned to the marital status of women changed 
significantly. Hence, the damage done to women’s socio-cultural personhood by 
forced marriage arrangements can only be restored through a new marriage. 
Chapter Six explained how this keeps women in a vulnerable position in the 
community in relation to men. It also explains why some women have decided to 
stay with their wartime husbands, although the meaning of this marriage has 
altered and sometimes been formalized by the family. I have argued that women 
are actors who reproduce the cultural framework of gender notions based on a 
hegemonic understanding of these relations. And, as mentioned earlier, in doing 
so, marriage for many of these women appears to be a tool for reintegration and 
at the same time becomes an important indicator of successful reintegration. 
Reintegration revisited 
The way women have reintegrated and (re-)established social relations in the 
communities they now live in, has been extensively described and analyzed in 
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the previous chapters. The question now is what all these individual stories col-
lected in Makeni and in the village, which are presented in their social-geo-
graphical context, might tell us about reintegration itself. I argue that although 
one can distinguish central issues in reintegration as a socio-cultural process in 
the (re-)establishment of relations, in the end it is both highly diversified and 
highly contextual. As obvious as this may sound, reintegration is still too often 
approached as homogeneous (as in the same for all ex-combatants or all women) 
or as individual (parallel to but not in interaction with the context). 
The central issue in shaping the course of individual reintegration of women 
in Sierra Leone appears to be whether relations with immediate kin and her 
original community were maintained or could be (re-)established. This involved 
the reconsideration of wartime marriages and access to assets and entitlements 
through social relations, which can bring reciprocity. Reintegration is about 
individuals reintegrating themselves in a process shaped by one’s agency which 
induces diversity. Individual women, who might share the same experiences, 
such as having been captured and taken into the bush, attach different meanings 
to these experiences. Some women have decided that their wartime marriage was 
indeed exclusively a ‘war thing’ and they left their captors once peace arrived. 
Others remained in their marriages because they felt some sort of responsibility 
to their husband and any children who may have been born during the war. 
Specific detailed circumstances in the different personal histories have shown 
significant diversity. When comparing the stories of Mende women in Makeni 
and the women in the village, one can for example conclude that it made a 
difference whether women were taken away from their communities and for how 
long. The further and longer away, the deeper the break with kinship and 
community has become and the more difficult it is to restore (or the longer and 
more difficult it has become to ‘come back from the bush’). I have shown that 
the decision as to whether to go back to family or not is not solely dependent on 
actual tangible situations but is fed by subjective expectations and the personal 
feelings of the women involved, which influenced the way they fulfilled role 
expectations. Women have at times justified their reluctance to go back home 
with the view that they could be better daughters to their families by not 
returning empty-handed or as someone who has prospered from the war.  
The community and society (the two spheres of interest in this study) have 
both influenced individual day-to-day reintegration, giving it its contextual 
character. Society’s influence is reflected in the way that the national political 
historical background of the conflict and the general political and cultural dis-
course on youth and gender shape options for reintegration, as was argued in the 
previous section. The community and society as contexts are, however, not fixed 
and non-responsive entities as objects for reintegration. The change in discourse 
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on youth resembles the interaction between context and those who reproduce and 
transform it. Context responds to those by whom it is created, so that reinte-
gration is interactive. It is inherently a cultural process and with that it carries the 
same essential characteristic, that of a mutually influential relationship between 
individual and cultural context.  
Data collected in Makeni and in the village reveal the influence of context at a 
community level. As a setting for reintegration, the village is characterized struc-
turally as a community in which category identities such as youth, ex-combatants 
and elders are to a large extent personalized. One could say that people here are 
‘known’ publicly. During the war, bridging relations between certain groups of 
combatants and civilians were at first forcibly established but in its aftermath 
such relations have been affirmed in community labour and the formalization of 
wartime marriage arrangements with young women from the village. This pro-
cess relies on local and communal perceptions of combatants and their wives. In 
this village, the community has responded explicitly by asking certain ex-
combatants and their wives to leave. But at the same time, for those who were 
allowed to stay, traditional structures have been opened up and women’s and ex-
combatants’ reintegration was able to follow existing paths, making it an organic, 
integrated and community-based process. 
In a town like Makeni it is less clear how the community as a whole is 
responding to reintegration. The process has taken a more individual (but not 
isolated) and fragmented course. As a former RUF stronghold, Makeni attracted 
many ex-combatants and their wives. The anonymity and urban promises of 
economic development have added others who forcibly (ex-combatants who 
were asked to leave elsewhere) or voluntarily are trying to make a future here. So 
whereas the village community could select those who they allowed to reinte-
grate, a town like Makeni has had to absorb anyone who wants to settle there. 
This creates a population with a range of very different personal histories. People 
in such a context appeared to a greater extent to be perceived in their category 
identities that are in this context less personalized and have become linked with 
the history of violent conflict. Examples of this are the perception of the Makeni 
motorbike drivers as ‘rebel drivers’ or Mende women as the mere embodiment of 
the war which arrived in town through Mende country. Being strangers in town 
and without access to kinship networks, women have to find new ways to reinte-
grate in such a context. I have argued that bonding relations that came about 
under force while in the bush have been transformed into social relations of mar-
riage and friendship in which reciprocity has been found. We have also seen that, 
for example, a church community can offer both bonding (among those of the 
same faith) and bridging relations (between strangers and civilians) for some 
women. This could be related to the church providing not only a community in a 
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structural sense but also a faith that offers a shared perception of individual and 
communal experiences.  
Women who are on their way back from the bush follow either existing paths 
or try to find new ways. In both approaches, the direction the road takes is shaped 
in relation to its environment, and by building roads the scenery changes. Rein-
tegration’s diversity is intensified by being contextual.  
Where to go from here 
With this study I hope to have shown how qualitative anthropological research 
can contribute to our understanding of reintegration as a social and cultural pro-
cess in all its diversity. Its comparative and descriptive character illuminates rele-
vant issues for individuals who reintegrate in relation to their social and cultural 
context and the way they occur in day-to-day life. Though this study was not 
designed to be an example of applied anthropological research, and notwith-
standing the fact that scholarly knowledge has value in its own right, to finalize 
this study I will attempt to think through what my ideas on reintegration as a 
highly diversified and contextual process of the (re-)establishment of social rela-
tions might imply for reintegration policy and programming.  
Firstly I would recommend the development of a reintegration policy based 
on the notion that people reintegrate in interaction with their context. This is the 
opposite of what often happens in practice – that policy and reintegration pro-
grammes are established to reintegrate people. Reintegration is, in my opinion, 
not something that can be externally imposed on people. The best one can do is 
to maximize the options that help people to find new ways. The basis of any such 
policy should be to promote choice within a wide variety of reintegration pro-
gramme options, recognizing individuals’ agency and diversity in the relevant 
cultural context. Programmes would in that case not be made for countries as a 
whole but would be adjusted to the local contextual needs and possibilities.  
Secondly I observed that policy and programming is often very explicitly 
linked to certain target groups. However, this often carries connotations for 
potential users that are unacceptable. For many women, applying for a program-
me specifically and explicitly designed for ex-combatants (wives) was problema-
tic because they did not identify themselves as (the wife of) an ex-combatant. But 
had it been designed as a programme simply for women, it might well have 
fulfilled the same needs. Making and implementing programmes for specific 
war-related categories emphasizes bonding relations while for better develop-
ment bridging relations might be more useful. It would be better to develop a 
programme for youth rather than for ex-combatants, and to offer programmes 
that benefit women in a certain community rather than offer a programme ex-
clusively for former captives.  
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I mentioned in the opening chapter that interest in issues concerning youth 
combatants and young women’s situations in conflict and the way they proceed 
in the aftermath comes from professionals in the fields of psychology/psychiatry 
and legal aid and human rights. The former are predominantly interested in the 
way individuals cope with the experience of violence and the latter focus on the 
question of how to ensure justice and promote reconciliation. For this study I 
wanted to add a socio-cultural perspective but, having done so, I believe that 
further study should explore the intersection between these fields of expertise. 
How does grassroots reintegration influence the way one copes with the experi-
ence of war? Does the notion of ‘the war don don’ help individuals to rebuild 
their lives and move on or does it interfere with personal coping and psycholo-
gical recovery? How are the proceedings of the Sierra Leone court and TRC 
influencing grassroots reintegration? Do these procedures actually bring people 
together in the communities or do they merely emphasize problematic divisions? 
Some people in Sierra Leone are complaining that too much money is being 
spent on only a few individuals while many are suffering from inflation and other 
problems of underdevelopment. There are serious questions to ask about the way 
the international global discourse on justice and human rights relates to grass-
roots reintegration and reconciliation in Sierra Leone.  
In the week that I was writing this final chapter, a long time after I had re-
turned from the field, I was pleasantly surprised by a phone call from one of the 
main participants in Makeni. The sad news she had was that one of the other girls 
had passed away a year ago. She herself had left town to settle in Freetown 
where she is now attending classes at nursing school. She is with her mother’s 
sister and her children, who she gave birth to during the war, are now seven and 
eleven years old and are both going to school. She said she was engaged to be 
married and was doing fine. 
During the war, women started wearing pants underneath their lappas so they 
would not end up naked if they had to run away into the bush, and they continue 
to do so. Though they still look traditionally dressed, underneath the history of 
war remains and things have inevitably changed. The most important understand-
ing gained during this study is that, for these women, reintegration means not 
becoming naked on their way back from the bush. 
 
  
References 
ABDULLAH, I. (1997), Bush path to destruction: The origin and character of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF/SL). Africa Development XXII (3/4): 45-76. 
ALIE, J.A.D. (2000), Background to the conflict (1961-1991): What went wrong and why?  
In: Ayissi, A. & R-E. Poulton, eds, Bound to cooperate: Conflict, peace and people in Sierra 
Leone, pp. 15-35. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2000), Child Soldiers: Criminals or victims? AI index: IOR 
50/02/00. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2004), Brief aan Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 
betreffende de situatie van vrouwen en meisje in Sierra Leone, dd. 15-01-2004. 
http://www.amnesty.nl dd. 23-01-2004.  
ANING, E.K (1998), Women and civil conflict: Liberia and Sierra Leone. African Journal of 
International Affairs 1(2): 54-58. 
ANING, E.K. & A. MCINTYRE (2005), From youth rebellion to child abduction: The anatomy of 
recruitment in Sierra Leone. In: McIntryre, A., ed., Invisible stakeholders. Children and war 
in Africa, pp. 67-86. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
ARCHIBALD, S. & P. RICHARDS (2002), Converts to human rights? Popular debate about war 
and justice in rural Central Sierra Leone. Africa 72(3) 2002: 339-367. 
BALL, N. (1996), The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies. In: Crocker, Ch.A., F.O. 
Hampson & P. Aall, eds, Managing global chaos. Sources of and responses to international 
conflict, pp. 607-621. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
HAMPSON & P. AALL (1997), Demobilizing and reintegrating soldiers: Lessons from Africa. In: 
Kumar, K., ed., Rebuilding societies after civil war: Critical roles for international 
assistance, pp. 85-105. Boulder: Rienner. 
BANGURA, Y. (1997), Understanding the political and cultural dynamics of the Sierra Leone 
war: a critique of Paul Richard’s Fighting for the rainforest. Africa Development XXII(3/4): 
117-148. 
BOURDIEU, P. (2004), Gender and symbolic violence. In: Scheper-Hughes, N. & Ph. Bourgois, 
eds, Violence in war and peace. An anthology, pp. 339-342. Malden/Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
BOUTA, T., G. FRERKS & I. BANNON (2005), Gender, conflict and development. Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
CLAPHAM, CH. (2003), Sierra Leone: The political economy of internal conflict. The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit. 
Working Paper Series No. 20.  
COHEN, A.P. (1994), Self consciousness. An alternative anthropology of identity. London/New 
York: Routledge. 
COLLETTA, N.J. & M.L. CULLEN (2000), Violent conflict and the transformation of social 
capital. Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia. Washington DC: World 
Bank. 
COMAROFF, J. & J. COMAROFF (2000), Reflexions Sur la Jeunesse. Politique Africaine 80 
(December): 90-110. 
CONTEH-MORGAN, E. & M. DIXON-FYLE (1999), Sierra Leone at the end of the twentieth 
century. History, politics and society. New York: Peter Lang. 
CRUISE O’BRIEN, D. (1996), A lost generation? Youth identity and state decay in West Africa. 
In: Werbner, R., ed., Postcolonial identities in Africa, pp. 55-74. London: Zed Books. 
DASGUPTA, P. & SERAGELDIN, I. (1999), Social capital. A multifaceted perspective. Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
DEAUX, K., A. REID, K. MIZRAHI & K.A. ETHIER (1995), Parameters of social identity. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 68(2): 280-291. 
120 
 
DE BOECK, F., & A. HONWANA (2000), Faire et défaire la société: Enfants, jeunes et politique en 
Afrique. Politique Africaine 80 (December): 5-11. 
DE WATTEVILLE, N. (2002), Adressing Gender issues in demobilization and reintegration 
programmes. World Bank, Africa Region: http://www.worldbank.org dd. 15-01-2004.  
DODGE, C.P. & M. RAUNDALEN (1991), Reaching children in war Sudan Uganda and 
Mozambique. Bergen: Sigma Forlag in cooperation with Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies. 
DUCASSE-ROGIER, M. (2004), Resolving intractable conflicts in Africa: A case study of Sierra 
Leone. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Working 
Paper Series No. 31. 
FARR, V. (2002), Gendering demilitarization as a peace building tool. Bonn: Bonn International 
Centre for Conversion, Paper 20. 
http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper20/paper20.pdf  
FARR, V. (2003), The importance of a gender perspective to successful disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration processes. Women, men, peace and security. Disarmament 
Forum. UNIDIR (4): 25-35.  
FANTHORPE, R. (2001), Neither citizen nor subject? ‘Lumpen’ agency and the legacy of native 
administration in Sierra Leone. African Affairs 100: 363-386. 
FERME, M. & D. HOFFMAN (2002), Combattants irréguliers et discours international des droits 
de l’homme dans les guerres civiles africaines. Politique Africaine 88 (December): 27-48. 
FERME, M. (2001), The underneath of things. Violence, history and the everyday in Sierra 
Leone. Berkeley & London: University of California Press. 
FORAY, M. (2000), Peace by other means: The missing link in DDR programmes. In: Ayissi, A. 
& R-E. Poulton, eds, Bound to cooperate: Conflict, peace and people in Sierra Leone,  
pp. 99-111. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
FURLEY, O. (1995), Child soldiers in Africa. Conflict in Africa. London: Taurus Academic 
Studies. 
GIBBS, S. (1997), Post-war social reconstruction in Mozambique: Reframing children’s 
experiences of trauma and healing. In: Kumar, K., ed., Rebuilding societies after civil war, 
pp. 227-238. Boulder: Rienner. 
GINIFER, J. (2003), Reintegration of ex-combatants. In: Malan, M. et al., eds, Sierra Leone. 
Building the road to recovery, pp. 40-52. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
http://www.iss.co.za dd 16-07-2003. 
GOSL (2003), Sierra Leone National Youth Policy. Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone & 
UNDP. 
HEYZER, N. (2003), Gender, peace and disarmament. In: Vignard, K. & V. Compagnion, eds, 
Women, men, peace and security. Disarmament Forum. Vol. 4, Geneva: United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research. 
HOGG, M.A., D.J. TERRY & K.M. WHITE (1995), A tale of two theories: A critical comparison 
of identity theory with social identity theory. Social Psychology Quarterly 58(4): 255-269. 
HONWANA, A. (1999), Negotiating post-war identities: Child soldiers in Mozambique and 
Angola. CODESRIA Bulletin 1-2: 4-13. 
HONWANA, A. (2000), Innocents et coupables. Les enfants-soldats comme acteurs tactiques. 
Politique Africaine 80 (December): 58-78. 
HRW (2003a), Forgotten fighters: Child soldiers in Angola. New York: Human Rights Watch 
http://www.hrw.org dd. 23-06-2003 
HRW (2003b), “We kill you if you cry” Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict. Human 
Rights Watch http://hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/sierleon0103.pdf dd. December 2003. 
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (2003), Sierra Leone: The state of security and governance. 
ICG Africa Report No. 67, 2 September 2003. 
JACKSON, M. (2004), In Sierra Leone. Durham: Duke University Press. 
JENKINS, R. (1996), Social identity. London/New York: Routledge. 
121 
 
KAI-KAI, F. (2000), Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Post-War Sierra Leone. 
In: Ayissi, A. & R.E. Poulton, eds, Bound to ccooperate: Conflict, peace and people in 
Sierra Leone, pp. 113-128. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
KANDEH, J. (1999), Ransoming the state: Elite origins of subaltern terror in Sierra Leone. 
Review of African Political Economy 81: 349-366. 
KINGMA, K. (1997), Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their 
reintegration into civilian life. Policy Sciences 30(3): 151-165. 
KNIGHT, M. & A. ÖZERDEM (2004), Guns, camps and cash: Disarmament, demobilization and 
reinsertion of former combatants in transitions from war to peace. Journal of Peace 
Research 41(4): 499-516. 
KNUDSEN, J.C. (1990), Cognitive models in life histories. Anthropological Quarterly 63(3): 
122-133. 
KOTTAK, C. PH. (2000) Anthropology. The exploration of human diversity. Boston: McGraw-
Hill. 
KOUROUMA, A. (2001), Allah is niet verplicht. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.  
LAPPIA, I. (2000), Community-based Disarmament and post-conflict peace building. In: Ayissi, 
A. & R-E. Poulton, eds, Bound to cooperate: Conflict, peace and people in Sierra Leone, pp. 
129-137. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
LONG, N. (1992a), Introduction. In: Long, N. & A. Long, eds, Battlefields of knowledge: The 
interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development, pp. 3-15. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
LONG, N. (1992b), From paradigm lost to paradigm regained? The case for an actor-oriented 
sociology of development. In: Long, N. & A. Long, eds, Battlefields of knowledge: The 
interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development, pp. 16-43. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
LONG, N. (1992c), Conclusion. In: Long, N. & A. Long, eds, Battlefields of knowledge: Tthe 
interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development, pp. 268-277. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
MACHEL, G. (1996), Impact of armed conflict on children. New York: Unicef: 
http://www.unicef.org/graca/graright.htm dd. 15-06-2003. 
MALAN, M., PH. RAKATE & A MCINTYRE (2002), Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL 
Hits the home straight. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 68. 
MÁUSSE, M.A. (2000), The social reintegration of the child involved in armed conflict in 
Mozambique. In: Bennett, E. & V. Gamba, eds, ACT against child soldiers in Africa: A 
reader, pp. 121-147. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
MAXTED, J. (2003), Children and armed conflict in Africa. Social Identities 9(1): 51-72. 
MAZURANA, D. & KH. CARLSON (2004), From combat to community: Women and girls of 
Sierra Leone. Hunt Alternatives Fund: 
http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peace_Negotiations/WWPSierraLeone.pdf 
http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/articles/SierraLeoneFullCaseStudy.pdf dd. 
January 2004. 
MCINTYRE, A. (2003), Rights, root causes and recruitment. The youth factor in Africa’s armed 
conflicts. African Security Review 12(2): 91-99. 
MCINTYRE, A., E.K. ANING & P. ADDO (2002), Politics, war and youth culture in Sierra Leone. 
An alternative interpretation. African Security Review 11(3): 7-15. 
MCINTYRE, A. & TH. THUSI (2003), Children and youth in Sierra Leone’s peace-building 
process. African Security Review 12(2): 73-80.  
MCKAY, S. & D. MAZURANA (2004), Where are the girls? Girls in fighting forces in Northern 
Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their lives during and after war. Montreal, 
Quebec: Rights and Democracy. International Center for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development.  
MEINTJES, S., A. PILLAY & M. TURSHEN, eds, (2001), The aftermath. Women in post-conflict 
transformation. London & New York: Zed Books. 
122 
 
MIALL, H., O. RAMSBOTHAM & T. WOODHOUSE (1999), Contemporary conflict resolution. 
Oxford/Malden: Polity Press. 
MOSER, C.O.N. & F.C. CLARK, eds, (2001), Victims, perpetrators or actors? Gender, armed 
conflict and political violence. London & New York: Zed Books. 
NORDSTROM, C. (1997), A different kind of war story. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
NORDSTROM, C. (2004),Shadows of war. Violence, power and international profiteering in the 
twenty-first century. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
PETERS, K. (2004), Re-examining voluntarism. Youth combatants in Sierra Leone. Monograph 
100. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
PETERS, K. & P. RICHARDS (1998), ‘Why we fight’: Voices of youth combatants in Sierra 
Leone. Africa 68(2): 183-210. 
PETERS, K., P. RICHARDS & K. VLASSENROOT (2003), What happens to youth during and after 
wars? A preliminary review of literature on Africa and an assessment of the debate. The 
Netherlands Development Assistance Research Council (RAWOO), Working Paper. 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS/UNAMSIL (2002), War-related sexual violence in Sierra 
Leone. Washington/Boston: Physicians for Human Rights. 
REHN, E. & E.J. SIRLEAF (2002), Women, war and peace: The independent expert’s assessment 
on the impact of armed conflict on women and women’s role in peace-building. New York: 
UNIFEM. 
RICHARDS, P. (1995), Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A crisis of youth? Conflict in 
Africa. London: Taurus Academic Studies. 
RICHARDS, P. (1998), Fighting for the rain forest. War, youth and resources in Sierra Leone. 
Oxford: James Currey. 
RICHARDS, P. (2002), Militia Conscription in Sierra Leone: Recruitment of young fighters in an 
African war. The comparative study of conscription in the amed forces 20: 255-276. 
RICHARDS, P. (2003), The political economy of internal conflict in Sierra Leone. The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit, 
Working Paper Series No. 21. 
RICHARDS, P, S. ARCHIBALD, KH. BAH & J. VINCENT (2003), Where have all the young people 
gone? Transitioning ex-combatants towards community reconstruction after the war in 
Sierra Leone. Typescript. [Final version 30 November 2003]. 
RICHARDS, P., KH. BAH & J. VINCENT (2004), The social assessment study: Community-driven 
development and social capital in post-war Sierra Leone. A study commissioned by the 
Community Driven Development group of the World Bank, Washington DC, for the 
National Commission for Social Action of the Government of Sierra Leone. [Final version 5 
February 2004] http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/136160/tslg/pdf/assessment.pdf 
RICHARDS, P. & K. VLASSENROOT (2002), Les guerres africaines du type fleuve Mano. 
Politique Africaine 88 (December): 13-26. 
SCHAFER, J. (2001), Guerrillas and violence in the war in Mozambique: De-socialization or re-
socialization? African Affairs 100: 215-237. 
SCHEPER-HUGHES, N. & PH. BOURGOIS (2004), Introduction. In: Scheper-Hughes, N. &  
Ph. Bourgois, eds, Violence in war and peace. An anthology, pp. 1-31. Malden/Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
SHAW, R. (2005), Rethinking truth and reconciliation commissions. Lessons from Sierra Leone. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
SHEPLER, S. (2002), Les filles-soldats: trajectoires d’après-guerre en Sierra Leone. Politique 
Africaine. 88 (December): 49-62. 
SIDERIS, T. (2001), Rape in war and peace. Social context, gender, power and identity.  
In: Meintjes, S., A. Pillay & M. Turshen, eds, The aftermath. Women in post-conflict 
transformation, pp. 142-158. London & New York: Zed Books. 
STAVROU, S. & R. STEWART (2000), The reintegration of child soldiers and abducted children: 
A case study of Palaro and Pabbo Gulu District, northern Uganda. In: Bennett, E. & V. 
123 
 
Gamba, eds, ACT against child soldiers in Africa: A reader, pp. 35-72. Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies. 
STOHL, R. (2002), Under the sun. Children and small arms. African Security Review 11(3):  
17-25. 
THOMPSON, C.B. (1999), Beyond civil Society: Child soldiers as citizens in Mozambique. 
Review of African Political Economy 80: 191-206. 
THUSI, TH. & S. MEEK (2003), Disarmament and demobilization. In: Malan, M. et al., eds, 
Sierra Leone. Building the road to recovery, pp. 23-38. Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies. 
TURSHEN, M. (2001), The political economy of tape. An analysis of systematic tape and sexual 
abuse of women during armed conflict in Africa. In: Victims, perpetrators or actors? 
Gender, armed conflict and political violence, pp. 55-68. London & New York: Zed Books. 
TURSHEN, M. & C. TWAGIRAMARIYA,, eds, (1998), What women do in wartime. Gender and 
conflict in Africa. London & New York: Zed Books. 
TWUM-DANSO, A. (2005), The political child. In: McIntyre, A. ed., Invisible stakeholders. 
Children and war in Africa, pp. 7-30. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
UPHOFF, N. (2000), Demonstrated benefits from social capital: The productivity of farmer 
organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka. World Development 28(11): 1875-1890.  
VEALE, A. & A. STAVROU (2004), Violence, reconciliation and identity. The reintegration of 
lord’s resistance army child abductees in Northern Uganda. Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, Monograph No. 92. 
VERKUYTEN, M. (1999), Etnische identiteit. Theoretische en empirische benaderingen,  
pp. 21-52. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. 
VIGNARD, K. & V. COMPAGNION, eds, (2003), Women, men, peace and security. Disarmament 
Forum. 2003, Vol. 4, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
VLASSENROOT, K. & R. RAEYMAEKERS (2004), Conflict and social transformation in eastern 
DR Congo. Gent: Academia Press. 
VOETEN, T. (2000), How the body? Hoop en horror in Sierra Leone. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff. 
WESSELS, M. (2002), Recruitment of children as soldiers in Sub-Saharan Africa: An ecological 
analysis. The comparative study of conscription in the amed forces (20): 237-254. 
WCRWC (2002), Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children. Precious 
resources: Adolescents in the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. New York: Women’s 
Commission for Refugee Women and Children.  
WOOLCOCK, M. (1998), Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical 
synthesis and policy framework. Theory and Society 27(2): 151-208.  
ZACK-WILLIAMS, A.B. (2001), Child soldiers in the civil war in Sierra Leone. Review of African 
Political Economy 87: 73-82. 
 
  
 
ASC BOOK PUBLICATIONS 
 
 
Copies of all the publications listed below in the African Studies Collection and  
the earlier Research Reports Series may be ordered from:  
 
African Studies Centre 
Email: asc@ascleiden.nl 
Tel: +31 (0)71 527 3490 
Fax: +31 (0)71 527 3344 
 
Check the ASC website [www.ascleiden.nl] under Publications for prices. 
 
 
African Studies Collection 
 
9 Coming back from the bush. Gender, youth and reintegration in Northern Sierra 
Leone 
Janneke van Gog   (2008) 
8 How to win a football match in Cameroon. An anthropological study of Africa’s 
most popular sport 
Arnold Pannenborg   (2008) 
7 ‘Prendre le bic’. Le Combat Spirituel congolais et les transformations sociales 
Julie Ndaya Tshiteku   (2008) 
6 Transnationalism, local development and social security. The functioning of 
support networks in rural Ghana 
Mirjam Kabki   (2007) 
5 Tied to migrants: Transnational influences on the economy of Accra, Ghana 
Lothar Smith   (2007) 
4 “Our way”: Responding to the Dutch aid in the District Rural Development 
Programme of Bukoba, Tanzania 
Adalbertus Kamanzi   (2007) 
3 Transition towards Jatropha biofuels in Tanzania? An analysis with Strategic 
Niche Management 
Janske van Eijck   (2007) 
2 “Ask and you shall be given”: Pentecostalism and the economic crisis in 
Cameroon 
Robert Mbe Akoko   (2007) 
1 World and experiences of AIDS orphans in north central Namibia 
Mienke van der Brug   (2007) 
 
 
Research Reports 
 
85 Microfinance, rural livelihoods, and women’s empowerment in Uganda 
 Alfred Lakwo   (2006) 
84 Trade liberalization and financial compensation. The BLNS states in the wake 
of the EU-South African trade and development agreement 
 Sam van der Staak   (2006) 
83 The rock art of Mwana wa Chentcherere II rock shelter, Malaŵi. A site-specific 
study of girls’ initiation rock art  
 Leslie F. Zubieta   (2006) 
82 Bibliography on Islam in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Paul Schrijver   (2006) 
81 Bridging the urban-rural divide: Multi-spatial livelihoods in Nakuru town, Kenya  
 Samuel Ouma Owuor   (2006) 
80 Bleak prospects: Young men, sexuality and HIV/AIDS in an Ethiopian town  
 Getnet Tadele   (2006) 
79 “The angel of death has descended violently among them.” Concentration 
camps and prisoners-of-war in Namibia, 1904-08 
 Casper Erichsen   (2005) 
78 Sahelian pathways. Climate and society in Central and South Mali  
 Mirjam de Bruijn, Han van Dijk, Mayke Kaag & Kiky van Til (eds)   (2005) 
77 Gacaca: Grassroots justice after genocide. The key to reconciliation in 
Rwanda?  
 Arthur Molenaar   (2005) 
76 The assertion of rights to agro-pastoral land in North Cameroon: A cascade to 
violence?  
 Ruth Noorduyn   (2005) 
75 Urban agriculture in Tanzania: Issues of sustainability  
 Dick Foeken, Michael Sofer & Malongo Mlozi   (2004) 
74 “We’re managing!” Climate change and livelihood vulnerability in Northwest 
Ghana 
 Kees van der Geest   (2004) 
73 Community-based conservation in an entitlement perspective. Wildlife and 
forest conservation in Taita, Kenya  
 James Gichiah Njogu   (2004) 
72 Witchcraft and policing. South Africa Police Service attitudes towards witchcraft 
and witchcraft-related crime in the Northern Province  
 Riekje Pelgrim   (2003) 
71 The solidarity of self-interest. Social and cultural feasibility of rural health 
insurance in Ghana  
 Daniel K. Arhinful   (2003) 
70 Recent advances in coastal ecology. Studies from Kenya  
 Jan Hoorweg & Nyawira Muthiga (eds)   (2003) 
69 Structural adjustment: Source of structural adversity. Socio-economic stress, 
health and child nutritional status in Zimbabwe   
 Leon Bijlmakers   (2003) 
68 Resisting reforms. A resource-based perspective of collective action in the 
distribution of agricultural input and primary health services in the Couffo 
region, Benin  
 Houinsou Dedehouanou   (2003) 
67 Women striving for self-reliance. The diversity of female-headed households in 
Tanzania and the livelihood strategies they employ  
 Anke van Vuuren   (2003) 
66 Démocratisation en Afrique au sud du Sahara: Transitions et virage. Un bilan 
de la littérature (1995-1996)  
 Klaas van Walraven & Céline Thiriot   (2002) 
65 Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa: Transitions and turning points. An 
overview of the literature (1995-1996)  
 Klaas van Walraven & Céline Thiriot   (2002) 
64 Sharing a valley. The changing relations between agriculturalists and 
pastoralists in the Niger Valley of Benin  
 Antje van Driel   (2001) 
63 Pathways to negotiate climate variability. Land use and institutional change in 
the Kaya region, Burkina Faso  
 Mark Breusers   (2001) 
62 “We think of them.” How Ghanaian migrants in Amsterdam assist relatives at 
home  
 Daniel K. Arhinful   (2001) 
61 Pastoralists and markets. Livestock commercialization and food security in 
north-eastern Kenya  
 Abdirizak A. Nunow   (2000) 
60 Rural development and agricultural policy in central western Zambia. The case 
of Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme  
 K. Hailu   (2000) 
59 Secrecy and ambiguity. Home care for people living with HIV/AIDS in Ghana  
 Maud Radstake   (2000) 
58 Urban agriculture in Africa: A bibliographical survey  
 R.A. Obudho & Dick Foeken   (1999) 
57 Changing security. Livelihood in the Mandara Mountains in North Cameroon  
 Annette van Andel   (1998) 
56 Catholic mission, colonial government and indigenous response in Kom 
(Cameroon 
 Jacqueline de Vries   (1998) 
55 Eritreo-Ethiopian studies in society and history: 1960-1995.  
A supplementary bibliography  
 Jan Abbink   (1996) 
54 Commodity auctions in Tropical Africa. A survey of the African tea, tobacco and 
coffee auctions  
 John Houtkamp & Laurens van der Laan   (1993) 
53 Land and labour in Myjikenda agriculture, Kenya, 1850-1985  
 Henk Waaijenberg   (1993) 
52 Democratisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara. Un aperçu de la litterature  
 Rob Buijtenhuijs & Elly Rijnierse   (1993) 
51 Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. An overview of literature  
 Rob Buijtenhuijs & Elly Rijnierse   (1993) 
50 Women in Bamenda. Survival strategies and acces to land  
 Adri van den Berg   (1993) 
49 Pratiques foncières à l’ombre du droit. L’application du droit foncier urbain à 
Ziguinchor, Sénégal  
 Gerti Hesseling   (1992) 
48 Power and privilege in the administration of law. Land law reforms and social 
differentiation in Cameroon  
 Cyprien Fisiy   (1992) 
47 Staatsvorming, rurale ontwikkeling en boeren in Guiné-Bissau  
 H. Schoenmaker   (1991) 
44 Popular Islam in Tunisia  
 Kees Schilder   (1991) 
43 Seasons, food supply and nutrition in Africa  
 Dick W.J. Foeken & Adel P. den Hartog (eds)   (1990) 
42 Socio-economic development of women in Zambia 
 A. Touwen   (1990) 
41 Enduring crisis, refugee problems in Eastern Sudan  
 Henk Tieleman & Tom Kuhlman   (1990) 
40 Marketing policies and economic interests in the cotton sector of Kenya  
 Tjalling Dijkstra   (1990) 
39 The IMF-World Bank's stabilisation and structural adjustment policies and the 
Uganda economy, 1981-1989  
 D.W. Nabudere   (1990) 
38 Economic management in neo-colonial states: A case study of Cameroon  
 N. Jua   (1990) 
34 Aspects of the Apartheid state. A bibliographical survey  
 Ineke van Kessel   (1989/91) 
33 Scenes of change: Visions on developments in Swaziland  
 Henk Tieleman (ed.)   (1988) 
32 State formation, religion and land tenure in Cameroon.  
A bibliographical survey  
 Kees Schilder   (1988) 
30 Irriguer pour subsister  
 Geert Diemer & E. van der Laan   (1987) 
29 Economic management in Cameroon: Policies and performance  
 W.A. Ndongko   (1987) 
28 Leven en werken in een Nyakyusa dorp  
 Nel van Hekken   (1986) 
27 Muslims in Mango  
 Emile van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal   (1986) 
25 West African colonial civil servants in the nineteenth century  
 Kwame Arhin   (1985) 
24 Staatsvorming in Guiné-Bissau  
 J.H. Schoenmakers   (1986) 
23 Producer prices in Tropical Africa  
 Paul Hesp   (1985) 
 
